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p. *22, line 21, word 4. Read pars 
p. *24, line 8, word 2. Read conclusions 
p. *4o, line 21, word 1. For stipulated read stipulates 
p. 12, par. 21, line 1, worcl3. For qrgu!°tU'r read arguitur 
p. 45, par. 83, line 8, word 2. FOr convertibiye--
read convert1b111s ---
p. 55, par. 102, line 7, word 5. l2!, sifficiunt 
~ suffioiunt 
p. 59, par. 110, line 23, word 4. For penna read pennam 
p. 92, par. 185, line 19, word 3. For oonvert!OI!is 
read convertibile 
p. lOo;-P'ar. 226, line 2, word 2. For minor read minori 
p. 112, par. 237, line 7, word 11. ""'F'Or parts --rea'd parte 
p. 113, par. 239, line 13, word 6. Fo.r di cjuncnVa 
read disjunctiva 
p. 122,Par. 254, line 7, w·ord 4. l2!, prolata read prolata.e 
p. 137, text c, line 8, word 1. For solve rea d--sorv1 
p. 138, text e, line 12, word 1. -rQr sign1frcat1o 
read significato -:---
p. 140, under FL, line 2, word 1. For Problemegeschichten 
read Probiemgesch1chten -
p. 14Y;"""'Under .§&, line 6, word 2. For stoppint read stopping 
p. 141, under ~. line 9, word 2. For incunabuls----
rea d 1ncuna bula 
p. 14"2;""""n. 6, line 2, word 3. For work read word 
p. 142, n. 6 line 9, word 1. For talis -read talia 
p. 144, n. i4, line 3, word 4. """'F'Or Me d1aeVar9 read Medieval 
p. 148, n. 66, point 3, line 2, word 5. For Propositio 
read Praedicato -
p. 149, n. 73, 1st full par., line 9, after word 8 
(falsa). Add •••• sexta conclusio: Omnis propositio 
sign1fioansse esse veram et se esse falsam est falsa. 
p. 152, n. 12, line 3, word 5. Read eatenus 
p. 152, n. 12, line 17, word 6. For instantis ~ instantia 
p. 154, n. 35, point 4, line 1, word 2. !!2.!: importnat 
read important 
p. 15"b';'"li. 67, word 5. l2£ descriptiones ~ descriptions 
p. 158, n. 88, line 15, word 6. .E2.£ least read best 
p. 162, n. 45, 3rd par., line 7, word 8. For-40'r ~ 47r 
p. 164, n. 6, line 7, after word 5 ( propter}." ill 
finem. Et s1m111ter formae non sunt, nisi propter 
p. 166, n. 24, word 5. For: aliqualite r re a d aliqualiter 
p. 168, n. 65, line 11, word 4. l2.!. prae dicatum 
~ praedicatur 
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p. 168, n. 66, line 5, word 2. For esse read 1nesse 
p. 169, n. 74, line 7, word 3. For fir reacr-r1t 
p. 171, n. 99, line 4, word 4. Fer and read an 
p. 171, n. 99, 2nd pa r., line 8,-rast wora::--For work 
read word 
p. 172;°Ii. 7, word 3. For quod read intentiones 
p. 175, n. 53, text a, line 14, after word 1 (intentionum). 
Add seu 
p. 18~n. 62, line 3, after the Bekker number {1027bl7-22,). 
Add Junt., v. 8, 
p. isir,-n. 80, word 2. For Tert1a read Tertio 
p. 185, n. 89, word 3. FOr ipse read ipsa 
p. 186, n. 17, the Bekkerliumber. For l024bl6-l025al2 
read 1024bl6-1025al3 
p. 18~. 49, word 3. For arrarante read apparante 
Po 189, n. 67, line 1, t~Bekker number:- For 16af. 
read 16a4f. - · 
p. 19r;-ll. 98, line 1, word 6. For to. read tx. 
p. 193, n. 28, line 1, word 9. FOr 1 est•---z=ead 'est 
p. 194, n. 53, line 4, word 8. For dubiecti---read subiecti 
p. 196, n. 95, line 2, word 2. FOr principle -read principal 
p. 209, n. 44, line 2, word 2. FOr ratio read-orat10 
p. 209, n. 44, line 2, word 5. FO"r monis read omnis 
p. 229, !!•!• var1at10. !g£ 208 read 209 -
p. 229, s.v. molitum. For molitum read volitum 
p. 231, entry 4, line 5:-Word 1. For Merietti ~ Mariett1 
1. 
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A.) The purpose of this study 
The study of self-refer~ntial semantic antinomies 
is an enterprise of considerable interest to modern 
thinkers. The literature on the subject is 1mmense.1 
By and large, recent attempts to resolve the antinomies 
2 have proceeded by appeal either to the theory of types 
or to the distinction between object-language and 
meta-language.3 Yet the problem is scarcely to be 
. 4 
considered settled. 
For this reason, an inquiry into the mediaeval 
discussions of the semantic antinomies seems to be of 
more than merely historical interest. Preeh light may 
perhaps be thrown on the modern versions of the problem 
by examining mediaeval logicians' presentations of it 
and suggested solutions to it. Unfortunately, little 
work has been done in this field, largely because of 
the unavailability of the mediaeval texts. 5 
The purpose of this present study is to contribute 
something toward the amelioration of this state of 
affairs. A hitherto unedited mediaeval treatise on 
semantic antinomies--"insolubilia", 6 as they were· 
-*1-
called--Will be edited and studied, its doctrine 
examined and evaluated, and 1 ts use of and relation 
to other mediaeval writers on the problem investigated, 
insofar as the present state of research makes this 
possible. 
13.) The Nature and Importance of the 
Semantic Antinomies 
Perhaps the most "classical" form of semantic 
antinomy is the so-called Liar paradox, in which a 
sp~aker utters the folloWing sentence only: 'I am 
lying'. The antinomy breaks out as follows: The 
speaker's statement is either true or false. It it 
is true, then it follows that, just as he says, he is 
in fact lying. Accordingly, what he says is not true, 
but rather false. On the other hand, if his statement 
is false, then, contrary to his own assertion, he is 
not lying, but rather uttering a true statement. 
Thus, his statement is true if it is false, and false 
if it is true. Is the speaker a liar or is he not? 
This dilemma constitutes the antinomyo 
such an antinomy is not a mere contradiction. A 
contradiction can be accommodated by simply denying it--
by asserting that it is false. An antinomy, on the 
contrary, gives rise to a contradiction regardl ess 
whether it is true or false. The distinguishing 
feature o! an antinomy is precisely this, that there 
seems to be !!Q.. way of avoiding a contradiction, once 
the antinomical statement is given. 
The paradox can be presented in other forms as 
well. one version which avoids any reference to a 
speaker is simply the folloWing: 'This sentence is 
false'. In fact, a great variety of subtle and often 
amusing variations on this paradoxical theme have been 
developed. 1 
such paradoxes are of very consid£rable importance. 
van Heijenhoort writes, "since the last years of the 
nineteenth century the paradoxes have exerted a profound 
influence on the development of logic. For a while 
their effect on logic and the foundations of mathematics 
seemed devastating. tt8 
The importance of the semantic antinomies lies in 
the fact that they seem to be cases in which a contra-
d1 ction is produced simply by the straightforward 
application of logical rules of 1nference--rules that 
are said to be logically valid precisely because their 
application would never give rise to a contradiction. 
The antinomies strike at the very heart of human 
reasoning. It is the whole enterprise of rationality 
that is at stake. Quine writes, " ••• it is they that 
bring on the crises in thought. An antinomy produces 
a self-contradiction by accepted ways of reasoning. 
It establishes that some tacit and trusted pattern 
of reasoning must be made explicit and henceforward 
be avoided or revised. tt9 Again, "An antinomy, however, 
packs a surprise that can be accommodated by nothing 
less than a repudiation of part of our conceptual 
heritage. nlO 
Al though, in both the Middle Ages and more modern 
times, the problem of the antinomies arose in the 
context of fonnal logio,11 its solution inevitably 
leads one beyond purely formal considerations to the 
investigation of the semantic relation of words to 
reality. Hence the tenn 'semantic antinomies'. This 
fact was first pointed out by F.P. Ramsey.12 .Ramsey 
distinguished two groups of paradoxes. The first 
group "consists of contradictions which, were no pro-
Vision made against them, would occur in a logical or 
mathematical system itself. They involve only logical 
*5 
or mathematical terms such as class and number, and 
show that there must be something wrong with our logic 
or mathematics." 
Paradoxes of the second sort, however, such as the 
Liar paradox and other semantic antinom1es, 
are not purely logical, and cannot be stated in 
logical terms alone; for they all contain some 
reference to thought, language, or symbolism, 
which are not fonnal but empirical terms. So 
they may be due not to faulty logic or mathematics, 
but to faulty ideas concerning thought and 
language. If so, they would not be relevant to 
mathematics or to logic, if by 'logic' we mean a 
symbolic system, though of course they would be 
relevant to logic in the sense of the analysis 
of thought.13 
Accordingly, the mediaeval treatise edited below 
considers, in addition to matters of formal logic, 
questions of semantics and even of psychology--questions 
about the meanings of terms, about the formation of 
mental propositions, and about the relation of language 
to thought. 
lh! Treatise, ~ J:!~ ~ ~ Author 
The treatise seems to have been originally part of 
a larger work dealing with t~e parva log1cal1a, 14 or 
perhaps even with the whole of logic. several references 
in the text indicate that the original work comprised 
more than the treatise on insolub111a. In paragraph 
85, for instance, there is a reference to a description 
of the term 1 sign1ficare'. No such description occurs 
in the treatise. In paragraphs 19 and 41, there are 
references to the descriptions of a univocal term and 
of the term 1 subord1nare', respectively. In both cases 
the description is said to be "alibi declarata". Yet, 
they are not to be found anywhere in the Insolubilia. 
More explicitly, paragraph 104 speaks of "ea quae 
prius d1cuntur in materia supposi tionum 11 • Again, in the 
last paragraph, paragraph 258, the author promises to 
consider certain pseudo-insolubles "non h1 c, sed 
convenienter in obligationibus". Treatises on supposition 
and obligationes were regularly included in the parva 
logicalia, along with treatises on insolubles.15 
The work seems to have been intended especially for 
beginners, £or "juvenes" who presumably had not had much 
experience in the more abstruse aspects of logical 
argumentation. At'the end of paragraph 162, for example, 
the author remarks that, when he is discussing insolubles 
in greater detail later in the treatise, he Will, for the 
sake of the "juvenes", treat of insolubles of the more 
difficult "exclusive" sort somewhat more briet.Ly.16 
The treatise was written sometime after 1335, 
perhaps by a Franciscan, and probably at oxford. The 
terminus post quern for the work is established by the 
author's use of John IDU:mbleton's Summa logicae ~ 
philosophiae naturalis in discussing the first of the 
•7 
four previous opinions considered in the treatise. 
D.Unbleton's work in turn makes use of William Heytesbury's 
Regulae solvendl sophismata, written in 1335.17 The 
present treatise was thus written sometime after th.at 
date. 
No terminus ~ quem can be certainly assigned 
to the treatise, although one might suspect that it was 
written sometime during the second quarter of the century. 
Another treatise on insolubilia in the same codex, that 
. 18 
of Roger Nottingham, is dated 1343 in the manuscript. 
Every 1 dentifiable work in the codex 1 s by an author 
affiliated with Oxford University: Thomas Bradwardine, 
Roger Nottingham, Walter Chatten (?), Adam lfodeham, 
19 Richar~ of Campsall and Richard Killington. Of these, 
Nottingham, Chatten and liodeham were Franciscans. 20 
Furthermore, in paragraph 243, the author of the present 
treatise explains the fallacia consequentls by an example 
which begins: "Frater studiosus communiter est in chore, 
et s1mil1 ter commun1 ter est in studio." Al though all 
this is scarcely incontrovertible evidence, 1t certain-
ly suggests that the author himself was perhaps an 
Oxford Fre.noiscan. 
The Form of the Treatise 
_,_ ----- - -
In brief, the form of the treatise is as follows. 
After a short consideration of the nature of an insoluble, 21 
the author considers four solutions held by previous 
writera.22 Taking up each solution in turn, he first 
states the principles and argumentation on which it is 
based, and then rejects it on the basis of several counter-
arguments. 
After each of these opinions has been considered 
and rejected, the author turns to a positive presentation 
of the principles of his own solution. He states and 
23 
argues for three "divisions" (i.e., dichotomies), five 
suppositions, 24 two descriptions25 and five conclusions. 26 
The last two conclusions concern the question whether a 
part can stand for the whole of which it is a part. This 
question was argued at length in discussing the four 
previous opinions, and the ·author feels that he must 
defend his own conclus1ons on the matter a little more 
fully. Accordingly, there follows a series of objections 
to the author's fourth and fifth conclusions,27 together 
28 
with his replies. 
When the principles of the author's solution have 
thus been established, he proceeds to resolve the problem 
of 1nsolub1lia by applying the principles to individual 
illustrative cases. Simple categorical insolubles are 
discussed and analyzed, first those which are true, 29 then 
those which .are falsa.30 Composite insolubles are then 
31 
considered, first disjunctive insolubles, then conjunctive 
ones,32 exclusive ones,33 and finally exceptive ones.34 
The treatise ends with a promise to consider certain 
pseudo-insolubles in a separate treatise on obligat1onea. 35 
~ SUbject-Matte r £.! ~ Treatise 
For the anonymous author, insolubles are "sophismata 
ex quibus non real1ter, sed apparenter, sequitur utraque 
pars contradiction1s, propter quam apparentiam talia 
soph1smata 1 insolub111a' d1cuntur, id est, de diffic1li 
solub111a. n36 Two points in this description deserve 
attention: first, insolubles are said to be in fact 
solvable--albeit only with difficulty; second, the 
source of this difficulty is said to lie in certain 
inferences that are only apparently valid. 
•10 
Th.at insolubles are really Hde difficili solubiliatt 
is carefUlly pointed out by other writers as well. The 
anonymous author of the ~lubilia contained in 
" B1bl1otheque Nationale, MS lat. 16617, writes, for 
example37: 
Circa tractatum de insolubilibus primo sciendum 
quod hoc nomen 1insolubile 1 dicitur tripl1c1ter: 
uno sc111cet modo, quad nullo· codo potest solvi; 
al1o modo, quod bene potest solvi quantum est de 
se, propt~r ta.men a11quod 1mped1mentum numquam 
solvitur3 ; tertio modo, quad propter su1 difficultatem 
difficile solvitur. Ad s1m1litud1nem pr1mi d1c1tur 
vox 1nv1s1b111s; ad s1m111 tudinem aecundi dici tur 
lapis abscond1tus in terra 1nv1sib111s; ad 
s1m111tud1nem terti1 dicitur sol 1nv1s1b111so 3 Ultimo autem modo 1ntend.1mus nW1c de 1nsolubili. 9 
Again, Albert of saxony's Insolub111a beg1ns4o: "Insolubilia 
dicuntur non quia nullo modo possint solvi, sed quia 
solve re est difficile". Yet again, Ockham wri tes41 : 
"Circa insolubilia est sc1endum quad non ideo dicuntur 
sophismata aliqua 1nsolub111a, quia nullo modo possunt 
solvi, sed quia cum d1ff1cultate solvunturu. And again 
he wri tes42: "Illud argumentum d1c1 tur 1nsolub1le, quia 
de d1ff1c111 solvitur 0 .43 
Nor is the author alone in holding that the difficulty 
in insoluble propositions arises from certain sophistical 
•11 
inferences that are only apparently valid. Ockham 
ma1nta1ns44 : 0 Unde soiendum quad 1nsolub111a sophismata 
aunt, quando, per consequent1as apparentes quae videntur 
regular1 per regulas necessarias, ex propositione aliqua 
contingente infertur sua opposita, quae idea dicuntur 
insolub1lia, quia difficile est tales consequentias 
impe dire n. 45 
For the author, the apparent validity of such 
inferences is based in turn on the apparent supposition 
of certain terms in the insoluble proposition. At least 
one tenn in the proposition must seem to stand for a 
0 complexum "--1.e., a proposi tion--wh1le in real1 ty 1 t 
46 does not. In the author's view, this is a necessary 
condition for an insoluble. For, it Sortes says only 
"De\1s est" and Plato says "Homo est asinus" while some 
. . ' 
third party says "Salus Sortes d1c1 t verum", this last 
proposition is not an insoluble at a11, for the term 
'verum' in it does not merely~ to stand for a 
proposition, but!!!~ stands for one, ~amely, 
Sortes' statement 'Deus est'. 47 such cases the author 
. 48 promises to discuss in his treatise on obl1gat1ones. 
In a word, then, the author thinks of an insoluble 
as a sophism which gives rise to a contradiction, and 
*12 
which is difficult to solve because of certain seemingly 
valid arguments lfhich are really f'allacioua, and which 
are based on the fact that at least one term in the 
sophistical proposition seems to stand for a proposition, 
while in reality it does noto It it not hard to see that 
a solution to the problem of 1nsolubilia is already 
contained in germ in the author's way of describing 
them. 
~ Oonsideration £! Previous Opinions 
A.) The First Previous Opinion, Based 
on John JDUmbleton 
The first of the four opinions considered by the 
author49 is based on John IDUmbleton's Summa ~oeicae 
et philosophise naturalis.SO It solves the problem 
by simply denying that it could ever arise. It denies 
that the 11 casus" of an insoluble is possible. The 
casus of an insoluble is, as it were, the situation 
11by which a proposition is made insoluble~•. 51 Thus, 
according to this opinion, no proposition is insoluble 
in its own right. The author agrees with the first 
opinion on this point.52 For instance, the proposition 
'Sortes dicit falsum', talcen by itself, does not constitute 
an insoluble. It would be an insoluble only under 
certain circumstances which would constitute the 
casus of the insoluble. If, for example, Sortes 
says ttHomo est asinusU, while Plato, referring to 
Sortes' statement, says ttsortes dic1t falsum", there 
is no 1nsoluble--indeed, Plato's statement is a true 
one, and there is no paradox at a11. If, on the 
•13 
other hand, it is Sortes himself who utters the statement 
1Sortes dicit falsum•, and if, further, he utters no 
other proposition, and if there is but one Sortes, and 
if, finally, Sortes 1 utterance means what it means in 
common parlance,53 then--according to the author54 __ 
Sortes• utterance is a genuine insoluble. 
The first opinion denies that such a case could 
ever arise by which a proposition would be made an 
insoluble. This opinion is based principally on two 
Hconclusions". The first conclusion--the third in 
DUmbleton 1 s treatment of the matter--is: 0Nulla 
propos1t1o per intentionem simplicem in an1ma, sed 
per complexum, comprehendi tur 11 .55 The second--the 
fourth 1n Dumbleton's presentation--is the following: 
"cujuslibet propos1tion1s signif1cantis pro complexo 
subjectum vel praed1catum est propos1t1o, et alter1 vel 
utrique proposi t1o 11 in anima "corresporidet". 56 
*14 
Thus, for example, in the propos1 t1on '"Homo est 
asinus" dicitur a Sorte', the subject would itself be a 
proposition, while in the proposition 'Falsum dicitur a 
Sorte', the subject would not itself be a proposition. 
In the latter case, however, the speaker must have some 
proposition in mind, to which he is referring by the 
word 'falsum '. 
on the basis of these principles, the author outlines 
the argumen~ behind the first opinion's denial that the 
caeus of an insoluble is possible. 57 The statement of 
the argument, as it stands in the treatise, is rather 
terse. The follolfing presentation, therefore, 1nsolves 
some degree of extrapolation from the text. 
As a paradigm example, the folloWing casus is 
chosen, namely that the proposition 'Falsum est' be 
the only proposition. This casus is then shown to be 
--
impossible. For the tenn 'falsum' in the proposition 
58 
'Falsum est' in some way stands for a complexum. 
Thus, according to the second conclusion (DUmbleton's 
fourth), either this term itself is a proposition, or 
else some mental proposition must correspond to it. 
But the term 'falsum' is not itself a proposition. 
Therefore, some mental proposition corresponds to it. 
*15 
But this is a second proposition, other than the original 
proposition 'Falsum est'. Thus the casus Which posited 
that 'Falsum est' be the only proposition is impossible, 
since there are at least two propositions involved.59 
60 DUmbleton presents an analogous argument. 
There is some resemblance between this opinion and 
the fourth in Paul of Venice's list of fifteen solut1ons61 : 
"Quarta opinio pon1 t quod null us potest dicere se dicere 
falsum, nee intellegere se intellegere falsum, nee aliqua 
proposi tio po test esse ex qua 1nsolubile posset generari "• 
The resemblance may be only superficial. In pauJ. of 
Venice's description of the opinion, it is the proposition 
that cannot be, not the casus. Paul takes this to mean, 
quite literally, that no one can utter the words 'Ego 
d1co falsum•, 62 which is of course false. This might, 
however, be a distortion of the opinion. At any rate, 
no definite connection between the first opinion in 
the anonymous treatise and the fourth in Paul of Venice's 
list can at present be firmly established. 
The expedient of solving certain insolubles by 
denying that their casus are possible was apparently not 
an unfamiliar one in the !!!!lieu in which the anonymous 
treatise was written. For in Roger Nottingham's 
rnsolubilia, 63 written at oxford probably about the 
64 
same time as the anonymous work edited below, the 
*16 
same technique is used in certain cases. For 1nstance65: 
Similis est hie: Sit quod omn1s dicens 
falsum sit aeger, et solum talis, et omnis dicens 
verum sit sanus, et solum ta11s, et dicat Socrates 
praecisive se esse aegrum, et dicat Plato pra.ecise 
ipsd ~ est s'iiiili'S; pro istis et consimilibus patet 
q o partes casus sunt impossibiles et quod casus 
ponit unam 1mposs1b1lem consequent1am. 
paragraphs 6 to 23 of the anonymous treatise contain 
the author's refutation of the first opinion. He prese;:~ts 
five arguments, all of which are directed, in one way 
or another, against the opinion's fourth conclusion. 
These refutations of the first opinion--as, indeed, of 
the others--w111 not be considered in detail, since they 
con tr1 bu te 11 ttle to an unde rs tan ding of the _ author' s 
own view or of that which he is refuting. 66 
B.) The Second Previous Opinion 
The second of the four opinions considered by the 
author67 grants the casus of insolubles, 6~ and conciudes 
that every insoluble is false. 69 This opinion is based 
primarily on two suppositions and one conclusion. 70 
The suppositions are these: first, that a part can stand 
for the whole of which it is a part; second, that every 
*17 
proposition signifies as of now (!:!! ~), or simply, 
whatever follows from it. 71 The conclusion states that 
every proposition the extreme of which stands for a 
single item signifies or denotes an affinnation or 
negation for that item. Thus, when Sortes says the 
following proposition only: 'Sortes dicit falsum', it 
follows that the proposition signifies both that it is 
true and that it is false. For, since the extreme 'falsum• 
can stand for the whole of which it is part, and since 
the casus posits that there is nothing else for which it 
can stand, therefore it in fact stands for the whole of 
which it is a part, from which it follows that the 
proposition is false. Thus, by the second supposition, 
the proposition signifies that it is false. But if it 
is false, then, since it signifies that it is false., 1 t 
follows that it is not as it signifies. That is, it is 
not false, from which it follows that it is true. Thus, 
again by the second supposition, the proposition signifies 
that it is true. Thus, the proposition signifies both 
that it is true and that it is false. Accordingly, 
since it signifies a contradiction, the proposition 
must be false. 72 
This position is similar to that of Albert of 
sa.xony. The author was not thinking of Albert, however, 
•18 
for the latter's suppositiones and conclusiones do not 
include those listed in the statement of this second 
opinion. 73 
On the basis of this opinion, the author says, 
some have held that insoluble propositions signify ttfirst 
and principally" that they are false, but secondarily, and 
as a consequent, that they are true. In the first way, 
they signify what is the case, in the second way what is 
74 
not the case. 
This derivative form of the second opinion may be 
that of a certain Robert Fland (i.e., of Flanders?), 
whose Insolubilia seems to have been preserved in a 
' single manuscript in the Bibl1otheque publique de la 
ville in Bruges. 75 The 1nc1p1 t is: "Insolubile est 
propositio signans primo et principaliter s1cut est, 
et ex consequent! ali ter quam est. 076 Until the work 
can be examined mo re care .fully, the re is no way to be 
certain that Robert Fland based his reasoning on a 
variation of the second opinion considered in the 
present treatise. Yet, the close correspondence of 
terminology would indicate at least some connection 
between Fland and the position described here bT 
the author. 
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Buridan mentions what is perhaps this same position. 
He says77 : 
Thus, it is otherwise said, nearer the truth, 
that every proposition virtually implies another 
proposition, so that of the subject standin~ for 
it, there is affirmed this predicate 11 true.' I 
say it implies virtually just as an antecedent 
implies that which follows from it. Thus, any 
proposition is not true, if in this consequent 
affirmation, the subject and predicate do not 
stand for the same ••• oFor it does not suffice for 
a proposition to be true that it is as it signifies 
according to formal significations. Rather, it is 
required that it is as is signified by the con-
sequent which was virtually implied • . 
The author first argues against this variation on 
the second opinion,78 and then turns to a consideration 
79 
of the opinion in itself. Others, he says, have 
suf~iciently refuted the second supposition and the 
first conclusion of the opinion, and therefore he will 
consider primarily the first supposition, that a part 
80 ' 
can stand for the whole of which it is a part. The 
opinion rests on this principle "sicut to tali .fundamento", 81 
so that, if this be refuted, the position loses all 
plausibility whatever. 82 
The author approaches the matter as follows: a 
part can stand for its whole neither in a proposition 
in the soul nor in a spoken or written proposition outside 
the soul; therefore, in no proposition at all can a part 
•20 
stand for its whole. 83 He then argues for the first 
part of the antecedent separately, 84 then the second 
part. 85 Finally, he concludes with a brief consideration 
of the opinion's second supposition, that a proposition 
signifies whatever follows from it.86 
C.) The Third Previous Opinion, That 
of William of Ockham 
The third of the opinions considered by the author87 
is that of William of Ockh.am. According to this opinion, 
some insolubles are true and some false. 88 The position 
is based on two principles: ,first, that a part cannot 
stand for the whole of which 1 t is part; second, that, 
when Sortes says, for instance, 'sortes dicit falsum', 
this means that Sortes some false proposition other 
than 'Sortes dicit falsum•. 89 
This, in fact, is exactly what Ockham maintains. 
If, he says, Sortes utters only this: 1 Sortes dicit 
falsum', that proposition is false. It asserts that 
Sortes utters some false proposition other than 'Sortea 
dicit falsum'; but the casus posits that Sortes does B2! 
utter any such other proposition. ContrariWise, if 
Sortes utters only: 'Sortes non dicit verum', that 
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proposition is true, for indeed Sortes does not utter 
any true proposition other than 'Sortes non dicit verum•. 90 
There are two other reasons for affinning that the 
author was certainly thinking· of Ockahm. The first 
is a confusion about just what is the third opinion's 
final verdict on. insolubles. Although he had already 
stated that the third opinion held. that some insolubles 
are true and some false,91 the author nevertheless says 
"Tert1o, 1nc1dental1ter, d1c1t quod propos1t1o dicta a 
Sorte nee est vera nee falsa 11 • 92 Since the oasus 
posits that the only proposition uttered by Sortes is 
the insoluble proposition 'Sortes d1c1t falsum', it must 
be the insoluble itself that is here said to be neither 
true nor falseo 
In replying to this n1ncidental n remark of the third 
opinion, the author observes that it is based solely on 
the following consideration: "s1cut concedendum quod 
Sortes non d1c1t verum neque falsum al1ud ab 1sto 
quod d1c1t, sic concedendum est quod propos1t1o dicta 
a Sorte nee est vera nee falsa. u93 This clearly comes 
94 from the follouing remark of Oakham : ~ ••• quando 
Sortes 1nc1p1t sic loqu1: 'Sortes d1c1t falsum', et 
quaeratur an Sortes d1c1t verum aut falsum, dicendum est 
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quod nee dic1t verum nee falsum. sicut concedendum est 
quo d nee di cit al1ud verum ne c ali ud falsum ab is to. tt 
If this remark is to be taken as the author seems 
to think. it would mean that Ockb.am was not consistent 
with himself. Yet. Ockham's remark means simply that. 
since there .!_!!no other proposition spoken by Sortes. 
no other proposition spoken by Sortes can be true or 
false. When read in its full context, 95 it is clear 
that Ockham does not mean--the author of the present 
-
treatise notw1thstand1ng--that the proposition which 
~spoken by Sortes, 1.e. 'Sortes dicit falsum', is 
neither true nor false. 
The most conclusive reason. however. for affirming 
that the author certainly had Ockham in mind is a 
reference made while arguing against the principle that 
a part cannot stand for the whole of which it is a part. 
He says that such a principle would contradict what the 
author of the third opinion had already said "in materia 
obligationum. ubi dicit quod in ista propositione 'Omnia 
propositio est vera' subjectum significat totam 1llam 
propos1t1onem cujus est p~s".96 In the first chapter 
on obligationea in his SUmma logicae, Ockham in fact 
says just thi s 0 97 
*23 
The author remarks that this opinion assumes Without 
proof that which stands in need of procf in logic most 
of all, namely, that a part cannot stand for the whole 
of ltThich 1t is a part.98 Secondly, he says, although 
this opinion99 is true, it nevertheless is opposed to 
the principles of its own author, and therefore he 
Will argue against the opinion solely "ex principiis 
suis".1 In fact, however, only the arguments in 
paragraphs 48-50, 52, 55 and 60 are formed explicitly 
"ex princip11s suis". 
The arguments against the third opinion proceed as 
follows: first, three arguments are given to prove that 
a part can signify the whole of which it is a part2; 
four arguments are then presented to prove that, if a 
part signifies the whole of which it is a part, then it 
can likewise stand for that same whole. 3 Six arguments 
are set out against the opinion's second pr1nc1ple. 4 
Finally, a single argument is presented against the 
"incidental tt remark mentioned above, 5 but a fuller 
consideration of the matter is put off to the discussion 
of the fourth opinion.6 
It is difficult to know just what to make of the 
author's arguments against the third opinion. In refUt1ng 
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the second opinion, he argued that a part cannot stand 
for the whole o:r which 1 t is a part. This, , indeed, is 
bis own view.7 Yet, here, in discussing the third 
opinion, he argues that a part~ stand for its whole. 
What is one to make of these arguments? 
The author never answers them. In his later 
presentation of arguments against his own fourth and 
fifth concillsions, together with their replies, 8 none 
of the arguments against the third opinion is included. 
The author tells us that the arguments are to be ta.ken 
Mex princ1p1is suis", but, as was just observed, not 
all of them are in fact based on pecu11ar1y ·ockhamist 
principles. Moreover, it is not clear that the author 
means to reject any of Ockham's principles on which the 
arguments might be based0 
Thus, there is an embarrassing residue, as it were, 
in the treatise. Certain arguments have been brought 
forward which conflict openly With the author's 
principles. No attempt has been made to answer them. 
Perhaps the author simply overlooked the arguments, 
forgot, as it were, that they had been raised. In any 
case, they do not obscure the main outlines of the 
author's own position. 
/ 
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D.) The Fourth Previous Opinion 
The fourth and last opinion considered by the 
author9 holds that an insoluble is neither true nor 
10 false. It is based on two definitions, two supposi-
tions and three conclusions. 11 The detinitions are 
these: first, a true sign is a sigi~ signifying 
precisely as things are; second, a false sign is a 
sign signifying as things are not. The two suppositions 
are as follows: first, the truth of that which is 
signified is the cause of the truth of the sign; second, 
the falsity of that which is signified is the cause of 
12 the falsity of the sign. The three conclusions are 
these: first, the truth of a sign presupposes the truth 
of that Which is signified, as a true cause ~rior even 
to the thin~ itself Which is signified; second, the 
falsity of a sign naturally presupposes as its ca.use the 
contradictory and the "prima falsi tas" of that which it 
signifies. The third conclusion states the opinion's 
verdict about insolubles: That which is signified by 
the proposition 'Omne verum est', or any similar 
13 proposition, is neither true nor false. 
This last conclusion is proved as follows14: the 
proposition 10mne verum est' is neither true nor false. 
For, if it were true, then its truth would presuppose 
the truth of that which it signifies, from the first 
conclusion; but the proposition itself is one of the 
things which it signifies; therefore, the truth of the 
proposition would presuppose the truth of the proposition. 
This is impossible, for in no order whatever can a thing 
presuppose itself. Thus, the proposition is not true. 
Similarly, the proposition cannot be false. For 
if it were false, that which it signifies would have first 
to be false, from the second conclusion; but, as above, 
the proposition itself is one of the things which it 
signifies; thus, the proposition would have to be false 
before it could be false. This is clearly impossible. 
Accordingly, the proposition cannot be false. 
Thus, the proposition 'Omne verum est' is neither 
true nor false _ Similar arguments would apply in the 
case of other insoluble propositions, and indeed of any 
proposition which sig: ;_fies itself• 
The author of this opinion is unknown. Perhaps 
it corresponds to the sixth in Paul of Venice's list 
of fifteen solu tions15: 11 Sexta op1n1o poni t quo d 1nsolub1le 
nee est verum nee falsum, sed medium 1nd1fferens ad 
utrumque." This is not certain, for although the fourth 
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opinion holds that insolubles are neither true nor false, 
the author says nothing about 1 ts holding for a "third 
value", an intermediate ground between the two .. 
Although the author of the fourth opinion remains 
unidentified, it is nevertheless known that his position 
was based on two definitions, four suppositions and 
16 twenty-four conclusions 0 His treatise could probably 
be identified on this basis. The schematic presentation 
of the opinion by the author of the present treatise is 
presumably but a distillation of the original. 
In arguing against this opinion, the author proceeds 
as follows: first, several arguments are given directly 
. 17 
against the opinion's third conclusion. These constitute, 
as it were, a defense of the Law of Excluded Middle. 
Second, the author argues that the opinion destroys 
18 itself. Third, he argues against the implicit premiss 
of the opinion, that a part can stand for its whole. 19 
In this respect, the fourth opinion agrees with the 
second. 20 
The author then turns to an individual consideration 
of the opinion's definitions and conclusions. He argues 
against the first definition, that of a true sign, that 
it does not take into account propositions about the 
past or future, or about the possirrle. 21 The second 
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definition, that of a false sign, is not a good one, 
because it is applicable to certain true signs as we11. 22 
The first conclusion is rejected because it does not 
take into account true propositions about the merely 
possible. 23 nor is it consistent with the fact that 
there is an infinitude of merely possible true 
24 propositions. Again, it ignores the case of true 
25 
negative propositions. The second conclusion is 
likewise rejected, because the false is ·not a positive 
real1 ty, nor could a false s1gnif1catum which exists 
26 
only in the mind ground the falsehood of a propos1 tion. 
Finally, the second part of the second conclusion is 
rejected because one of a pair of contradictories does 
not necessarily presuppose the other. 27 
E.) Other Opinions 
1.) Thomas Bradward1ne 
Elsewhere in the treatise, the author refers to 
at least two other previous opinions, al though he does 
not discuss them in full. After stating his fifth 
supposition, for instance, namely that every insoluble 
has its origin from some caaus or supposition which is 
ordered to such an insoluble, 28 the author remarks29 
that it follows from this 
quod male div1d1tur insolubile, quando dicitur 
quod aliquod insolubile oritur ex actu nostro 
et aliquod ex proprietate vocis •••• Nec ratio 
ducta pro illa opinione aliquid cogit, cum 
d1c1tur quod ideo oritur tale insolubile 
'Sortes d1c1 t falsum • ex actu nostro, qu1a, 
s1 illae propos1t1ones essent amotae ab actu 
nostro, non essent insolubiles. 
He also says that, according to this opinion, every 
insoluble is false.30 
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These references are to the Insolubilia of Thomas 
31 Bradwardine, written between 1321and1324. Compare 
the above text with the following passage32: 
D1v1siones autem sunt duae, quarum prima ••• talis 
est: Omne insolubile aut oritur ex actu nostro, 
aut ex proprietate vocis. Actus autem nostri 
sunt duplices, sc111cet, dioere, intellegere, et 
s1m111a. Idec ta11a 1nscilub1lia: • Sortes d1c1 t 
fa.isum', 1 Sortes intellegit falsum• dicuntur or1r1 
ex actu nostro. Et hujus cau~a est quod, s1 illae 
proposit1~nes assent r emotae)) ab actu nostro, 
non sunt) 1nsolub111a7 Sed, posito actu nostro, 
f1un"f'"Tiisolub111a. Vocis autem proprieta.tes sunt 
subic1 e55vocari, esse verum et esse fa.lsum, et s1m11ia. 
Bradwardine argues further that propoi:~i tions signifying 
that they are not true, or that they are false, are in fact 
false. 36 
Again, the author uses Bradwardine extensively in 
discussing his own fourth and fifth conclusions. At 
least five of the arguments which he raises against these 
conclusions are taken from Bradwardine's treatise. 37 
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11.) An anonymous opinic.n 
Still another writer's opinion seems to lie behind 
the author's third conclusion38 : ttQuidquid aliqua 
propositio vel ejus extremum denota.t significare, ipsum 
necesse est quo d actuali ter sie;nificat." This conclusion 
is presumably directed against some who would distinguish 
between what a proposition denotes and What it signifies. 
For, in a later context, he says: "Nee valet fictio 
ponentium quad propositio dicta a Sorte denotat Sortem. 
dicere aliquam a11am, cum, ea quod aliqua propositio 
aliquid denotat, 1psum s1enificat. Et d.1c1t tert1a 
conclusio sic.~39 It is not known whom the author had 
in mind here. 40 
~ Principles £! ~ Author'~ Solution 
A.) Three Divisions 
After stating and arguing against the four 
previous opinions in the first part of his treatise, 
the author sets out the principles of his own solution. 
He first posits three "divisions" (i.e., dichotomies). 
They are, f1rGt41 : Every instance of supposition in 
a proposition is either material or significative. 
"significative" supposition is the same as "personal" or 
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ttf0 rmal" suppos1tion. 42 Moody summarizes the distinction 
between this and material supposition43: 
When a word was used significatively, to stand for 
things such as it was instituted to be a sign of, 
it was said to be used in personal supposition, or 
in !'ormal supposition. 1fhen used au tonym ously, as 
a name for itself or £or the kind of language-sign 
of which it is an instance, it was said to be used 
in material supposition. · 
To support this division, the author appeals to 
what was previously said 11in materia supposi tionum ". 44 
The dichotomy is important. For a third type of 
supposition was commonly accepted by mediaeval logicians, 
namely simple supposition. In the fourteenth century, 
this was taken to mean the supposition of a term for a 
45 
mental sign or concept0 The author excludes this type 
of supposition by his first division. 
The second division is simply an application of the 
Law of Excluded Middle46 : Every simple categorical 
proposition is either true or false. This had already 
. 47 been defended in arguing against the fourth opinion. 
The third and last division is this48 : Every insoluble 
is either categorical or hypothetical. This division 
is but an application of the more general principle, 
commonly held by mediaeval logicians, that every proposition 
• 
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1s either categorical or hypothetical. Ockham makes the 
distinction as follows49: 
••• propositionum alia est categorica, alia 
hypothetica. Propositio categorica est 111a, 
quae habet sub1ectum et praedicatum et copulam 
et non includit plures proposit1ones tales. 
Propositio hypothetica est 111a, quae ex 
pluri bus ca tegoricis est com po si ta • . 
The author seems to use the tenns 'simplex' and 
'categor1ca 1 interch.ange~bly when referring to insolubles, 
as 11keW1se the terms 'composita' and 'hypothetica'. 
For in stating the two descriptions which are principles 
of his solution, he makes a dichotomy between ttinsolubile 
simplex categoricum" and "1nsolubile hypo the ti cum"• 50 
Again, after discussing true and false categorical 
insolubles, the author says, "superest igitur, post 
1nsolubilia s1mpl1c1a, de composi tis aliqu1ci disserere, ••• 051 
Yet, among composite insolubles, the author includes 
exclusive and exceptive propositions. 52 These were not 
usually included among hypothet1cals. Boethius, 53 Abelard,54 
and Peter of Spain,55 for instauce, give three kinds of 
bypotheticals, corresponding roughly to modern disjunctions, 
conjunctions and strict implications. Oakham held for 
f1ve5 6: "copulativam., disjunctivam, condi tionalem, 
causalem et temporalem." paul of Venice mentions no 
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fewer than fo~rteen kinds of hypothet1ca1s that had been 
distinguished by his day.57 
•' In none of these authors are exclusive and exceptive 
propositions inclu~ed among hypothet1cals. Instead, such 
propositions were usually treated in discussions of 
syncategoremata58 or of "exponi ble ~ propo~i t1ons. 59 
Ockham, tor example, considers them to be exponibles, 
and says that, while they are in fact categorical, they 
are equ1 val en t · to hypo the ti cal So 6o 
B.) Five Suppositions 
After the divisions, the author lays down five 
suppositions. The first four deal With truth and 
falsehood in propositions. First, any simple, categorical, 
61 
affinnat1ve assertoric proposition about the present 
is true if it primarily signifies precisely as things 
are. 62 Second, if any such proposition does ~ 
primarily signify precisely as things are, 1t is ~alse. 
This follows from the first supposition and the second 
d1 vision. 63 
Third, if a simple, categorical, ne gative assertoric 
proposition about the present primarily signifies as 
things are, then it is false, and signifies something 
64 
not to be which, as a matter of fact, is. Thus, 
!ourth, if such a proposition primarily signifies as 
things are not, then it is true. 65 
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These four suppositions present a peculiar notion 
of truth and falsehood. A proposition is not necessarily 
true 1f it signifies as things are, or false ff it 
signifies as things are not. That is so only if the 
proposition is affi rmative. For negative propositions, 
at least for those which are simple, categorical, 
assertor1c and about the present, just the opposite 
holds. Contrast this position with the more common 
mediaeval view: "Proposi tio vera est oratio sign1f1cans 
tantum sicut est •••• Propositio falsa est oratio 
significans ali ter que.m est. tt66 Or again: "Proposi t1o 
vera est quae, qua11tercumque significat, 1ta est, et 
cum hoc possibile est eam esse •••• Propos1t1o falsa est 
quae, non qualitercumque significat, ita necesse est 
et potest esse."67 
The author's reasoning seems to be approximately 
as fol~ .owa68 : A simple, etc., affinnative proposition 
signifies a thing (or things) to ~. either absolutely 
or in a certain way (aliqua11ter). If, therefore, it 
signifies the thing to be according as 1 t is in fact, 
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the proposition is true; otherwise, it is false. By 
contrast, a simple, etc., negative proposition signifies 
a thing (or things)~ to be, either absolutely or in 
a certain way. If, therefore, it signifies the thing 
not to be just as it in fact is not, the proposition is 
true; if, on the other hand, it signifies the thing not 
to be as it is, then clearly it is false. ·For instance, 
the proposition 'Grass is not red' is true, because it 
signifies grass not to be (~ ~ ~) as it is not 
(sicut ~ ~ ~). The proposition 'Grass is not 
green' is false, because it signifies grass not to be 
(~ .!!Q!1 !!!!.!) as it is (sicut ~). 
The fifth supposition is that every insoluble takes 
its origin from a casus or supposition which is ordered 
69 to such an insoluble. That is, it is the casus or 
supposition which renders an otherwise harmless proposition 
an insolubla.7° 
O.) Two Descriptions 
After the five suppositions, the author lays down 
two descriptions. First, a simple, categorical insoluble 
is one in which one or both extremes merely ~ to stand 
for or to s1g~1fy71 precisely a complexwn or complexa--1.e., 
propositions.72 Second, a hypothetical insoluble is one 
in which some part merely seems to stand for or to signify 
precisely a complexum.73 Once again, the notion that terms 
in an insoluble proposition seem to stand for something 
for which they do not in fact stand anticipates the 
author's solution.74 
ID.) Five Conclusions 
After positing his divisions, suppositions and 
descriptions, the author argues to five conclusions. 
These are the most important of his principles. The 
first is a twofold conclusion75: Every mental species 
of a spoken or written term naturally and in a precise 
way makes known(~ ostensiva) both itself and its own 
agent cause. 76 Second77: No extreme of a proposition 
outside the soul can signify a thing by imposition, 
except what is naturally and ~ priori signified by an 
extreme of some mental proposition. Third78 : What-
ever a proposition or 1 ts extreme denotes, that it must 
signifYo 79 
The fourth and fifth conclusions are closely 
related. Fourt1180 : No extreme of a proposition in the 
mind can stand for the whole proposition itself. A 
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number of arguments support this conclusion. 81 Finally, 
the fifth and last conclusion, and the last of the 
author's principles82: If in no proposition in the 
mind can a part stand for its whole, then neither can 
a part stand for its whole in any proposition outside 
the mind. 
These divisions, suppositions, descriptions and 
conclusions are "principles" of the author's solution 
only in a certain sense. They set out the author's basic 
position from which follows his solution to insolubles. 
They are not a11, however, explicitly used in the 
argumentation which follows. The first division, for 
instance, is never referred to again, although it is 
hinted at, for example, in paragraph 245. Nor is the 
third division ever explicitly used, although it pro-
vides for the author's treatment of simple insolubles 
first, and then composite ones separately. 
The two descriptions are used only once, and then 
83 
only to rule certain cases out of consideration. The 
third conclusion likewise is used but once, for the sole 
purpose of forestalling a specific objection. 84 The 
third, fourth and fifth suppositions are stated, but 
never· again referred to or used in any fashion. 
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Thus, al t'·ough each of thr principles is useful 
1nsofar as it reveals one aspect of the author's thought, 
his trea"til1ent of insolubles could, strictly speaking, 
have done Without some of them 0 
Furthermore, although the author's five conclusions 
are indeed conclusions of arguments, they are not in 
general conclusions of arguments based on principles 
which the author had previously laid down. Only the 
last conclusion is argued on such a basis. The others 
are argued from quite different principles. They have, 
in fact, no more claim to be singled out as Hconclusions" 
than have certain of the suppositions which are also 
conclusions of arguments. 85 
After arguing for the last two conclusions, the 
author observes that they are more open to debate than 
86 
are the rest. He therefore sets out several arguments 
that might be raised against these conclusions, 87 and 
88 
then replies to them one by one, in order the more 
firmly to establish his point. several of these 
arguments are taken directly from Thomas Bradward1ne's 
Insolub111a~ 89 
It is clearly of the greatest concern to the author 
to establish that a part cannot stand for 1 ts whole. 
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More than any other feature of his position, this 
point he argues again and again. He devotes several 
arguments to it in arguing against the second opinion. 90 
He argues it again in discussing the fourth opinion. He 
proves the point with yet a third set of arguments in 
presenting his fourth and fifth conclusions. Not content 
With this, he now takes up the issue once again, in a 
lengthy consideration and reply to a series ·of objections. 
It is only after this overwhelming mass of argumentation 
th.at the author considers the matter safely established. 
Only with the 1ast two conclusions thus firmly substantiated 
does he proceed to the resolution of the problem of 
insolubles. 
Application of ~ Principles 12, 
Individual Cases 
The author now turns to a consideration of individual 
cases, solving them by an application of the principles 
just establ1shed.9l At this point, his style changes 
abruptly. Whereas hitherto he has maintained a style 
that might be described as "expository", he now adopts 
a more dialectical approach, as though he were engaged 
1n actual dispute with a particular opponent. The 
paragraphs are frequently much shorter, in some oases 
consisting solely of an assent to or dissent from an 
argument just stated.92 The author maintains this 
style throughout the section on true simple insolubles.93 
He takes up his former style again with false simple 
insolubles:. and maintains it to the end of the treatise. 
The dialectic of the discussion of true simple 
insolubles proceeds in seven stages, 94 the argument 
beginning anew with each stage. The main outlines of 
the author's solution gradually emerge from this 
dialectic, and are filled in as the discussion proceeds 
to false simple insolubles and composite insolubles.95 
His position is th1s96: 
In any insoluble proposition, there is at least one 
term which appears to stand for a proposition. 97 such 
a term cannot, of course, stand for the whole insoluble 
proposition of which 1 t is a part,. for this would violate 
the fourth and fifth conclusions.98 Nor can such a term 
stand for any other proposition, because the casus 
stipulated that there J2.! no other appropriate99 propos1t1on.1 
The casus eliminates the only possibility that such a 
term ·has that it stand for a proposition. Thus, it is 
ultimately the casus that is responsible for making the 
2 proposition an insoluble. 
Since the term which seems to stand for a proposition 
cannot in faot so stand, it must instead stand for whatever 
3 it stood for before it was given any imposition. The casus 
. 4 
implicitly excludes any imposition for the tenn. 
Thus, in the insoluble proposition, the term stands 
for whatever it stands for E.z nature. That is, it represents 
only itself to the 1ntellect.5 In other words, it stands 
. 6 
materially. 
The ultimate solution to insolubles, therefore, is 
the observation that the terms in the insoluble which 
~to stand s1 gn1ficat1vely, in personal supposition 
for a proposition, in fact stand materially, because the 
casus implicitly demands this. 
With this basis, it is easy to evaluate any given 
insoluble. The classical instance 1 Sortes d1c1t falsum'--
where there is but a single Sortes, who utters this 
proposition and no other7--1s easily seen to be true. 
For the term 'falsum' in that proposition does not, 
contrary to appearances, stand for any proposition, 
neither for itself (by the fourth and fifth conclusions) 
nor for any othe~ (by the casus). 8 It stands solely for 
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the term itself. 9 Thus, the proposition 'Sortes dicit 
falsum' means simply 0 sortes d1ci t: 'falsum 1 "--i.e., 
that Sortes utters the ~ 'falsum•.10 Thus, the 
insoluble is clearly true, for, since Sortes utters 
the whole proposition 'Sortes dicit falsum', he must 
utter the term 'falsum', which is its part.11 
It follows that the proposition 'Sortes dicit 
falsum', when uttered by Sortes under the above conditions, 
is not convertible with the equifonn proposition 'Sortes 
dicit falsum' uttered by Plato. The latter is false, 
because Sortes utters one and only one proposition, and 
that proposition is true. The two propositions are not 
convertible, because the tenn 'f'alsum ' · in Plato's. 
proposition stands for Sortes' proposition, but no term 
in Sortes' proposition stands for that proposition or 
for any other. The terms in the two propositions do not 
stand for the same things. Thus are refuted objections 
based on the seeming converti bill ty of an inso.luble 
12 proposition and an equiform, but not insoluble, one. 
Similar to the insoluble 'Sortes dicit falsum' are 
the following insolubles: 'Sortes sor1b1t falsum' 'Sortes 
audit falsum' 'Sortes 1ntelleg1t falsum' 'Proposit1o est' 
'Verum est• 'Falaum est', etc., 13 each with its appropriate 
casus . All of these are true, and each is solved as was 
14 
• sortes dici t falsurn' • 
While some insolubles are true, there are nevertheless 
some which are false. In this respect, the author's 
solution agrees with the third opinion, that of William 
of Ockham.15 
Consider, for instance, the following proposition: 
'Hoc est falsum'. Let this proposition be the only 
proposition, and let it be uttered by Sortes. Then 1t 
is clear that neither the 'hoc' nor the 'falsum' in that 
proposition stands for the whole proposition of which 
it is part. Nor do they stand for any other proposition, 
for there is no other proposition, by the casus. Thus, 
each stands in material supposition, and the proposition 
'Hoc est falsurn' means simply "'Hoc' est 'falsum'"--1.e., 
that the word 'hoc' is identical with the word 'falsum'. 
This is obviously false. 16 
Composite, or hypothetical, insolubles are to be 
treated in the same way. If the only d1sJ.unct1ve 
propos1 tion which I utter is the follow1ng: 'Deus non est 
vel disjunctiva prolata a me est falsa', then it is false. 
For the tezms 'disjunctiva' and 'falsa' must in that 
case stand in material supposition, and the second part 
of the disjunction means "Iste terminus 'disjunctiva' 
est 'falsa•M,17 which is clearly false. But, 1f the 
second part of the disjunction is false, so too is the 
first part, and thus the disjunction as a whole is 
false. 
Similarly, 1f a unique Sortes utters only the 
following conjunct1 ve propos1 tion: 'Tu es homo et 
al1qua conjunctiva prolata a Sorte est falsa', the 
proposition is false, for analogous reasons. 18 
The exclusive insoluble 'Tantum Sortes dicit 
falsum' is true, if So rte a says this and only this.19 
For it means "solus Sortes d1cit talem vocem 'falsum'", 
which is true. 20 Likewise, the exceptive proposition 
'Nullus praeter Sortem d.icit verun' is true under 
21 
analogous circumstances. 
After the very brief consideration of exceptive 
insolubles, the author brings his treatise to a quick 
conclusion with a promise to consider certain pseudo-
22 insolubles in a further treatise on obligationes. 
He has examined in great detail certain previous 
solutions . to insolubles, he has argued at considerable 
length that a part cannot stand for its whole, he has 
presented the principles of his own position, and he has, 
finally, applied these principles to several illustrative 
cases. 
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An E\raluation of the Author's Work 
-- ·--- --
A.) Philosophical 
How ought one to evaluate the anonymous author's 
work? Of what historical or philosophical value is it? 
It is only fair to say that, philosophically, the work is 
rather mediocre. The author gives every indication that 
he was not a mature or first-rate logician. First, his 
handling of the tenninology of mediaeval logic is rather 
unorthodox. As has been observed, he tends, for instance, 
to use the terms 1 s1gnif1care' and 'supponere' as nearly 
interchangeable. 23 Again, his apparent inclusion of 
exclusive and exceptive propositions among hypotheticals 
24 is certainly unusual, if not unique. 
More important, however, is his logical. techniqueo 
While some of his argumentation is extremely clever and 
insightful, other passages are surprisingly bad.-even 
puerile. The two forms of the tt1nductive 11 argument for 
the Law of Excluded Middle, for example, are totally 
inadequate. 25 Again, the fact that the author has 
left several arguments unanswered from his discussion 
26 of the third opinion points to a certain carelessness 
of technique. 
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Furthermore, although the general thrust of the 
author's solution is.clear en?ugh, he does not seem to 
na.ve thought through very carefully the individual cases 
which he uses as exampleso For instance, in the case of 
the insoluble proposition 'Sortes dicit falsum', is it 
' sufficient to posit only that Sortes utter this and 
no other proposition? The author's solution is predicated 
on the notion that the casus excludes the possibility 
that there be any other proposition for which the term 
1falsum' in the insoluble can stand. But the casus, as 
the author states it, 27 is not sufficient to exclude 
thiso On the contrary, it excludes only the possibility 
that there be any other proposition uttered _2l Sortes 
for which the term 'falsum' could stand. As it is, 
the casus does not exclude the possibility that, for 
instance, Plato utter the false proposition 'Homo est 
as1nus•. In such a circumstance, the term 'falsum' in 
Sortes' utterance would indeed have a proposition for 
which it could stand, namely Plato's utter,anoe. And, 
since Sortes does !!.21 in fact utter that false proposition, 
'Homo est aainus', the insoluble would be fal se , and no 
paradox would arise. Yet, the casus , as the author 
has it, would be fUlfilled. 
Again, in the case ot the insoluble proposition 
'Hoc est falsum', the author posits as its casus only 
that Sortes utter that proposition and th.at only, that 
it be the only proposition, and that it be symbolized by 
• ' 28 a • 
-
Then, he argues, "si aliquod extremum in a aliquid 
-
, ex impositione significaret, isto casu posito, illud asset 
proposi tio. u29 Since this is impossible, the terms must 
b.ave no imposition, but stand in material supposition. 
Yet, there seems to be no reason for the assumption that 
the term 1boc' must either stand materially or else stand 
for a ~roposit1on. 
In short, the author appears not to have fully 
thought through his examples. 
On the other band, the author's position says too 
much. He argues30 that, because ·there ~ no · other 
proposition than that of which the term 'talsum' is 
a part, therefore the term cannot stand for any other 
such proposition. This is but an application of the 
more general principle that the author attributes to 
William of Ockham, namely that a term standing with 
respect to a verb in the present tense ntantum suppon1 t 
pro his quae sunt0 o 31 The author uses this principle 
as the very basis for his solution to insolubilia. Yet, 
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this same principle, when applied Without restriction 
to other propositions, leads to most undes~rable results. 
Consider, for example, the following propositions: 
'Ant1chr1stus est' '.Dies c~astina est' 'Adam est•. 32 Dl 
each of the three oases, the verb is in the present tense. 
- Yet there is nothing now existing for which the subject 
te:nn can stand. For Antichrist and tomorrow are still 
to come, and Adam is dead. 
Thus, arguing as does the author in the case of 
insolubles, each of the subject terms must stand in 
material supposition. But then each of the propositions 
is true, for, by virtue of the fact that the whole 
proposition exists, its subject term exista. 33 The 
propositions, then, simply assert the existence of their 
subject terms. 
Indeed, applying the author's argumentation with 
full rigor, it would follow that .!!.2. proposition of the 
fonn '!est' would be false. Every such proposition 
would be true. For either the subject term ·~· stands 
in personal supposition, in which case it stands for 
something which exists, which is what the proposition 
asse~ts, or else the subject term '!' stands in material 
supposition, in which case the proposition asserts simply 
that its subject term exists. In either case, the 
proposition is true. 
It would follow, on this account, that the denial 
of an1 proposition of the foxm ·~est' would be false. 
In short, folloWing the author's argumentation to its 
/ultimate conclusion, it would be impossible truly to 
deny the existence of anything whatever. 
This, of course, is going further than the author 
himself would wish to goo Indeed, he explicitly asserts 
that the proposition 'Ant1ohr1stus est' is false. 34 
Thia only means, however, that the author had not 
worked out all the implications of his own pos1 tion. 
B.) Historical 
H1stor1oally, the anonymous treatise is of somewhat 
greater value. It does not seem to h.a.ve been highly 
influential. The author's position does not, for 
instance, appear among the fifteen solutions catalogued 
by paui of Venice at the end of the fifteenth centur1. 35 
For this very reason, however, the treatise is of interest, 
in that it makes known 1et a sixteenth solution • 
. Again, if one turns to paul of Venice's chapter on 
ampliat1on, 36 one finds him saying37: 
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Dicto de suppos1t1on1bus in general!, rest.at 
nunc de e1sdem specialius pertractare, et hoc 
quantum pert1net ad divers1tatem suppos1t1onis 
quae fit respectu diversorum temporum. Ideo, 
antequam ad alia procedam, pono 1stam conclus1onem, 
quod terminus communis vel discretus supponens per 
se respectu verb1. de praesent1 sol um supponi t pro 
his quae sunt, vel pro 1110 quod est. 
This is precisely the principle on which the anonymous 
author implicitly bases his solution to insolubles. Yet, 
while the author uses the principle Without fanfare, and 
apparently unaware of its difficulties, Paul of Venice 
devotes almost ~wo full folios to arguing the point and 
to meetins objections against it, making use of just such 
examples as 'AntichJ-.•istus est•. 38 The present treatise 
is a Witness to the state of Paul's question in the 
second quarter of the fourteenth ~entury. 39 
There are other points of historical interest in 
the treatise. The author's use of Ockham, Bradwardine 
and Dumbleton reveals something of the milieu in which 
he was workingo These were presumably authors who were 
being discussed in his circle. Perhaps as important, 
however, is the author's silence about the positions of 
4o 41 Heyteabury and Swyneshed, both of which were circulating 
42 by the time of the anonymous treatise, and both of which 
43 
came to be well-known solutions to the problem of insolubles. 
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Again, the Insolubilia of Robert Fland is perhaps 
cited almost verbatim in the anonymous treatise. 44 If 
this is so, it would suggest that Fland, almost totally 
unknown to present-day scholarship, was to some degree 
]Cnown and used at oxford in the second quarter of the 
fourteenth century. 
l!'Urthermore, the author's great concern to establish 
firmly that a part cannot stand for its whole suggests 
' 
that this issue was a heated one in the intellectual 
atmosphere in which the treatise was writteno 
Thus, the present treatise provides a glimpse of a 
certain stage in the develoIJilent of the mediaeval con-
sideration o! the problem of self-referential semantic 
antinomies. Some idea of the state of the question in 
the author's day can be gathered from his text. In 
addition, the treatise presents a solut1on--albeit 
not an altogether satisfactory one--that is quite 
different both from the solutions usually proposed today 




The treatise has been preserved in a single known 
manuscript: British Museum, Harley 3243, ff. 47ral-
56rb5. The description of the codex in the catalogue 
to the Har1e1an collection reads45 : 
Rogeri Notingha.m, Adami Wodha.m, & Ricardi 
camassale, Quaestiones variae philosophioa.e 
& theologicae. Ad fol. 56 scriptum est 
1Expliciunt insolubilia'. 
In add.1 tion to uorks ascribed in the manuscript to these 
three authors, the codex includes several other items, 
some of which have been identified. Professor E.A. 
Synan has published a brief description of the manuscript, 
together with a detailed account of its contents. 46 
The codex clearly l~ '.s produced in a fourteenth-
century Oxford milieu. Each of the five hands appearing 
in the manuscript is fourteenth-century and English. 
Moreover, every author that has been identified is. 
connected with the fourteenth-century University of 
Oxford. 47 
The Insolubilia is the fourth item in the manuscript. 
It is written in a clear hand that appears nowhere else 
in the codex. The writing 1s in two columns, fifty-one 
to fifty-six lines to the column. The treatise ends on 
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f. 56rb5. The remainder of f. 56rb and all of f. 56v 
are blank. 
Throughout the treat1se--as indeed elsewhere in the 
manuscr1pt--blank spaces have been left for the capitals 
at the beginning of important divisions of the text. 
These capitals were never supplied. Normally in the 
treatise, such a blank space results in two indented 
lines of text. At the beginning, however, three lines 
are indented, perhaps indicating that a larger capital 
was intended for the 1nc1p1t. 
The scribe has usually written rather carefully. 
~here are occasional omissions and repetitions, but 
these seldom put the sense in doubt. In a few places, 
the text is badly muddled. The marginalia are mostly 
to indicate divisions of the text and art1cuiat1ons of 
the argument. Only a few are corrections, the most 
significant being on f. 50rb (paragraph 85), where a 
passage of thirty-four words is inserted in the margin. 
In a great many cases, the scribe seems to have 
corrected his own work as he was writing. A glance at 
the notes to almost any paragraph of the text will 
reveal false starts, omissions, misplaced words or 
phrases, or bad abbreviations, etc., which seem to have 
• I 
been corrected at the time of writing. The errors have 
been crossed out (expunotuat1on is not frequently used), 
.. 
and the correct text writ~en immediately after it, on 
the line of lfri t1ng--not inserted between the lines or 
-
in the margin, as if by a later correotor. 




The orthography of this edition has been made to 
conform to Lewis and Short, ! Latin Dictionary. In a 
few cases, our1ous manuscript spellings, mostly of proper 
names, are mentioned in the notes. cases have not been 
noted in which the soribe has omitted a horizontal 
stroke or other sign of abbreviation, or where · he has 
added an extraneous one, except where this raises some 
doubt about the correct reading. The abbreviations 
1So2 1 1 So4', etc., have been expanded to 'Sortes', rather 
than to 'Socrates•.48 
In the interest of clarity, words in material 
supposition are enclosed in single quotation marks 
(double quotation marks for material supposition Within 
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material supposition). This practise conforms to the 
modern convention for expressions which are mentioned 
but not used. There ls, no corresponding 1nd1cat1on in 
the manuscript, except that the expression 'hoc nomen' 
or 'haec propositlo', or a similar one, often appears 
before the word or words 1n question. 
References are given according to the "List of 
Abbreviations of lforks Frequently 01tedu. 49 All other 
references are given in full 1n the notes. 
~he division into paragraphs is mine. 

~Ino1p1unt Insolub111aj 
1.) 2<.n>e3 1.nsolub111bus tractaturus eorum causam 
duX1 .finalem pr1m1 tus 1ntuendam, ut ju:x:ta naturam et 
d1spos1tionem finis ordinentur ea quae sunt a~ finem, 
cum finis, seoundum Aristotelem, 2° Physicorum., textu 
comment1 29, 4 !JJ?.5 causa propter quam oausata omh1a ab 
ali1s caus1s concausantur, et et1am ad qua.m omnes a11ae 
causae ord1nantur, 2° Physicorum, commento 31. 6 Finis 
autem hu~us sc1ent1ae est sc1re solvere sophismata ex 
quibus non rea11ter, sed apparenter, sequitur utraque 
pars contrad1ot1onis,7 propter quam apparen~iam talia 
soph1smata "1nsolub111a" dicuntur, id est, de diffic111 
solub111a. 
2.) Propter 1g1tur huno f1nem, pr1mo recitabo 
opinionesc non omnes, sed quattuor tan tum, quarum quaelibet 
a plur1bus approbctur. Secundo, 1mprobat1s 1ll1s 
op1n1on1bus, ponam pos1t1onem a11am. Et tertio, 




3.) 8 Quattuor en1m sunt opiniones extremales magis 
ab 1nv1oem discrepantes, quarum prima ponit quod casus 
quo pr0pos1 tio redd1 tur 1nsolub111s est 1mposs1b111s, et 
1deo nullo mo do adm1 ttendus. Secunda contrad1c1 t pr1mae 
et conced.1 t ca.sum . Poni t quasi u1 ter1us pro fundsmento 
quod quaclibet propos1t1o 1nsolubills s1gn1f1cat so esse 
veram.9 et se esse falsam. CU1 contrad1c1t tert1a opinio 
ponens quod nulla propos1t1o 1nsolub111s s1gn1f1cat se 
ease veram vel falsam. D1c1 t en1m, prorosi to10 quod Sortea 
1nc1p1at sic loqu1: HSortes dicit falsum 0, illa non· 
s1gn1f1cat Sortem dio~re falsam11 illam, ~ed aliam ab 
111a. OUjus contradictum ponit quarta op1n1o, cujus 
fundamentum est quod quaelibet propos1t1o 1nsolubi11s 
antecedenterl2 s1gn1f1cat se esse veram et falsam . 13 
4.) 14 Prima opinio casum 1nsolub111um s1mpl1c1ter 
negat, 15 et 1deo non habet ad 1nsolub111a respondere. 
16secunda omne 1nsolub1le d1c1t esse falsum . 17sed 
tert1a aliquod 1nsolub1le conced1t esse verum et a11quod 
talsum . 18Quarta autem op1n1o ponit pro19 regula quad 
nullum 1nsolub1le est verum vel falsum. 
5.) Prima autem opinio, quae pon1t quod qu111bet 
casus 1nsolub111um est 1mposs1b111s, et 1deo nullo modo 
.s 
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admittendus, prinoipaliter stot in duabus conclusionibus, 
quarum pr1ma est talis, et est tertia in ord1ne 20 : "Nulls 
propos1t1o per 1ntent1onem s1mpl1cem in anima, sed per 
complexum, oomprehend1 tur. u Secunda est talis, quae est 
quarta in ord1ne21 : "cujuslibet propos1t1on1s s1gn1f1cant1s 
pro complexo eubjeotum vel praed1oatum est propositio, et 
al teri vel utrique22 <propoei tig') in anima correspondet. tt23 
Ex qu1bus negatur talis casus, quad sit unioa propos1tio 
quae sit haec: 'Fal.sum est', quia, cum haec propos1t1o 
'Falsum est' sit talis cujus extremum significat 
al1qual1ter24 pro complexo, subjectum vel praedicatum 
-
1111us propositionis est propos1t1o, per tertiam ad 
quartam conclus1onem25; et 1psamet est a11a propositio; 
1gitur, ad m1nu~ aunt 1b1 duae propositiones. 26 
6.) 27contra istam op1n1onem arguendum multipliciter. 
Primo sic: Sit! aliqua propositio vera cont1ngenter, 
ut talis: 'Homo est albus'. Et sit b ista: 'Hoc est 
-
falsum', denotando per subjectum ~28 !• TUno quaero 
utrum a sit suppositum 1111us termini 'falsum' vel aliud 
-
complexum ab!• Non! probo: Nihil est suppositum 
illius termini 'fa.lsum', n1s1 propter s1gn1f1cat1onem 
fals~; ! non habet s1gn1f1cationem falsam; igitur~ ! 
non est suppo .s1 tum 1111us termini ':f'alsum • • Consequentia 
4 
patet, et major est sua, arguendo contra tertiam opinionem, 29 
ub1 assumit, pos1to quod sit unica propositio tal1s: 
•ra1sum (est)•, quae sit false., quae vocetur30 "!0 , 
quod ! non est suppos1tum 1111us termini 'fals~•~ 31 
nis1 propter s1gn1f1cationem falsam. Igitur, secundum 
eum, prius natural1ter oportet proposit1onem esse falsam., 
qua(Jl\) s1 t suppos1 tum 1llius termini •:ra1sum', quod est 
major probanda. Et minor 1111us argument! paret casum. 
Igitur, secundum eum, .! non est suppositum 1111us termini 
1 falsum'. 
7.) Conf1rmatur per eum: Prius naturaliter d.1spon1tur 
suppositum termini val 1ntent1on1s, ut. s1gn1ficetur per .ea, 
quam terminur.: vel 1ntent1o 1llud32 s1gn1f1cat, ut prius 
natural! ter est Sortes albus, (47rb) quam so.rtes s1gn1f1catur 
per istum terminum 'album'. Sic prius natural! ter 
significat propos1tio a11ter quam est, quam sit suppos1tum 
1111us termini 1falsum'. Haec en1m est sua suppos1t1o, 
arguendo contra quartam opin1onem33 ; 1g1tur, illam negare 
34 
non potest. Ex qua sequitur syllogist1oe.quod a non 
-
est suppositum 1111us termini 'falsum', cum.! sit 
propos1t1o vera. 
8.) Sit igitur, secundum ejus quartam conclusionem, 35 
~ proposit1o quae est suppositum 1111us termini 'falsum' in 
5 
b36 propositione. Et arguo sic: Quaelibet propositio est 
-imposs1b1lis in qua affirmatur unum oontrad1ctorum, vel 
00nvert1b1le cum uno contradictorum, de rel1quo; in 
propos1t1one correspondente ~ propos1tion1 in anima est 
talis affirmatio; 1g1tur, propos1t1o correspondens b 
-
propositioni in anima est impossibilis. Minor illius 
argumenti patet. Nam in illa proposit1one correspondente 
b proposit1on1 in anima affirmatur propositio non 
-
s1gnificans sicut est de proposit1one37 significante 
. 8 
s1cut est, quia affirmatur ~3 propositio falsa de! 
propos1t1ono vera. Ex quo ulterius poter1t !ormaliter 
concludi quad propos1t1on1 verae extra animam propositio 
1mposs1b111s in an1ma correspondet, ut, posito quod maneat 
tam a quam ~. quousque ! sit falsa, tune~ erit vera, et 
- ' 
propositio in anima correspondens erit imposs1b111s. 39 
9.) 4o Item, secundo, sit! ista propos1t1o: '"Rex 
sedet" est proposi tio vera', et ~ 1sta: '"Rex sedet" 
est propos1t1o falsa'. Et argue sic: ! et~ praecise 
eidem proposition! in anima subordinantur; 1g1tur, ! et 
~ et convertuntur. Consequent1a patet. Et anteoedens 
probo ex pr1nc1p11a 1st1us opinantis. Nam praed1cato 
in! correspondet propoaitio nulla a11a, n1s1 1sta 'Rex 
6 
sedet', et eadem correspondet praed1cato in~; et subjecta 
aunt eadem et oopulae; 1g1tur, in an1ma aut est tantum una 
propos1t1o aut duae propositiones convertibiles, quod41 
aeque valet pro argumento. 42 
10.) Quod autem nulla a11a propos1t1o in an1ma, quam 
1sta 'Rex sedet', oorrespondet praedicato 1111us proposit1on1s 
in vooe '"Rex sedet" est propos1t1o vera• arguitur sic: 
Quaecumque a11a sibi oorrespondens in an1ma, illa esset 
1mpossib111s43; constat et 1lla !.sibi subordinata est 
propositio possibilis; 1g1tur, propos1t1o possibilis 
proposit1on1 1mpossibil1 esset subord1nata. 44mc quo 
u1ter1us sequitur haec conolusio, quod duae propos1t1ones 
assent convert1b1les quarum una est poss1b111s et a11a 
1mposs1b111s, quod non ca.pit 1ntellectus. Conclus1o 
sequitur per hoc medium generaliter verum, quod propositio 
in an1ma et propos1t1o extra an1mam sibi praeo1se subordinata 
convertuntur. 45 
11.) Eodem modo arguitur quod nulla a11a propos1t1o 
correspondet praed1cato 1111us proposition1s '"Rex sedet" 
est propos1tio falsa', qu1n ista 'Rex eedet'. QuiD, si 
. 46 
a11a, sit illa ~· Tune sic: ~ aut stat pro se 1psa 
aut pro alia. S1 pro se ipsa, et affirmatur de ista 'Rex 
1 
sedet'; 1g1 tur, quod non est ista 'Rex sedet', neo47 
potest esse ista 'Rex sedet', aff1rmatur de ista 'Rex 
sedet'. Si s1gn1f1cat istam 'Rex sedet', 1g1tur, cum 
in~ sit actus oomponendi vel d1vidend1, actus ille, cum 
al11s part1bua ejusdem ~. aff1rmn,turt;Et} 48 de ista 'Rex 
sedet', quod verum esse non poteat. 49 
12.) 50Item, tert1o, s1 t ! 1sta propo.s1 tio 'Hoc est 
falsm', denotando per subjectum 1stam 'Tu es homo'. Tune 
aut praed1cato in! correspondet 1sta propos1t1o 'Tu es 
(homo)' aut a11a. Si ista, igitur istae duae propositiones 
convertentur in anima: '"Tu51 es homo" est "Tu52 es homo"' 
e'1; 'Hoc est falsum', denotando per subjectum 1stam 
propos1t1onem 'Tu ea homo'; sed haec est vera 1n anima: 
'"Tu es homo" est53 "Tu54 es homo"'; igitur, sua convertibilis 
est vera in an1ma, quae est 1sta 'Hoc est falsum'; et! 
est proposit1o falsa, ut patet; 1g1tur, propos1t1on1 
falsae propos1t1o vera correspondet. Praed1cato in a 
-
et solum talis in anima correspondet. 55 
13.) 56s1 1g1tur d1oatur quod non solum 1lla propositio 
quae correspondet subjecto in !• sed illa, cum a~iquo a110, 
correspondet praedioato in a, sit igitur illud quod non 
-
est illa propos1t1o, nee para 1111us propos1tion1s, quod 
8 
cum 111a propos1t1one correspondet praed1cato in!• ~· 
Et quaero de E,, utrum ]! s1 t 1ntent1o simplex vel compos1 ta 
(47vr::.) vel al1qu1s modus signif1oand1 sequens 1ntent1onem 
simplicem vel compos1 tam. Si ]! s1 t 1ntent1o simplex, et 
per illam comprehenditur complexum; 1g1tur, per 1ntent1onem 
s1mpl1cem complexum 1ntend1tur, quod est contra primam 
conclusionem. 
14.) Item, s1 .2 sit 1n.tent1o simplex, 1g1 tur s1 bi 
aliquid correspondet pro suppos1too Quaero 1g1tur aut 
ipsum subjectum est s1b157 suppos1tum aut aliud. Si 
subjectum, et subjectum est propos1t1o, per quartam58 
conclusionem; 1gitur, ut prius, per 1ntentionem simplicem 
propos1t1o comprehend1tur. 
15.) Si autem aliquid aliud sit suppositum illius 
1ntent1on1s s1mplic1s, argu1tur sic: Sit illud suppos1tum 
~· Tune sic: ~' cum ista propositione quae est subjectum, 
. 
affirmatur de proposit1one quae est subjectum; sic non 
est, nee esse potest; igitur, quod non eat, nee esse 
poteat, subjectum aff1rmatur de subjectoo-
• 16.) Item, sequitur si ]! sit 1ntent1o composita 
d1stincta ab 1sta propos1t1one in anima 'Tu es homo'. 
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17.) Item, si ~sit modus e1gn1ficand1 qui uJ.ter1ua 
correspondet praedica.to in! propos1t1one, quam propos1t1o 
correspondens subjecto, argu1tur sic: Ille modus 
s1gn1f1oand1 non sequitur 1ntent1onem s1mpl1cem vel 
oompositam d1st1nctam ab 1st.a propos1t1one in an1ma 'TU 
es homo', et a part1bus 1111us propos1t1on1s, quia ubi 
non est 1ntent1o distinota non est modus sequens talem 
1ntent1onem; 1g1tur, s1 ~sit modus s1gn1f1cand1, ~ 
sequ1 tur 1stam propos1 tionem in anima. Quo dato, 
arguitur sic: Quam natura11ter ista propos1t1o in 
anima s1gn1f1cat qu1dqu1d s1gn1f1cat, tam naturaliter 
s1gn1f1oat qualitercumque s1gn1f1cat. Et loquor de 
1qua11tercumque' prout d1stribu1t modos s1gn1f1cand1 
sequentes natural1ter 1psum complexum s1gn1f1care. Sed 
tam natural1ter s1gn1f1cat 1sta propos1t1o •ru59 es 
homo' in an1ma qu1dqu1d s1gn1f1cat, quod non potest 
manere illa propos1t1o quin s1gn1f1cet qu1dqu1d s1gn1f1cat; 
1g1tur, tam naturaliter s1gn1f1cat qua11tercumque 
s1gn1f1cat, quod non potest manere 1lla p~opos1t1o quin 
s1gn1f1cet qua11tercumque s1gn1f1cat; 1g1tur, s1cut b 
-
sequ1 tur propos1 tionem a parte praed1cat1, 1 ta a parte 
subject! sequetur. Prima consequentia patet cum minore, 
cujus major sic arguitur: Qu111bet tal1s modus s1gn1f1cand1 
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est passio vel proprietas natural1ter concomitans ipsum 
s1gn1f1care; igitur, quam naturaliter habet proposit1o 
1psum s1gn1f1care, tam naturaliter habet queml1bet modum 
s1gn1f1cand1. 
18.) 60Quarto pr1nc1pal1ter arguitur contra quartam 
oonclus1onem in se, quae dicit quod subjecto cujuslibet 
propos1t1on1s talis in voce est propositio in anima 
corresponde~~l 62unde erit genera.liter quad cu111bet 
tali term1no 'propos1 t1o', 'verum vel falsum 1 , • cont1ngens 1 , 
et hujusmod1, proposit1o in anima correspondet. 63oontra 
hoc arguo primo sic: Ooncipiat Sortes sic in anima sua: 
'Haec est propos1t1o', denotando per subjectum hanc 'Deus 
est' vel hanc 'Homo est asinus', quae propos1t1o sit!• 
Et arguo sic: In !. est praedicatio dire eta;. 1g1 tur, 
in! praedicatum non est propos1t1o. Probe consequent1am: 
quia, si in! praedicatum est propos1t1o, aut eadem 
proposi tic quae demonstratur per hoc . demonstrat1vum 'haec' 
aut a11a. Si eadem, 1g1tur ibi est praedicatio 1dentica64 
et non directa. 65 Oonsequentia paret Aristotelem, primo 
66 Posteriorum., capitulo de statu pr1nc1p1orum. Si autem 
detur quod sit a11a propositio quae praedicatur. in!• quam 
propos1t1o quae est subjeotum, tune, cum affirmatur esse 
subjectum, 111a aff1rmat1o non est vera. Conaequentia 
11 
argui tui:- ex hoc, quia, cum proposi tio est extremum 
proposit1on1s, non sign1f1cat1ve supponit. Probata 
igitur consequent1a. Probo antecedens: Sit! iste 
terminus 'homo', et .!?. 1ste tenninus composi tus '1ste 
homo', £ 1ste terminus 'propositio', et67 ~ 1ste terminus 
oompos1tus 'ista proposit1o'. Et arguo sic: S1cut se 
babet a ad b, sic se habet c ad d; sed sic se habet a 
- - - - -
ad E_, quod est praed1cab111s de <b) praed1cat1one d1recta; 
1g1tur, sic se habet £ad~' quod £est praedicabil1s de 
~ praedicatione directa. 
19.) Item, iste terminus 1propos1 tio' de aliquibus 
sibi inferioribus praed1catur un1voce; 1g1tur, iste 
terminus 'propos1t1o' subordinatur uni intention! s1mpl1ci 
in anima de 1111s pluribus univoce a priori praed1cabil1[sj; 
sed non est pra.edicabilis univoce de aliquibus, nis1 quae 
potest 1ntellectu1 repraesentare; 1g1tur, 1ntent1o simplex 
potest 1ntellectu1 propositionem repraesentare. Prima 
consequentia patet juxta descr1pt1onem termini univoci 
alibi declaratam.68 ; et secunda patet de ae; 1gi:tur, etc. 
20.) Tertio ad idem sic: Haec passio d1sjuncta69 
'verum vel falsum' est demonstrab11!.!!70 de propos1t1one 
in anima; igitur, huic termino 'propos1t1o' extra 
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1ntent1o commun1s et simplex (47vb) in anima correspondet. 
probo consequentiam: Nihil p~test . esse subjectum71 
conclus1on1s72 demonstrat1vae, n1s1 quod potest esse73 
tenn1nus communis potens plura s1gn1f1care; 1g1tur, cum 
1proposit1o' potest esse subjectum conclus1on1s demonstrat1vae, 
sequitur conclusio 1ntenta, cujus antecedens paret 
Aristotelem, 2° Posteriorwn, capitulo 2°, 74 ubi tradit 
in lectione75 quomodo passio d1ajuncta76 poterit 
demon3trar177 de subjecto suo proprio, de quo neutra pars 
per se est demonstrab111s. 
21.) 78Quinto prinoipa11ter qrgu1tur contra hoc, 
quod d1c1t quod subjecto tal1s proposit1on1s 'Falsum est' 
propos1t1o in an1ma correspondet. Ponit enim in hoc quod 
maxime 1nd1get probat1one. Nam cum omnibus suis pr1nc1p11s 
stat oppos1tum 1111us d1ct1. Stant en1m simul quod, 
cujusl~. bet propos1 t1on1s cujus extremum a11qua11 ter suppon1 t 
pro complexo, qtiod e jus extre.mum sit proposi t1o, vel quod 
ejus extremo correspondat propos1t1o, et tamen quod 
extremum 1111us propos1t1on1s 'Falsum est' non est 
propos1t1o, nee sibi correspondat propos1t1o; cum stet 
quod 1ste terminus 'falsum' in illa propositione non 
supponeret79 pro co~plexo. 
13 
22.) Conf1rmatur ratio: Sit! 1ste terminus 'falsum', 
et b ejus species propria et natura11s ex1stens in anima • 
... 
Et arguitur sic: Si ipsa anima praecise affirmaret esse de 
1110 quod natura11ter repraesentat s1b1 ~' tali proposition! 
in anima talis extra animam 'Falsum est' esset aubordinata; 
sed tune in tali extra animam 'Falsum est' subjectum non 
supponeret pro complexo; 80ig1t~r, s1 an1ma affirmaret 
esse de 1110 quod natura11ter repraesentat s1b1 ~' in tali 
extra 'Falsum est' s1bi subordinata subjectum non supponeret 
pro complexo. Ista consequentia est bona, et totum antecedens 
possibile; 1g1tur, consequens. ('anim~ Major arguitur ex 
hoc, quod, si tal1s esset extra animam 'Falsum est', esset 
al1ou1 propos1t1on1 in an1ma subordinata, et nullae a111 
<qua~ 1111 cujus ~est subjectum; 1g1tur, eto. Et81 
minor: qu1a subjec~um in 1sta propos1t1one 'Falsum est' 
n~n supponit pro a11quo, n1s1 pro quo supponit subjeotum 
82 propos1t1on1s 1n anima; sed ~' quod est subjectum 
propos1t1on1s in an1ma, pro se suppon1t pro isto termino 
'fa.lsum'; 1g1tur, 'falsum' !a 1sta propos1t1o(ntP 83 
-
'Falsum est' praec1se pro eodem aupponit; 1g1tur, poasibile 
est quod aliqua talis sit extra animam, cujus nul.lum 
extremum pro al1quo complexo suppon1t. 
14 
23.) Ad idem aio: Quam possibile est quod a11qua 
vox vel aliquod scriptum causat speoiem in anima n1h11 
d1st1notum ab ipso causante actualiter s1gn1f1cantem, tam 
poss1b1le est de qualibet vooe et quolibet scr1pto; 
poas1b1le est 1g1tur quod iste tenninus 'falsum' causet 
84 
spec1em in anima Sortis quae Sarti solum istam vocem 
'falsum' s1gnif1oet; et sicut Sortes 1ntellegit, sic 
potest componere in an1ma; absolute 1g1tur poss1b1le est 
ut ta.lie propositio '?alsum est' sit in an1ma Sort1s, cujus 
-
subjectum. praeoise s1gn1!1cat Sort1 talem vocem 'falsum', 
a qua fuit causata, sic ~uod nulla a11a sit in anima 
Sortis, nee extra animam. Ex quo forma11ter sequitur 
quad casus iste est absolute poes1b111s, qui ponit quad 
sit un1ca propos1t1o talis: 'Falsum. est'. 
24.) 85<s)eounda op1n1o ponit quod quael1bet 
propoaitio 1nsolub111s s1gn1f1cat se ease veram et 
a1gn1f1cat se esse falsam. Ista opinio princ1pal1ter 
cons1st1t in duabus suppos1t1on1bus et una oonclusione, 
86 quarum suppos1t1onum una est quod pars potest supponere 
pro toto cujus est. 87 Alia est: Quael1 bet propos1 tio 
s1gn1f1cat ut nunc vel s1mpl1c1ter quidquid sequitur ad 
earn. 88conclus1o autem est 1sta: Quaelibet propos1t1o 
cujus extremum un1cum habet suppoaitum significat s1ve 
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denotat aff1rmat1onem vel negationem pro 1110 suppos1to. 
EX quibus conced1tur casus 1nsolub111umt et d1c1tur 
quodl1bet 1nsolub1le ease falsum, eo quod s1gn1f1oat 
se ease verum et s1gn1f1cat se ease falsum. 89 
25.) Quod arguitur .(e~ 1st1s princ1p11s sic: 
90ponatur quod Sortes d1cat 1st.am et nullam a11am: 
1 Sortes dic1 t falstn •, quae sit _2 0 9l 9 2Tunc ista 
consequentia est bona: 'Sortes d1c1t falsum; 1g1tur, 
a est falsu:n'. Consequentia tenet per secundam 
-
suppos1t1onem, quia, per casumt praedica.tum 1111us 
propos1t1on1s 'Sortes d1c1t falsum' non suppon1t (48ra) 
pro a11a proposltione a ~. 93 Et 1deo, cum, per pr1mam 
suppos1t1onemt potest pars supponere pro toto oujus est 
pars, tune ! in propos1 to solum unicum habet. suppos1 tum, 
sc111cet, totam propos1t1onem cujus est pars; unde, per 
primam conclusionem, ! sign1f1cat affirmative vel 
negative pro 1110 suppoa1to. Tune sic: b ease falsum 
-
sequitur ad!; 1g1tur, k s1gn1f1cat se esse falsum. 
Oonsequentia paret secundam suppositionem. Et, per 
consequens, .E, s1gn1f1cat se non94 ease verum, ·cum se 
non esse verum et se ease falsum (et se esse falaum] 
convertuntur. Ex qu1bus duobus arguitur sic: ! est 
falsum, et b s1gn1f1cat se non ease verum; igitur, non 
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est 1ta, quod ~non est verum. Et ultra: Ig1tur, 
est 1ta, quod ~eat verum. Et ultra: Et95 ease verum 
et esse falsum sequuntur.96 
26.) D1cunt 1g1tur qu1dam quod quodlibet 
1nsolubile s1gn1f1cat primo et principaliter sicut 
est, qu1a significat primo et principaliter se esse 
falsum, et sic est. Secundario tamen, et non 
97 pr1nc1paliter, aliter quam est, quia significat 
secundario et ex consequent! se esse verum, et sic 
non est. Quare istud dictum solum est sophisticum.98 
27.) Ideo contra ipsum soph1st1ce99 arguitur sic: 
Sit a 1sta propos1t1o: 1 b s1gn1f1cat primo et pr1nc1paliter 
- -
a11ter quam est'. Et demonstro per subjectum totam 
propos1t1onem cujus ~est subjectum. Tune quaero utrum 
! s1gn1f1oat primo et pr1nc1paliter sicut est aut non. 
Si sic, et! s1gn1f1cat pr1mo et principaliter aliter 
quam est; 1g1tur, cum! sit propositio 1nsolub111s, 
aliqua propos1t1o insolubilis s1gn1fioat pr1mo et 
principaliter aliter quam est; 1gitur, non quodlibet 
1 insolubile s1gn1f1cat, etc. Si autem detur quod ! 
non s1gn1f1cat primo et principaliter sicut est, 1g1tur, 
per d1ctum eorum, ! s1gn1.f1cat primo et pr1ncipa11 ter 
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ali ter quam eat; et ! sic [sic] significat; 1gi tur, ! 
s1gn.1f1cat priino et pr1nc1pal1ter sicut est, quad est 
oppasi tum dati. 
28.) 2contra istam op1n1onem autem in se arguitur 
brevius, eo quo d ab (q] al11s suff1c1enter 1mprobatur 
[quo] quoad secundam suppos1t1onem et primam conclusionem. 
Ideo arguitur pr1nc1pal1ter contra ejus pr1mam suppositionem, 
quae est quod pars potest supponere pro tota cujus est 
pars. Nam, 1110 1mprobato, constat quad deductiones 
3 . 4 quas fec1t nullum omn1no habent colorem. Non enim 
valet haec conseq~ent1a: 'Sortes d1c1t falsum; 1g1tur, 
a est falsum', n1s1 pars supponeret pro toto cujus est 
pars. Alioquin enim consequens totaliter 1mpertinens 
esset antecedenti. 
29.) Item, ex hoc, quod ista propos1 tio 'Sartes 
dicit falsum' habet se ipsum pro suppos1to extrem1, 
concluditur apparenter quod propositio dicta a Sorte 
s1gn1ficat se esse5 veram et falsam. Quae deductio 
1lli pr1nc1p1o renititur, sicut totali funda(men>to. 
Quod fundamentum destructum sive negatum, quod ista 
pos1t1o concluderet, non haberet. 
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30.) Ideo contra istud pr1ncipium arguitur pr1mo 
sic: In nulla prop.osi tione in anima potest pars 
supponcre pro toto cujus est pars, nee in aliqua 
propos1tione extra an1mam; 1g1tur, 1n nu11a propositione 
potest pars supponere _ pro toto cujus est pars. 
Consequentia patet ex suffic1ent1 d1v1s1one. Et 
assertum. pro prima parte arguitur sic: qu1a, s1 in 
aliqua propositione in anima potest pars supponere pro 
toto cujus est pars, sit in ista: propositione 'Falsum. 
est•. Et arguo sic: In ista proposit1one subjectum 
supponit pro tota propos1t1one cujus est subjectum; 
1g1tur, quam primo anima habet illud subjectum tam 
pr1mo 1ntelleg1t totum. Et sequitur formaliter: 
Intelleg1t totam illam propos1t1onem; igitur, 1ntelleg1t 
actum an1mae qui er1t in 111a propos1t1one, qui actus 
s1 t !• Tune arguo sic: Anima [quam] priusquam produc1 t 
!• non plus de se determ1natur ad producendum ! quam ad 
producendum a11un actum ejusdem[us] spec1e1 cum !_, ut per 
subjectum detenninatur plus ad a quam ad (48rb) 1llum 
- .. 
actum ejusdem specie! cum a; 1gi tur, si aubjectum pro 
-
1110 priori repraesentet 1ps1 an1mae !_, pro eodem priori 
repraesentet ips1 an1mae omnem actum qui potest esse 
ejusdem spec1e1 cum !• Consequentia patet, cum non ex 
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se nee ex natura animae nee ex aliqua a11a circumstantia 
determinatur plus ad repraesentandum ! quam alium aetum 
ejusdem speciei. Sed in.f1n1 ti possunt ease actus 
ejusdem specie! cum!; igitur, infinitos aetus repraesentat, 
si repraesentat !• 
31.) 6sed forte hie diceret aliquis quod subjectum 
repraesentat 1ntellectu1 totam illam propositionem cujua 
est pars, sed non repraesentat quamlibet partem 1111us 
propos1t1on1s, et 1deo non sequitur quod infertur. Sed 
hoc non exacuat argumentum. Nam idem argu1 tur de 
propositione. Nam in omni propositione in an1ma prius 
(ta.nJ est subjectum quam anima, intellecto 1110 subjecto, 
habeat aetum composition1s vel divisionis; sed quam primo 
est ibi subjectum, tam pr1mo repraesentat 1ntellectu1 
. . 
totam propositionem cujus, in posteriori natura, erit 
pars, CUlll naturaliter et non ad placitum significat; 
ig1tur, prius natura repraesenta.t illam propositionem 
quam. 1lla propos1t1o sit. Paret consequent1a cum 
antecedente. · Ex quo sequitur 1dem7 1nconven1ens quod 
prius, quia non plus determ1natur subjectum ad repra.esentandum 
1psi an1mae propositionem quae erit quam propos1t1onem 
ejusdem spec1e1 quae poterit fore; 1g1tur, s1 111a quae 
er1t repraesentet, 1nf1n1tas repraesentat. 
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32.) 8 Secundo sic: Sicut se habet 1ntellectus 
totius propos1t1on1s ad totam propositionem, 9 sic 
1nte11ectua10 partis ad partem; sed se habet intellectus 
totiua propos1tion1s ad totem proposit1onem, quod sio 
est intellectus tot1us, quod intellectus partis esse 
\ 
non poteat, non plus quam totum pars esse possit, cum 
1ntellectus totius propositionis resultet ex 1ntellect1on1bus 
part1um, s1cut totum quantitativum resultat ex quantitate 
part1um suarum; igitur, sic se habet 1ntellectus partis 
ad partem, quod sic est intellectus partis, quod intellectus 
totius esse non poter1t. 
33.) 11 Tert1o sic: Si ista propositio 'Homo est 
asinus' asset 1n an1ma Platollis, et 1sta 'Falsum est' 
esset in an1ma Sort1s, tune 1n ista in anima Sortie pars 
non supponeret pro tote cujus est pars; sed non magis 
nunc suppon1t pro toto cujus est pars, quam si 1sta 
propos1t1o 'Homo est as1nus' esset in anima Platania; 
1g1tur, ~12 pars pro toto non supponit. Consequentia 
patet, et major est omnium illorum qui ponunt partem 
posse supponere pro toto cujus est pars, eo quod tune 
ha.beret pars propositionem pro qua posset supponere 
distinctam ab 111a proposit1one cujus est pars. Et 
m1norem arguo sic: Iste terminus 'falsum' 1n anima 
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naturaliter significa.t; 1g1tur, quidquid est quad jam 
potest s1gn1f1c~re jam s1gn1f1cat. Patet consequentia 
cum antecedente. Igitur, s1 non potest significare 
totam propositionem cujus est pars, a11a propos1t1one 
. . 
posita, dempta13 1lla, non s1gn1ficab1t. 14oonfirmatur 
breviter sic: Qualiter[cumJ iste terminus 'falsum•15 
in an1ma s1gn1ficat, posita propositione in anima 
Platon1s, taliter omnino signif1cab1t, dempta propositione, 
eo quo~ secundum Aristotelem in Praedicam.entis, cap1tulo 
de substantia, 16 termini non mutant suas significationes 
propter mutationes rerum; sed, pos1ta propositione in 
an1ma Platonis, taliter significat, quod non faciet 
an1mam refleot1 supra propos1t1onem cujus est pars; 
1g1tur, 111a dempta, ta.liter signif1oab1t, quod non 
faciet animam reflecti supra propos1tionem cujus est 
pars; 1g1tur, nee pro illa supponet. 
34.) 17Quarto sic: S1 in tali propositione 'Falsum 
eat• pars supponit pro toto, quaero aut intellectus 
elicit actum virtute not1t1ae hab1tae per subjectum 
ad habendum notitiam quam habet~ aut18 ad habendum 
a11am. Primum non potest dari (48va) propter repugnantiam 
tenni.norum mutation1s. Si autem detur secundum, 1g1 tur, 
poeito 1110 actu, habeb1t a11am not1t1am; sed nullam 
a11am, ut suppono, n1s1 not1t1am 1llius propos1t1on1s 
'Falsum est'; 1g1tur, not1t1a 1111us propos1t1onis 
'Falsum est' est a11a a not1t1a subject1; et, per 
consequens, subjectum non repraesentat 1ntellectu1 
to tam 111am propos1 tionem cujus est [es-€] pars. 
35.) 19Qu1nto sic: Secundum. Aristotelem, 3° JDe 
-
anima, cap1tulo 3°, natura n1h11 agl.!20 frustra21 ; 
1g1tur, s1 subjectum repraesentat 1ntellectu1 totam 
proposi tionem cujus est pars, una cum 1llo subjecto 
22 
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non adderet natura proposition~ ad idem repraesentandum 0 
Oonsequentia pate.t. Antecedens argui tur: Nam quam 
primo 1ntelleg1tur subjectum., aut 1ntelleg1tur tota 
propos1t1o aut non. Si non, 1g1tur non supponit pro 
tota illa propositione. Si quam primo 1ntellegitur subjectum 
1ntelleg1tur 111a propos1t1o, 1g1tur frustra pon1tur 
postea 111a propositio propter notitiam al1quam habendam; 
nee propter aliam causa.m a11quam 111a propositio ponitur, 
cum omn1s propositio ponitur propter·notitiam habendam; 
1g1tur, 1sta s1mpl1c1ter frustra ponitur. 
36.) 23conf1rmatur ratio: Quidquid ista propos1t1o 
significat, pars ejus significat, et e contrario. Et 
hoc simul et semel in eadem an1ma. Igitur, cum non 
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ponatur aliquod signum in ipsa anima, n1s1 propter 
1psum repraesentare sive significare, necessario alterum 
superfluit, quad natura non penn1tt1t. 
37.) Item, si pars posset supponere pro toto cujus 
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est, contradictorium pro contrad1ctor1o supponere 
potest. Consequent1a generaliter conced1tur. Ex quo 
arguitur contradictio sic: Sit! ista propositio: 
'QuodJ.ibet istorum est verum•, tantum denotando per 
hoc 'istorum' contrad1ctor1um illius ! et istam 'Deus 
est', quae praecise s1gn1f1cet juxta compositionem 
<::termin;>orum. 25 Et quaero utrum ! $1t verum vel falsum. 
Si verum, et contradictorium ! est, 1gitur contrad1ctor1um 
! est falsum; 1g1tur, !!.Q.!!,26 quodlibet illorum est verum. 
Patet consequ~~ntia. 
38.) 27rtem sic: Sit~ contradictorium !• Et 
argue sic: ~ est falsum; et ~ est a11quo~ illorum; 
igitur, non quodlibet28 1llorum est verum. 
39.) S1 ! sit falsum, tune sic: a est falsum; 
1g1tur, ~est verum; et 1sta 'Deus est' est verum; 
1g1tur, quodlibet 1llorum est verum. Consequent1a est 
bona; . verum est ante ce dens; 1g1 tur, verum est consequens; 
et consequens est!; igitur, ! verum. 
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4o.) 29sexto, ad ul t1mum: secundum Aristotelem, 
primo Elenchorum , cap1tulo 14°, 30 propter nugationem 
v1tandain, hoc nomen 'duplum. 131 per se positum a1gn1f1cat 
duplum3 2 d1m1d11. s133 tamen add1 tur 'dimid.11' ad 'duplum', 
totum s1gn1f1cat duplum d1m1d11, et nulla ejus pars; 
1gitur, secundum. Ar1stotel1s pr1nc1p1a, propter consimilem 
nugationem v1tandam, tota 1sta propos1t1o 'Falsum est' 
. I 
s1gn1f1cat falaum esse et nulla ejus pars. 
41.) 34rtem, quod in nulla propos1t1one extra 
animam pars supponat pro toto cujus est pars solum 
facio unicam formam. Arguitur sic: In nu11a propos1tione 
in anima pars potest supponere pro tote cujus est pars; 
1g1tur, 1n nulla propositione extra animam pars pro toto 
supponere potest. Probo consequentiam: Sicut tota 
propos1t1o extra animam subordinatur propositioni in 
anima, sic subjectum 1n propos1t1one extra anfmam subjecto 
propos1tion1s in anima, et praedicatum praed1cato. patet 
ex descr1pt1one istius termini 'subordinare' alibi 
declarata.35 Ig1tur, n1h11 a11ud potest subjectum in 
propositione extra animam s1gn1f1care quam 1llud quod 
a priori s1gn1f1ca.t subjectum proposit1on1s in anima cui 
est subord1nata. Et sic patet consequentia. Antecedens 
conclud.1 tur ex praemissis. 
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42.) 361tem, contra secundam suppositionem aeque 
breviter sic: Non quaelibet propos1t1o s1mpl1c1ter 
1Jnposs1b111s simpl1c1ter sign1f1cat quodlibet; ex qualibet 
propositione s1mp11c1ter 1mposs1b111 s1mpl1c1ter sequitur 
qu1dl1bet37 ; 1g1tur, non quaelibet propos1t1o sign1f1cat 
s1mpl1c1 ter qu1dqu1d s1mpl1c1 ter sequitur ad eam. Major 
arguitur: quia nee ex natura nee ex 1mpos1t1one talis 
proposit1o s1gn1f1cat quidlibet. Et minor conceditur 
genera11ter apud eos. 
43.) Item, si quaelibet propositio (48vb) sign1f1cat 
quidqu1d sequitur ad eam, s1gnif1cat eo modo quo s1gn1f1oat 
propos1t1o quae sequitur ad eam, quia sicut s1gn1f1care 
ad s1gn1f1care, sic modus sign1f1cand1 proposit1on1s 
sequentis ad mo dum s1gn1f1cand1 proposi tion1s ex qua 
sequitur; sed propos1t1o sequens, ratione modi s1gn1f1oand1, 
est hypothet1ca, cum ex qua11bet propos1t1one, quantumcumque 
s1mpl1c1ter38 categor1ca, sequatur hypothet1ca, quia 
ipsamet et a11a s1b1 convertibilis vel superior; 1g1tur, 
proposi tio ex qu!39 sequitur esset hYJlothe·t1ca. Probatur 
consequentia: Modus suus significandi est hypotheticus; 
4o igitur, propositio hypothetica. 
44.) Item, data suppositione, quaelibet propositio, 
quantumcumque 1mposs1b111s, s1gnif1caret sicut necesse est 
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ease. Oonsequens absurdum. Et consequentia patet, eo 
quod, juxta regulas eorum, propositio s1mpl1c1ter 
41 
necessar1a sequitur ad quodlibet. Et tantum contra 
secundam op1n1onem. 
45.) 42<T)ert1a op1n1o pon1t43 pro fundamento duo. 
Pr1mum: quod pars non potest supponere pro toto cujus 
est pars. Secundum: quod, pos1to ca.au communi, quod 
Sortes tantum dicat istam propos1t1onem 'Sortes d1c1t 
falsum 1 , dicit quod 111a44 propos1t1o ~ignificat _ Sortem 
dicere a11am propos1t1onem quam 1llam quam d1c1t. Tertio, 
1nc1dental1ter, d1c1t quod propos1t1o dicta a Sorte nee 
est vera nee falsa. 45 
46.) Ista opinio mirab111s m1h1 non v1detur. 
Primo, quia ponit sine aliqua probatione illud quod 
maxime in log1ca46 1nd1get probatione, sc111cet, quod 
pars non potest supponere pro toto cujus est pars. 
Secundo, v1detur, quamv1s ista op1n1o sit vera, tamen 
obviat propr11s pr1nc1p11s. Unde solum ex princ1p11s 
su1s arguam. 
47.) 47contra eum arguitur 1g1tur primo, probando 
duas conclusiones, quarum 48pr1ma est quod pars 
s1gn1f1cat totum cujus est pars. Secunda: Si pars 
s1gn1f1cat totum. cuju~ est pars, pro tote cujus est 
pars supponere potest. 
48.) 49Pr1ma 1starum probatur sic: Qu111bet 
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terminus communis omn1a s1b1 1nfer1ora s1gn1f1cat; 1ste 
terminus 'propos1t1o' est terminus commun1s; 1g1tur, iste 
terminus communis omn1a inferiors s1gnif1cat. Patet 
consequent1a in tert1o modo pr1mae figurae, 50 et minor 
51 de se. Major autem est principium apud eum. Sed 
propositio prolata a Sorte, cum sit una s1ngular1s 
propos1t1o, est aliqua propos1t1o s1gn1f1cab111s per 
1stum terminum communem 'propos1t1o'; 1g1tur, in 1sta 
propos1t1one 'Propos1tio est' aubjectum s1gnif1cat 
totam illam propositionem. 
49.) 52 Secundo sic: Ad hoc, quod aliquis terminus 
sign1f1cat a11quam rem vel aliquas res ex 1mpos1tione, 
non requ1r1tur praecognitio 1111us vel 1llarum, n1s1 
53 tantum confusa et un1versalis, secundum eum ; sed talem 
de omni propositione habet 1ntellectus54 per conceptum 
. 55 ' . 
propositionis secundum quid propositio est ; igitur, 
hab1ta 1lla cogn1t1one, potest intellectus 1mponere istum 
tenninum 'proposit1o 1 ad s1gn1f1candum. omnem propos1t1onem 
(et ad omnem proposi t1onem s1gnif1candum] 56 ; 1g1 tur, cum 
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a sit propositio virtute 1llius 1mpos1tion1s, sign1f1cat 
- . 
iste terminus 'propositio' !; ~t 1111us propos1t1on1s iste 
terminus 'propoe1t1o 1 est pars; 1g1tur, pars potest 
s1gn1f1care totum cujus est pars.57 Et ad vitandum 
omnem cavillationem, pone quod iste terminus 1proposit1o' 
positus in illa propositione sit omnis talis terminus. 
patet major primae consequentiae: Nam ali ter 1st~ , 
terminus 'homo' un1ca 1mpos1tione non s1gn1f1caret omnem 
hom1nem, cum nullus unico conceptu 1ntelleg1t omnem 
hominem, n1s1 prout omnis homo convenit in eadem natura 
in specie. 
50.) Item, quod pars s1gn1f1cat totum cujus est 
pars negari non potest ab eo, eo quod est conclusio sua 
1ri materia obligationu~,58 59ub1 dicit quod in 1sta 
propos1t1one 'Omnia propos1t1o est vera' subjectum60 
s1gn1f1cat totam illa.m. propositionem cujus est pars. 
51.) 61Hab1to 1g1tur quod pars significat totum, 
probatur secunda conclusio, quae est 1sta: quod, s1 
pars s1gn1f1cat totum cujus est pars, pro toto cujus 
est pars supponere potest. Arguitur haec consequentia 
prime sic: Quod.11bet s1gnif1catum termini de quol1bet 
potest intelleotus aff1nnare vel negare; propos1t1o cujus 
1ste terminus 'propos1t1o 1 est pars est al1quod s1gn1f1catum 
1111us termini 1propos1t1o 1 ; 1g1tur, hoc significatum 
potest62 1ntellectus de isto te:rmino 1propos1t1o', quae 
est pars, aff1rmare vel negare; (49ra) et sive sic sive 
sic, sequitur quod pars potest supponere pro (toto) cujus 
est pars; 1g1tur, eo ipso quod 1propos1t1o' significa~ 
totum cujus est pars, pro tote cujus est pars supponere 
po test. 
52.) 63secundo sic: Secundum pr1nc1p1a 1111us 
64 opinantis, terminus communis respectu verb1 de praesent1 
suppon1t pro quolibet suo significato quod est; 1gitur, 
secundum ewn, cum propos1t1o quae est cujus iste terminus 
1propos1t1o' est pars sit aliquod significatum 1111us 
termini com.munis 'p~oposit1o', in 1sta propositione 'Omnia 
propositio est <vera)' in qua subjectum supponit respectU 
verbi de pra.esent.1, pro ea actua11 ter supponi t; unde, 
secundum pr1ma principia, haec consequentia est bona: 
'Omnis propositio est vera; haec est propositio; igitur, 
haec propositio est vera', denotando per subjectum m1nor1s 
.. 
1psam propositionem; quae consequentia non valeret, nisi 
in minori pars supponeret pro toto cujus est pars; 1gitur, 
eo ipso quod pars significat totum cujus est, et totum est, 
et pa·rs est, pro eo respectu verbi de praesent1 supponere 
po test. 
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53.) 65Tert1o sic: Sint ! ~ duae tales propos1t1ones: 
'Propos1t1o est', 'Propos1t1o est'. Et sit una in anima 
Sortis .et a11a in an1ma Platonis. Et sint 1stae propos1t1ones 
omnes propositiones. Et arguo sic: SUbjectum ! supponit 
pro~' et subjectum ~ supponit pro!• juxta 1stam op1n1onem; 
sed major refl.exio actuum supra se est, sive circulatio in 
oausis essentialiter ordinatis, quod ! supponit pro~' et e 
contrar1o, quam quod pars suppon1 t pro toto cujus eat pars; 
igitur, eo ipso quod concedit quod subjectum ! supponit 
pro ~. et e contrar1o, quod partem posse supponere pro 
toto concedere habet. 
54. ) 66Quar.to sic: Sit a ista propos1t1o 'Propositio 
- . 
est', ut prius, et,£ 1sta 'Nulla propositio est'. Et , 
sfnt ! b omnes proposi tiones. Tune quaero u:trum subjectum 
in~ supponat pro 1psa propositione cujus est pars aut 
pro qualibet a11a·propos1tione distincta ab ipsa. Primum 
non concedet, eo quod repugnat suae position!. Secundum 
autem negare non potest, eo quod sequens es't. Ex quo 
arguitur propositum sub ista forma: In omnibus 
contradictor11s forma11ter inter se contradicentibus 
termini supponunt pro e1sdem67 ; ! et,£ aunt contradictoria 
. . 
68 inter se contradicentia; ig1tur, in! et~ termini 
supponunt pro eiadem. Patet consequentia et consequens. 
\ 
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Et ex69 consequente sic: In ~ subjectum supponi t pro 
!; tamen ! sit propositio a11a7o a~; in! al1qu1s 
terminus supponi t pro !• quod est probandum. Et tantum 
contra pr1mum dictum in ista op1n1one. 
55.) 71 . Contra secundum, in quo dicitur quod 
propositio dicta a Sorte s1gn1ficat Sortem dicere 
a11am propos1tionem ab illa quam dicit: Contra quod 
arguitur prime sic: Sit ista propos1t1o 'Falsum est' 
omn1s propoa1t1o. Et arguo sic: Iste terminus 'falsum' 
est terminus commun1s supponena respectu verb! de 
praesent1; 1gitur, tantum supponit pro his quae aunt. 
Haec consequent1a est sua.72 Sed tantum haec propositio 
est; 1g1tur, juxta pr1nc1p1a sua, in 1sta propes1t1one 
'Falsum est' subjectum non supponit pro a11a. propos1tione 
ab 1lla cujus est pars. 
-
56.) 73secundo sic: Sint ! ~ duae tales propos1t1ones: 
'Falsum est', 'Falsum est', quarum prima sit in an1ma 
Sort1s et a11a in anima Platon1s. Et non sint a11ae 
proposit1ones quam ! et~. Tune, juxta istam74 rat1onem~ 
subjectum a s1gn1f1oat b, et subjectum b s1gnif1cat a. 
- ~ - - . -
Quaero 1g1tur, utrum ! sit verum vel falsum. Si verum, 
1g1 tu·r ~ est falsum. Probe consequentiam: ! s1gnif1cat 
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b esse75 falsum; 1g1tur, si sic est, 
~ est falsum. Si au~em quod !76 .est 





! est falsum; 1g1tur, ~est verum. 77 Patet 
consequentia, eo quod tune non est, sicut illa s1gn1f1cato 
. . 
Igitur, isto casu pos1to, cum ista po~1t1one non stat 
quod ! sit verum, nis1 ~78 s;t falsum, nee quad b (49rb) 
sit verum, n1s1 a sit falsum; et tamen omnis ratio per 
quam intellectus a11quis concludit quod ! ver1f1catur 
pro~' cons1m111ter et per idem medium concludere habet 
quod b verificatur pro !• et omn1no eadem ratione qua! 
falsificatur pro b, b falsificatur pro !• Quia pono quod 
Sortes et Plato s1mul sic componant, et quod null~s prius 
alio, quod etiam tam ! quam ~ praec1se sienificent juxta 
compositionem terminorum. Talia igitur opinio concedere 
habet propositionem vel negare, et tamen nullam causam 
assignare potest qua:t'e plus eam concedere [eam] quam 
negare, vel e contrario. Quod ration1 et regulis logicae79 
repugnat manifeste. 
57.) 80 Tertio sic: Si propositio dicta a Sorte 
s1gn1ficat Sortem dicere a11am propositionem quam dicit, 
quaero quam a11a.m. Quaecumque detur, sit illa !• Et 
. 81 
argue.sic: ! est suppositum 1st1us term.1n1 'falsum' 
1n propositione dicta a Sorte; 1gitur, extremtnll propos1tion1s 
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dicta a Sorte s1gn1f1oat ~· Consequens falsum, cum tune 
1ntellectus possit devenire et actualiter intellegere 
quam propos1t1onem, aliam a82 propositione dicta a Sorte, 
extremum proposi tionis dictae a Sorte s1gn1f1caret. 
58.) Confirmatur 1stud per exemplum: Si! esset 
1sta propositio 'Homo est asinus', tune ista in an1ma 
converterentur: 'Sortes dic1t falsum' et 'Sortes dicit 
1stam "Homo est asinus" non s1gn1f1cantem sicut est'; 
sed palam est quod non sequitur, 1sto casu posito: 
'Sortes dicit falsum; igitur, Sortes dicit hominem esse 
asinum'; et quam non sequitur de ista, tam non sequitur 
de quacumque a11a falsa; igitur, nullam a11am falsam 
s1gn1f1cat hoc' extremum 'falsum' in propositione dicta 
a· Sorta. 
59.) 83Quarto sic: Sit a intellectus qui sine 
omni medic videre potest rem quamcumque intellectus 
84 Sortis potest videre per medium vel media. Et applicet 
se 1lle intellectua ad videndum significatum illius 
termini 'falsum' in propositione dicta a Sorte. ~uo 
posito, quaero utrum videt aliquam propositionem esse 
auppositum illius termin185 'falswn' aut videt quod 
nullum est supposi tum illius termini 'falsum'. Si 
Videat quod nullum, 1g1tur, cum, per casum sequitur quod 
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videt sicut est, cum non potest dec1p1, sequitur quod 
de facto 1ste terminus 1 falsum' non significat a11quam 
propositionem a11am a propositione dicta a Sorte. Si 
autem detur quad videt aliquam propos1t1onem esse suppositum 
illiue termini 'falsum 1 : Contra: Quad 4ion prius)86 
videt unam propositionem falsam quae non est dicta a 
sorte quam aliam, ut patet diligenter consideranti; 
igitur, vel quamlibet possibilem videt esse suppositum 
illius termini 'falsum' vel nullum. Si quamlibet 
possibilem videt, tum propter 1ncomposs1bil1tatem 
earum simul in falsi tate, tum propter f1l'In1 tatem tali s 
intellectus, infirmitatem tal1um objectorum, fictio est 
ig1tur, ponere quod propositio dicta a Sorte s1gnif1cat 
Sortem dice re a11am propos1 tionem ab 1lla quam dici t. 
60.) 87Quinto sic: Sit! proposit1o dicta a Sorte. 
Et arguitur sic: Nullum extremum in! supponit pro tota 
illa propos1t1one oujus est pars, nee pro aliqua a11a 
propositione; aliquod extremum in! supponit; 1g1tur, 
pro nulla propositione aliquod extremum in! supponit. 
Oonsequentia ev1dens. Et pr1ma pars antecedentis 
sequitur ex hoc, quod pars non supponit pro toto cujus 
est pars. Secunda pars arguitur: quia, sint b £ d, 
gratia argument!, omnes propos1 tiones possibiles •. iTunc 
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pro nuila 1starum al1quod extremum. in! supponit; quaelibet 
propos1t1o est aliqua 1starum; 1g1tur. pro nulla propos1t1one 
aliquod extremum in! supponit. CUjus rat1onis major 
sic ostend1tur: quia, s1 ~non esset (49va) nee esse 
posset, n1hil minus staret quod ! s1gnif1caret. sicut 
si quod88 mode significat; 1gitur, nullum extremum ! 
suppon1t pro~; et, per idem, nee pro£ nee pro d; 89et 
s1cut arguitur de 1stis tribus, sic argui potest, dato 
. ' 
quod essent inf1nitae propos1t1ones b• etc., quod, si 
datur quod propositio dicta a Sorte s1gn1ficat propoa1t1onem 
aliam ab illa, nullam tamen aliam significat. 
90 ' 91 61.) Oontra: Nullus tenninus stat confus2_ 
tantum, nisi propter a11quod syncategorema vel aliquem 
a11um terminum praecedentem habentem vim fac1end1 
terminum sequentem sic supponere; sed in propositione 
dicta a Sorte, quae ·est haec: 'Sortes dicit falsum', 
nullum est tale (syn) categorema aut aliquis talis 
tenn1nus, ut manifestum est; igitur, in propositione 
dicta a Sorte nullus terminus sic supponit, quod est 
oppo si tum da ti. 
62.) 92sext1. sic: Haec posi tio cum prima videtur 
co1nc1dere, cum vooaliter oasum 1nsolubil1um concedat et 
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in effectu realiter illum negat. Est en1m unus93 
, particul.!:!.,!!94 casus, quod Sortes non dicat al1quam a11am 
~b 111a unica qua.m .(a101t); 1g1tur, 111a negativa 
exoludit Sortem dioere a11quam a11am; et propositio 
dicta a Sorte ponit Sortem dicere aliqua.m aliam, quae 
s1gn1~1oat Sortem dicere aliquam a11am; 1g1tur, propositio 
dicta a. Sorte exoludi t 95 casum. Probatur consequentia; 
Propos1t1o aff1rmat1va96--quod oasus negat; igitur, etc. 
63.) 97 Tertio d1c1 t 1sta op1n1o quod propos1 t1o dlcta 
a Sorte nee est vera nee falsa. Pro quo dicto, tantum 
pon1t quod, sicut concedendum quod Sortes non d1c1t 
verum neque falsum al1ud ab 1sto quad dicit, sic concedendum 
est quod proposit1o dicta a Sorte nee est vera nee falsa.9 8 
Sed palam est quod 1sta ratio non valet. Stat enim quod 
Sortes non d1c1 t al1ud ab illo quod dici t, et tamen quod 
d1c1t verum vel falsum, ut, s1 esset a11us Sortes qui 
diceret quod homo .est asinus et tantum 1llam, et 1ste 
Sortes tantum 1stam 'Sortes dicit falsum.', tune, ista99 
'Homo est asinus•1 dicta ab a110 Sorte, tune propositio 
dicta a Sorte est vera, et ta.men tune Sortes non d1ceret 
aliud ab illo quad dicit. 
64.) Est tamen alius qui hoc dictum profundius 
1nvest1gat, qui pro principali conclusione tenet in hac 
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materia quod propos1t1o dicta a Sorte nee est vera nee 
falsa, quae est quarta opinio, ultima in ordine. Contra 
quam et 1stam simul ob1c1am convenienter. 
65.) 2(Q) uarta op1n1o, 1g1 tur, pro pr1nc1pal1 
conclusione ponit quod propositio 1nsolubil1s est talis, 
quod nee est vera r:ec falsa. Quae op1n1o ad id probandum 
· mul ta p~aem1.tt1t~ 3 Poni t enim duas defini ti ones, quattuor 4 
suppositiones, et v1gint1 quattuor conclusiones. 5 Sed, 
quia 1sta pos1t1o ex suis pr1nc1p11s poterit declarar1 6 
brevius, ideo solum 111a rec1tabo ex quibus, tamqua~7 
ex necessar11s, haeo dependet. 
66 .• ) Stat en1m princ1pa11 ter in duabus supposi t1on1bus 
et tribus conclus1on1bus. 8mef1n1t1o pr1ma est ta.lie: 
Signum verum est s1gnum praec1se qualiter est s1gn1f1cans. 
9secunda: ~ ."?;num fa.lsum est signum qua11 ter non est 
s1gn1f1cans. 10suppos1t1o prima: Et veritas s1gn1t1cat1 
' . 
est causa ver1tat1s s1gn1. 11 secunda: Falsitas 
s1gn1f1cat1 est causa falsitatis s1gn1. 12 .. Conclusio 
prima: Veritas s1gn1 praesupponit, tamquam prius veram 
causa(m), veritatem su1 s1gn1f1cat1, quam 1psum s1gn1f1catum. 
l3secunda ad propositum est talis: Quaelibet fa.lsitas s1gn1, 
tamquam oausam s1b1, naturaliter primam falsitatem su1 
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81gnificat1 et 1psius sign1f1cat1 contrad1ctor1um 
praesupponit. (49vb) 14Tert1a: S1gn1f1catum 1111us 
ptopositionis 'Omne15 verum <est)• et cujuslibet cons1m111s 
nee est verum nee falswµ, quae est epinie in term1n1s. 
67.) 16Et haec -sic arguitur ex praem1ss1s: Sit a 
-
1sta prepos1tie 'Omne verum est'. Et arguitur quod ! 
nee est verum nee falsum. Nam omne verum praesupponit, 
tamquam fPrius> vera(m) causa<m>~ 17 ver1tatem su1 s1gn1ficat1, 
quam 1psum signlficatum, ex prima conclusione; sed, cum· 
a sit s1gn1f1catum 1ps1us a, a sic non praesuppori1t. 
- - -
Consequentia arguitur ex lfz,-x] hoc, quod n1h11 alique 
ordine se ipsum praesuppon1t. 18 Et quod ! non sit faleum 
arguitur ex a11a cenclusione sic: ! est falsum; igitur, 
1ps1us ! s1gn1f1catum prius naturaliter est falsum. 
Consequentia paret secundam conclusionem. Igitur, ex 
opposite consequent1s sequitu~ oppositum antecedent1s19; 
oppositum autem consequentis est verum. Nam s1gnif1catum 
20 1ps1us ! est 1psamet !; et 1psamet ! non est prius 
falsum quam 1psum sit falsum; 1g1tur, 1ps1us ! s1gn1f1catum 
21 
non est plus naturallter falsum quam. ipsum est falsum. 
68.) 22contra istam quartam opinionem argue 
tr1plic1ter: prime contra conclusionem in se; secundo 
39 
quod iata op1n1o destru1t se 1psam; et tert1o contra23 
rationem pos1 t1on1s. 
69.) Pro primo arguitur primo sic: Sit a ta11s 
proposit1o: 'Omne verum est'. Et sit hoc!' grat1a 
argument1, omne a, quae secundum 1stam opin1onem nee 
est vera nee falsa. Tune s1c: ! est signum; aut, 1g1tur, 
~ est signum pl'6ecise qualiter est s1gn1f1cans aut non 
est signum praec1se .qua11ter est significans. Si detur 
. 24 
pr1mum, 1g1 tur, .per descr1pt1onem suam, A est signum 
verum. Si detur secundum, 1g1tur a est signum falsum. 
Probe consequentiam: Nam arguitur sic: Nullum a est 
s1gnum praecise qual1ter est s1gn1ficans; quodlibet ! 
est signum aliquali ter r_9sfil s1gn1f1cans, cum sit s1gnum 
complexe s1gn1f1cans; 1gitur, quodlibet ! est s1gnum 
!!,_liter guam25 qualiter est sign1f1cans. 
70.) 26 Conf1rmatur breviter consequent1a sic: 
Quodlibet totale s1gn1f1care ipsum ! est tale .(quod 
habe,Y correspondentiam adaequatam vel est tale quod 
non habet. Si est tale quod habet, 1g1tur praecise 
siout est s1gn1f1cat, juxta desor1pt1onem primam. Si 
non habet, igitur s1gn1f1cat a11qua11ter, et ta11ter 
non est; 1g1tur, est signum falsum. Consequentia 
, paret descriptionem euam secundam. 
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71.) '27 Secundo sic: ·Quod ! s1 t verum vel falsum 
probatur inductive: Aliqua propos1t1o vera est vera; 
-
et nulla s1t propos1t1o vera quin 111a sit vera; 1g1tur, 
0mn1s propos1t1o ver< est vera. Deductio patet, et 
totum antecedens est verum.. Qu1a, s1 a11qua propositio 
vera sit quae non sit vera, a11qua propos1t1o est vera 
et 111a non est vera, quae est contradictio. Et, per 
consequens, sequitur quad consequens 1llatum est verum. 
72.) Ite~, 1nduct1va28 probatur sic: Haeo 
propositio vera est vera, et haec propos1t1o vera eat 
vera, et sic de s1ngul1s; 1g1tur, omnis propos1t1o vera 
est vera. .Deduotio patet; et totum antecedens verum.29 ; 
30 
1gitur, consequens verum. 
73.) 31 Tert1o sic: Falsum solum est pr1vatio veri 
in propos1t1one; igitur, eo ipso quod aliqua propos1t1o 
simplex categorica est non vera, est falsa. Probo 
assertum: Nam s1t ! ista propos1t1o 'Sortea est' 
praecise s1gn1f1cans juxta compositionem terminorum, 
quae nunc sit vera. Et argue sic: Si, manente ista 
propositione praecise s1gn1f1cante s1cut modo significat, 
Sortes corrumperetur et n1h11 omnino generaretur, ista 
propositio, Sorta corrupto, esset falsa: 'Sortes est'; 
1g1tur, falsum in propositione n1h11 omn1no est, n1s1 
pr1vat10 ver1. Ad hoc: quod a sit falsa, postquam 
-
fuerit vera, requiritur aliqua pos1t1o et non solum 
pos1t1onis privatio. 
74.) 32 Quarto sic: Sit! propositio dicta a 
41 
Sorte quae est propos1t1o mere de 1nesse de praesent1 
affinnativa. Et quaero utrum ita sit, sicut ! primo 
sign1f1cat aut-non est33 1ta, sicut ! primo s1gn1f1cat. 
-mvisio patet, eo quod sit per partes contradictionis. 
Si est 1ta, sicut ! primo significat, 1g1tur ! est 
propos1t1o vera. patet consequentia per def1n1t1onem· 
propos1t1on1s vera.e.34 Si non est 1ta, sicut ! primo 
sign1f1cat, igitur ! est propos1t1o falsa. (50ra) 
patet etiam consequent1a, per descriptionem proposition1s35 
falsae. 
75.) 36Qu1nto sic: Hoo d1sjunctum 'verum vel 
falsum' est convertibile cum 1sto termino 'propositio', 
ut colligi potest per37 Aristotelem, 2° Posteriorum, 
capitulo 2°,38 ubi loqu1tur de pass1on1bus d1sjunct1s; 
sed propos1 tio dicta a Sorte est propos1 tio; 1g1 tur, 
proposit1o dicta a Sorte est vere. vel falsa. Consequent1a 
patet cum toto antecedente. 
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76.) 39sexto sic: Omnia conceptus compositus in 
an1ma in quo est actus componendi vel d.1v1dend1 est verus 
ve140 falsus; propos1t1o in an1ma est hujusmodi; 1g1tur, 
omnis propositio in an1m.a est vera vel falsa. Consequentia 
patet et minor. 
Aristot(~lis, 3° 
Et major in tenninis est proposit1o 
~ an1ma, textu comment1 26t1. 41 Et 
< 42 Commentator in commento dicit quod hoc est proprium 
huic43 propos1t1on1 esse verum vel falsum. 
-
77.) 44sept1mo argu1tur contra 1stam conclus1onem 
per auctor1 tates, ostendendo quo d sit contra mentEm 
Aristotelis et suorum sequaoium. D1v1d1t enim Aristoteles, 
45. prime Pe r i ermenias, oapitulo 4°, orationem in orationem 
enunt1at1 vam et orationem non enunt1at1 vam, enunt1at1 va.m 
vocana "propos1t1onem" quae, secundum eum, primo E.tl.2,~, 46 
"est oratio affirmativa vel negat1va alicujus de aliquo", 
ut communiter definiens orationem enunt1at1vam dic1t 
quad orat10 enunt1at1va est in qua est verum vel falsum; 
1g1 tur, cum d1c1 t pl.'Oposi tionem esse nee verum nee falsum, 
pr1nc1p11s ph1losoph1ae Aristote11s47 clare contrad1c1t. 
78.) 48rtem, Aristoteles, 2° Peri ermenias, oa.pitulo 
2°, 49 concludi t sic in tenninis: "Semper en1m vel veram 
vel falsam ease negationem" in propositione[_inj negat1va[m] 
43 
"necesse est~; sed quam necesse est unam partem contrad1ct1on1s 
esse veram vel falaam, tam neeesse est a1teram. Al1oqu1n 
, 
1.Jnag1na11ter possent simul stare in veritate vel falsitate. 
Igitur, necesse est utramque partem esse veram vel falsam . 
79 . ) 50rtem, Boethius, primo Topicorum suorum, 
ca.pi tulo . prim~, 5l def1n1ens proposi t1onem d1c1 t, 11Propos1 tio 
est oratio verum vel falsum s1gn1f1cans." 
80.) 52rtem, Anselmus,53 ~ ver1tate, oapitulo 
20,54 "cum s1gn1fioat", 1nqu1t, ·enunt1at10 "esse quad 
est, tune est in ea veritas et est vera." Oujus 
probat1o55 dicit quod tuno 0 sign1ficat q~od debetn. 56 
Et, s1 s1gn1f1cat quod recte significat, quare conclud1t 
quad tune est in ea veritas et57 recitudo ad 11neam58; 
se d absolute impossi bile quo d aliqua linea s1 t quae nee 
sit recta nee curva59; 1gitur, absolute 1mposs1b1le est 
quad sit proposit1o quae nee sit vera nee falsa . 
81.) Item, sit! propositio data quae nee sit 
vera nee fa.Isa, et ~ ejus contradictorium. Tune quaero 
utrum b sit verum vel falsum vel neutrum . Non neutrum, 
propter repugnantiam ad pr1lllum pr1nc1p1um demonstrat1on1s. 
Si verum, 1g1 tur .! est falsum . Patet consequentia, pe'r 
necessitatem primo princ1p11 demonstration1s . Si b est 
falsum, 1g1tur ! est60 verum. 
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82.) 61 rtem, Aristoteles, 6° Meta.phys1cae, textu 
comment1 octav1, 62 vult quod cujuslibet contrad1ct1on1s, 
. 
s1 affirmat1va erit ~era), negative. erit fa1sa, et e 
contrar1o. Super quam litteram d1c1t Commentator, 63 
"cum aff1rmat1va est vera," 1nqu1 t, "per composi t1onem, 
negativa est falsa per d1v1s1onem. Et sim111ter, quando 
negat1va est vera per d1v1sionem, aff1rmat1va est falsa 11 
generali ter "per com po s1 tionem. n 
83.) Secundo argu1tur64 pr1nc1pa11ter contra 
pos1t1onem in se, arguendo quod destru1t semet 1psam. 
Nam, juxta 1mag1nat1onem 1111us op1n1on1s, ex pr1nc1p11s 
65 . 
suis non sequitur aliqua conclusio vera vel falsa. 
66 Quod ostenditur sic: Nullum pr1nc1p1um suum est 
verum vel fal·sum; 1g1 tur, etc. Assertum argui tur sic: 
Acc1p1endo pr1mam definitionem suam, quae est haec: 
10mne s1gnum verum est s1gnum praecise qua11ter est 
s1gn1f1cans', et1am et !• 67 Tune sic: SUbjectum in 
a est terminus commun1s s1gn1f1cans totam illam 
-
proposit1onem cujus est pars; 1g1tur, cum ver1tas 
s1gn1f1cat1 sit causa ver1tat1s s1gn1, per primam 
conclusionem, prius esset ! vera. Consequentia b.aeo 
I 
omnino arguitur, sicut arguitur conclusio sua pr1nc1pal1s. 
(50rb) Et antecedens et arguo per eum: quia, qua 
45 
ratione in ista proposit1one 'Omne verum est verum', 
subjectum suppon1t pro toto cujus est pars, eadem 
rat1one per 'omn!• 68 in ! pars pro toto supponere 
potest. Debet quod, s1 d1catur quod def1n1t1o est una 
part1cular1s et non un1versal1s, et ideo non sequitur 
quod 1nfertur: sed hoc non solv1t. Nam aut 1lla 
def1n1t1o est data bene aut non. Si bene, 1g1tur 
est convert1b1le cum definite, per Aristotelem, 2° 
'posteriorum , oapi tulo 2°69 ; et, per consequens, s1 
signum un1versale additur subjecto, vere praedioabitur 
de illo illa def1n1t1o. Si male autem detur illa 
defin1t1o, habeo quod 1ntendo. Per idem medium 
concluditur quod quaelibet conclusio sua est talis, 
quarum nulla est vera vel falsa. 
84.) Secundo arguitur contra op1n1onem in se, eo 
quod ratio cui nititur est nimis d1m1nuta, 70 quae est 
quod n1h11 al1quo ordine naturae (Pra~supponit se 1psum. 
Nam sit Sortes f111us Platonis. Tune constat quod Sortes, 
ea ratione qua est f111us Platon1 s, est p·oster1or Platone, 
qu1a sic est effectus Platon1s, non solum ut Plato est 
Plato, sed ut Plato est,pater, 71 quia sic Plato est causa 
Sort1s; s1m111ter, f111us prius naturaliter est Platone, 
ut Plato est pater, eo quod Plato 1deo est pater, qu1a 
46 
babet filium; 1g1tur, 1psum habere filium est causa quare 
1pse est pater; f!lius, igi tur, ea ratione· qua est ca.usa 
quare pater est pater, est prius naturaliter ·se ipso, ea 
rat1one qua est a patre. Et hoc est quad vult Avicenna, 
6° Metaphys1oae.. suae, capitulo ultimo, 72 ub1 d1o1t quod 
causa, inquantum causa, prior est causato, inquantum 
causatum, et tamen causa, inquantum causa, s1m11 est 
cum oa.uaato simultate73 requisita ad relativa; 1gitur, 
secundum eum, causa, inquantum est illud a quo est 
oa.usatum, est prius natural1ter se 1psa, inquantum est 
correlativum cum causate. 
85.) Tertio sic: Sit a species lap1d1s ex1stens 
-
in an1ma Sort1s. Et argui tur s1 c: a est intellegib111s; 
-
aut, igi tur, per se aut per a11am speciem. ·s1 per a11am 
spec1em, quaero de 111a alia. Et sio vel erit processus 
1n74 infinitum val a11qua species in anima natural1ter 
praesentat se ipsam 1ps1 an1mae, quae species sit b. 
-
Tune sic: ~eat signum su1 1ps1us; 1g1tur, ~ praesuppon1t 
se 1psum ut signif1catum sibimet 1ps1, ut signo vero. 
Patet consequentia per primam conclusionem, et antecedens 
per descriptionem illius termini 1 signif1care•.75 Quod 
0 
etiam ~sit signum verum dicit Aristoteles, 3 ~ an1ma, 
textu comment1 26ti, 76 ubi vult Aristoteles et etiam 
47 
TI commentator quad intellectus simplex semper est verus; 
sed intellectus ~est intellectus simplex; igitur, ~ 
est signum verum. Sic, terminus in anima se 1psum 
repraesentans 1ps1 an1mae Sortie secundum rat1onem est 
se 1ps!78 ea ratione qua repraesentatur 1ps1 animae. 
oons1m111ter accidit in mUltis a111s, propter quod 
positio 1sta omnino vera non est.79 
86.) 80 Tertio pr1nc1pal1ter arguitur contra 
rationem pos1t1on1s. Ista enim pos1t1o in hoc concordat 
. . fil 
cum secunda, quod 1nn1t(ur) partem posse supponere 4'ro 
totg) cujus est pars. Inn1tur en1m illi proposition!, 
tamquam auo pr1nc1pa11 fundamento, qua negata, omnia 
argumenta sua pecca.rent fS.llac1am aequ1vocationis, et 
s1m111ter non causam ut oausam. 
87.) Arguitur82 contra83 hoc sic: Pars suppon1t 
pro toto cujus est pars; 1g1tur, est signum verum totius 
vel signum falsum totius. Consequens patet, arguendo 
contra conclusionem pr1nc1palem 1111us op1n1on1s. Et 
consequens falsum, secundum 1stam opinionem, cum non 
praesupponat propositionem cujus est pars esse veram 
neque falsam esse, quia ~1c se 1psam praesupponeret, 
quod .ista opinio non adm.1tt1t. 
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84 880) Isto posito, argu1tur quod pr1no1pia sua 
aunt n1mis85 d1m1nuta. 86 Pro quo primo sic: Nam, quando 
sic dicit: "signum verum. est signum praecise qualiter 
est s1gn1f1oans, n quaero quid determinat hoc verbum 'est' 
87 . in 111a definitione: (50va) aut ipsa propositio sic 
significans, aut ipsum significare, aut res quae s1gn1f1catur. 
Si primo modo, 1gitur omnis propos1t1o est vera. et nulla 
falsa. Probo consequentiam: Nam quaelibet propositic 
praecise significat tal1ter, qua11ter est s1gn1f1cans, 
cum haec sit imposs1b111s: 'Quaoumque propositione 
demonstrata, illa s1gn1ficat a11ter quam est s1gn1f1cans'. 
[E]idem sequitur, s1 1psum s1gn1ficare detenn1nat hoc 
verbum 'est' in ipsa def1n1tione. Ig1tur, 1ps1us 
88 89 d1v1sionis concedenda est pars ultima, quod res 
[quod res] quae sign1f1oa.tur per propc31 tionem 
determinat hoc verbum 'est•. Ex quo arguitur propositum 
sic: Sit! 1sta propositio 'Antichristus er1t', quae 
sol um s1gn1ficet juxta composi tionem terminorum, et 
pr1mo quo4 modo non sit Antichristus nee al1quid ejus. 
Tune sic arguo: ! est signum verum; et non praec1se 
qua11ter est s1gn1f1cat; igitur, non quodlibet signum 
verum praecise qualiter ~st significat, quod est oppositum 
illius defin1tion1s. patet major. Et minor arguitur: Nam 
hoc verbum 'est' determinat res s1gn1f1cata[s] per~; 
49 
sed nulla est res significata per!; 1g1tur, ! non 
sign1f1cat sicut est. Oonsequentia evidens. 90 Et prim.a 
pars antecedentis patet per d1v1sionem prius posita.m, et 
secunda pars per oasum. 
89.) 91 secundo sic: Sit a11qua propositio vera mere 
de praeter1 to vel de futuro, ut talis 'Adam fui t' vel 
talis 'Dies crast1na92 erit'. Tune sic: ! est propositio 
vera; et tamen ! non praecise qua11ter est s1gn1f1oat; 
1g1tur. Minor sic: Quam determinatur verbum unius 
tempor1s ad praecise significandum tempus ejusdem dicere, 
'tam. determinatur93 verbum al ter1us94 dicere ad praeoise 
cons1gn1ficandum. tempus alterius d1oere; ig1tur, sicut 
verbum praesentis temporis non cons1gn1f1cat futurum 
tempus vel praeteritum., sic verbum praeteriti temporis 
vel futur1 non consignifi cat tempus pra.esens; non plus, 
igitur, s1gn1f1cat propos1t1o de future, quamvis vera, 
sicut est, quam propositio de praesenti vera s1gn1f1cat 
sicut eri t. 
90.) Item, propositio de cont1ngent1, ut talis 
'Album poss1b1le est esse nigrum', non plus s1gn1f1cat 
sicut est, quam propos1 tio ,negat1 va vera de 1nesse 
significat sicut potest esse. 
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91.) 95rtem, secunda def1n1t1o est 1nsuff1c1ens 
et falsa. Insuff1c1ens est enim, eo quod multa sunt 
vera quorum quodlibet qua11ter non est s1gn1f1cat. 
Quod arguitur sic: Nulla negat1va vera de praesenti 
praecise qua11ter est s1gn1f1cat; et a11qua96 negat1va 
vera de praesenti est; 1g1tur, aliqua negativa vera de 
praesent1 qualiter non est s1gn1f1cat. Consequentia 
evidens est. Et assertum probo: Sit! ista propos1t1o 
'Ant1chr1stus potest non esse•, quae sit vera. Et arguo 
sic: ! non s1gn1f1cat quod al1qu1d est; nee ! s1gn1f1cat 
quod a11qua11ter est; 1g1tur, ! non s1gn1f1cat sicut est. 
97 patet consequentia: Nam ex opposite sequitur oppositum. 
Igitur, ! non praecise qualiter est s1gnif1cat; et, s1cut 
arguitur de (1sta>, ita de qualibet negativa a11a; 
1g1tur, nUlla negativa, 98 etc. 
92.) Item, a s1gn1f1cat primo Ant1chr1sttm.i non 
... 
esse; 1g1tur, ! non s1gn1f1cat primo a11qu1d [non] esse. 
Patet consequentia, cum Antichristum non esse non sit 
al1qu1d esse, sed al1qu1d non esse.99 
93.) 1 rtem, quad 1lla def1n1t1o secunda2 sit 
falsa concluditur ex hoc, -quod definitio praedicatur 
de opposite def1n1t1. 
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94.) 3Item, contra primam conclusionem, quae 
d,icit quod veritas signi praesupponit, tamquam prius 
natura, tam veritatem sui s1gnif1cat1, quam suum 
s1gn1f1catum: Ista conclusio omnino stare non potest. 
Nam sit! 1sta propositio: 1Poss1b1le est Sortem ease'. 
4 Et demonstro per 'Sortem' qui numquam er1t, poterit 
tamen fore. Et arguo sic: Si n1h11 esset, n1s1 causa 
prima et una an1ma et5 ~ et partes ejus, quae anima in 
se ! propositianem componeret, ! propos1t1o asset vera; 
sed tune! non praesupponeret ver1tatem su1 s1gn1f1cat1, 
(50vb) cum ta1is ·veritas non esset veritas praecise ease, 
nee veritas animae, nee veritas complexa 1111us propos1t1on1s; 
1g1tur, non sequitur quad quaelibet propos1t1o vera 
ver1tatem sui s1gn1f1cat1 naturaliter praesupponeret. 
95.) Item, si verita.s s1gn1f1cat1 praesupponitur 
(a) veritat~6 s1gn1, aliqua veritas s1gn1f1cat1 non 
dependet a ver1 tate <s1gnj), ut7 ex1g1 t ad unum esse8 
veritatem signi, eo quad accidentaliter soltnn et non per 
se sequitur a11quam proposi tionem aliquwn . rem s1gn1f1cantem 
esse.9 .: Ex quo una cum conclusione arguo quod, si 
nih11 asset, n1s1 Deus, adhuc 1nf1n1ta assent. Probatur 
consequent1a: qu1a, si n1h11 asset, n1s1 Deus, adhuo 
1nf1n1tae propos1t1ones verae d1st1nctas res s1gn1f1cantes 
possent esse; sed omnium 1llarum rerum ver1 tates mo do 
aunt; 1g1tur, etc. 
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96.) Item, s1 inf1n1tae tales propos1t1ones assent 
in actu, tune 1nf1n1 tae ver1 tates significatorum p(;r 
111as propositionea essent in actu; sed nulla illarum 
ver1tatum dependet a pos1t1one10 propos1t1on1s sign1f1cant1s 
rem cujus est ver1tas; 1gitur, jam est quael1bet 1llarum. 
97.) Item, componat Sortes sic in anima sua: 
'Antichristus non est•, quae sit!• quae modo sit vera. 
Tune arguitur sic: ! est verum; igitur, ~ praesuppon1t 
tam ve ri ta tem <s 1 gni fi cat') su1 q uam 1 p sum s1 gni f1 ca tum. 
Quaero, 1.gitur, aut suum s1gn1ficatum quod praesuppon1t 
est in anim& Sortis aut extra animam. 11 Non extra 
animam, quia nihil est extra animam quad est Ant1chr1stum 
non ease, nee ~liquid er1t extra, nee fu1t; 1g1tur, s1 
praesuppon1t significa.tum suum, praesupponit ipsum in 
anima Sort1s in ease subject1{v)o vel object1(v)o. 
Consequent1a patet. Et consequens falsum: Nam, dato 
consequente, duo contradictoria possent esse simul vera. 
Quad arguo sic: Sit significatum 1111ua ! ~· Et 
veri tas ~ sit £• Tune sic: Quandocumque erunt ! ~ £, 
I 
erit ! verum, eo quod ! in esse vero solum dependet a~ 
et£, per conclusionem primam. Al1oqu1n, quando erit 
ab c, erit haec vera: 'Ant1chr1stus est'. Igitur, 
-- -
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aliquando quando ! er1t verum, er1t haec vera: 'Antichristus 
est'; et! est ista: 'Antichristus non est'; 1g1tur, 
aliquando quando erit haec vera 'Ant1christus non est', 
erit haec vera 'Ant1chr1stus est'; et ista sunt contradictoria; 
1g1tur, etc. Et minor primae consequentiae argu1tur sic: 
Quad est in an1ma Sortie po test mane re (cum) posi tione 
Antichrist! in esse, eo quod Ant1chr1stus non repugnat 
alicu1 vel a11quibus qui aunt in an1ma Sortie; 1g1tur, 
cum ! ~ _£ sun t in an1ma Sorti s, ! ,2 .£ po ssun t manere cum 
pos1tione12 .Ant1chr1st1; qua posita reduota ad actum, 
sequitur minor in term1n1s. 
98.) Ex 1sto sequitur etiam quad opposi tum 
conclusionis secundae suae fore verum, quae d1c1t quod 
signum falsum praesupponit tam s1gnif1ca~ falsum13 quam 
1ps1us s1gnif1cat1 contrad1ctor1umo14 Haec enim 
propositio 'Antichristus est' est falsa, et tamen ista 
propositio nee praesupponit significatum falsum, nee 
contrad1ctor1um 1111us s1gn1f1cat1. Quod arguitur sic: 
qu1a, nee in re, nee in intellectu; 1g1tur, etc. Non in 
re, q~ia nihil est15 Ant1chr1stum esse in re, quando 
Antichristus non est; nee in intellectu, propter 
argumentum prius fa.ctum; igitur, etc. 
16 99.) Item, per Aristoteles, 5° Metaphysicae, 
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textu commenti 34ti,l7 nullum falsum est al1quod ens in 
rebus, ut patet per exempla sua per totum capitulum de 
falso; igitur, s1 propositio falsa praesupponit suum 
signif1catum, praesupponit illud solum in intellectu, 
quod etiam non perm1tt1t deductio prius facta. 
100.) Ultimo arguitur quad propositio non praesupponit 
contrad1ctor1um su1 s1gnif1cat1: quia quaero quid 
1ntelleg1t per 'oppositum s1gn1f1cat1 propositionis 
falsae': aut contradictoriam propositionem aut oppositum 
sign1f1catum; sed sive sic sive sic, non praesupponit 
e,jus contradictorium; 1g1 tur, etc. Antecedens argue 
breviter (5lra) sic: Nam ad hoc, quod ista propositio 
sit falsa: 'Antichristus est', non requiritur quad 
prius re vel rat1one f\lerit ista propos1t1o 'Antichristus 
non ("est)' ·, nee s1gn1f1catum illius proposi t1on1s, cum 
n1h11 sit Antichristum non esse. 
101.) Item, unum contradictor1um non18 praesupponit 
re11quum, cum nullum ordinem19 habere posset20 ad'ipSUlll. 
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102.) Item, secundum Aristotelem 2° Elenchorum , 21 
contra d1ct1o sol um est inter proposi ti ones; sed una 
pars contrad1ct1on1s forma11s, maxima pars affirmat1va, 
s1ve vera sive falsa, non praesupponit a11am; 1g1tur, 
n1hil est ponere quad propositio falsa praesupponit tam 
• · sign1f1catum falsum quam contrad1otor1um 22 e1gnif1cat1. 
Et ista contra opiniones s1ff1c1unt. 
103.) (~)mprobatis 1g1tur 1111s op1n1on1bus, 
tamquam 1nsolub111a 1nsuff1cienter solventibus, rest.at 
a11a pr1nc1p1a ponere, ex qu1bus eorum solut1o poterit 
clarius apparere. Unde, pro eorum solut1one, praemittendae 
aunt a11quae d1v1s1ones. Secundo, ponendae aunt al1quae 
suppositiones. Tertio, addendae aunt descript1ones. 
Et quarto el1c1endae sunt a11quae conclusiones, ex quibus 
patebit posit1o a11a in hac materia. 
104.) Divisiones autem aunt tres. 23Pr1ma: Omnia 
24 
suppos1t1o in propos1t1one est mater1a11s vel signif1cat1va. 
Haec paret ea quae prius dicuntur in mater.1a supposi t1onum. 25 
26secunda est ista: Quael1bet propositio simplex categories 
est vera vel falsa. Haec patet ex his quae arguuntur 
contra pr1nc1palem conclusionem quarta.e op1n1on1s. 
27Tert1a: Omne 28 1nsolub1l; est ca.tegor1oum vel hypothet1mun.29 
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105.) Suppos1tiones vero sunt quinque, quarum 
prima est haec: 30Quael1bet propos1t1o simplex oategor1ca 
sffirmat1va de 1nesse et de praesent1 quae praecise 
significat prime s1cut est est vera. Addo autem hoc 
determinativum 'primo' ad hoc verbum 's1gn1f1cat', quia 
ra.tionab111ter posset d1o1 quod nu11a propos1t1o praecise 
sign1f1cat sicut est, eo quod quaelibet propos1t1o 
sign1f1cat pr1nc1pal1ter sicut s1gn1f1cat suum subjectum, 
quod non s1gn~fioat [quod non s1gn1f1cat] esse, nee 
sign1f1cat non esse; et 1deo non s1gn1f1cat s1cut est. 
S1m111ter, al1qua talis propos1tio s1gn1f1cat multa 
quorum a11quod non est, ut haec propos1t1o 'Sortes 
intellegit Ant1chr1stum'; 1g1tur, non praecise sign1f1cat 
quod est, nee praecise sicut est. Total1s tamen 
s1gn1f1cat1o propos1tion1s et prima 1ntegra.tur ex 
s1gn1f1cat1one omn1um suoi1lm partium; et idea praec1se 
s1gn1f1cat primo aff1rmat1va de praesent1 et de 1nesse 
sicut est, quamvis secundar1o, ut part1a11 ter, s1gn1f1cat 
s1gn1f1catum a11cujus alterius suae partis. 
106.) 3lsecunda est 1sta: Quaelibet simplex 
categor1ca affirmat1va de 1nesse et de praesenti quae 
non praecise s1gn1f1cat primo sicut est est falsa. Haec 
sequitur ex prima, una cum secunda in div1s1one. 
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107.) 32Tertia est ista: Si qua simplex categories 
negat1va de praesent1 et de 1nesse quae praecise sign1f1cat 
primo sicut est est propos1t1o falsa--haec sic: Si qua 
talts sit, est fa1sa. Oonsequentia patet et assertum, 
quoad primam partem. S1m111 ter, si [s;) qua talis s1 t, 
s1gn1ficat primo rem non esse. Et quod s1gn1f1cat rem 
non esse quae est argu1tur ex hoc, quod sign1ficat sicut 
est;: 1g1 tur, :. sicut res est vel sal tem sicut praesent1a11 ter33 
est; sed nihil nee aliqualiter praesent1al1ter est, n1s1 
res; 1gitur, a prime: s1gn1f1cat (stcu~ est; igitur, 34 
s1gn1ficat stout res est; et s1gn1ficat 11lam rem non 
esse; igitur, quaelibet talis s1gn1f1cat prime rem non 
esse quae est, quod est probandum. 
108.) Ex 1sta sequitur quarta, quae talis: 
35Quael1bet simplex negativa de inesse et de praesenti 
quae praec1se sign1f1cat pr1mo sicut non est est propos1t1o 
vera. Haec, quamvis manifeste sequatur ex priori, arguitur 
ta.men breviter sic: Quaelibet talis s1gn1ficat rem non 
ease (5lrb) a11ud; igitur, s1gnificat rem non esse 
. 36 
sicut res non est, et habeo propos1tum, aut s1gn1ficat 
rem non esse non eo mode quo res non est, et constat 
quod tune non est vera; 1g1tur, ad hoc, quod sit vera, 
requ1ritur quod sign1f1cet prime sicut non est. Quae 
58 
est suppositio data. Et acclpetur in 1stis suppositionibus 
1ste terminus 'sicut' prout habitudinem denotat et 
proport1onem inter rem s1gn1f1catam et term1num 
significantem. 37 
109.) 38Quinta: Omne 1nsolub1le, sive categoricum 
s1ve hypothet1cum, ortum habet ex casu a11quo vel 
suppositione ordinata ad tale 1nsolub1le. Haec [Sexto39J 
d1norab1tur per processum: Nam, Sorte loquente talem 
propositionem ··sortes dicit falsum' vel 1ntellegente 
talem proposit1onem 'Sortes 1ntellegit falsum', stat 
ipsum Sortem verum dicere vel verum 1ntellegere ab 
40 ha.es1tat1one et dub12 ut, si 1ntellegeret vel diceret 
hominem ease as1num, et pro ea d1ceret vel componeret 
'Sortes d1c1t falsum', vera esset talia propositlo; sed, 
. . 
41 
suppositis cum hoc a111s part1cul1s quae sunt in casu, 
quae aunt quod Sortes dicat 1llam et nullam a11am, et quod 
sit unicus Sortes, et quod 111a s1gn1f1cet juxta compos1t1onem 
terminorum, tune primo redditur talis propositio 1nsolub111s; 
et idea 1nsolub1le oritur, tamqua.m ex cauaa sua total1, 
ex casu aliquo vel suppositione ordinata ad tale insolubile, 
quae est op1nio data. 
110.) Ex quo sequitur quod male div1d1tur 1nsolub1le, 
quando dicitur quod aliquod insolubile oritur ex actu 
42 43 
nostro et aliqu~d ex proprietate vocis, cum omne 
1nsolubile oriatur praec1se ex casu vel suppos1t1one 
aliqua ordinata ad tale 1nsolubile. Nee ratio dUcta 
59 
44 pro 1lla op1n1one aliquid cogit, cum d1c1tur quod ideo 
oritur tale insolubile 'Sortes dicit falsum' ex actu 
nostro,. quia, si illae proposi tiones essent amotae ab 
actu nostro, non essent 1nsolub1les. 45 Sed contra hoc 
brevi ter sic: Quaero utrum 1ntelleg1 t haeo opinio quod 
in tali propositione 'Sortes dicit falsum' actus noster 
sit tota causa quare talis propositio est 1nsolub111s 
vel 1ntelleg1t quod actus sit tantum causa partialis. 
Si primo modo, tune, in quacumque propos1t1one esset 
actus noster, 111a propositio esset 1nsolub1lis; igitur, 
cum omnis propositio 1nsolub111s sit falsa, secundwn istam 
opinionem, 46 omnis tal1s propositio in qua ponitur actus 
noster, ut sunt istae propositiones: 'Sortes dicit falsum' 
'Sortes scribit falsum' 'Sortes audit fa.lsum•, nullo al1o 
oasu posito, esset falsa; igitur, si detur altera pars, quod 
actus nester non sit oausa totalis, sed pa.rtialis, quare 
ta11s propositio est 1nsolub111s, 111a divisio tune non 
exprimit sufficienter unde oritur ratio propos1tion1s 
insolubilis, ut, si quaeratur 11Quare scribis", et47 
respondes "Quod habeo penna", 1nsuff1c1entem causam 
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assignas, qu1a, quamvis necessario tuerit penna 
requisita ad scribendum., multa tamen a11a requ1runtur. 
111.) Descr1pt1ones vero su11t duae. 48 Prima: 
rnsolubile simplex ca.tegorioa est illud cujus alterum 
extremum vel utrumque, sub appar~nte49 supposit1one 
pro complexo, praec1se complexum vel complexa signifioat 
vel supponit. 50 secunda: Insolubile hypotheticum. est 
. . 51 illud cujus al1qua pars, sub appar~nte suppositione 
pro complexis, praec1se supponit pro complexo vel 
significat D.nJ complex!• 52 Quomodo autem istae duae 
descriptiones sequuntur ex53 qu1n"t!54 d1v1s1one55 1nfer1us56 
ostendetur. 
112.) His p.raemissis, sequuntur conolusiones, quae 
sunt quinque in numero, quarum prima est haec: 57Quael1bet 
species termini in voce vel in scripto existens in anima 
est praecise agentis propriae et sui ipsius naturaliter 
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ostensiva. Haec conclus1o habet duas partes. Pro 
utraque simul general1ter arguitur sic: Illam rem 
species existens in anima praecise naturaliter significat 
quam, seclusa omni 1mpos1 tione, (5lva) sign1f1ca.t; sed 
omni 1mpos1t1one seclusa, nu11am. a11am59 rem a se ipsa 
et ab agente proprio significat; 1g1tur, quaelibet 
61 
species praec1se natural1ter60 se 1psam et agens propr1um 
signifi cat. 
113.) Sed, qu1a non aeque pr1mo in 1ntellectu 
conjuncto signif1cat se ipsam et agens a quo causatur, 
1deo probo generaliter quad quaelibet species tennini 
in voce vel in scripto s1gnificet naturaliter agens 
proprium a quo causatur. Pro quo argu1tur sic: 
Quaelibet species re1 sens1b1lis est agent1s proprii 
naturaliter sign1f1cativa; quaelibet species termini 1n 
voce vel in scripto est species rei sensibilis; igitur, 
quaelibet species termini in voce vel in scr1pto est. 
agentis [et] propr11 naturali ter s1gn1ficat1va. Consequentia 
patet et major, cum non a11ter sensib111a naturaliter 
intelleguntur. Et minor et1am, cum omn1s tenn1nt;s in 
voce vel in scripto est ab a11quo sensu perceptibilis, 
ut quilibet terminus scriptus visu et qu1libet tenninus 
prolatus aud1 tu. 
114.) Secundo, arguitur quod 111a species [in anima] 
ex1stens in anima ~st naturallter ipsi an1mae sui 1ps1us 
ostensiva; tamen, quia al1quid existens in an1ma est 
61 
su1 1ps1us ostensiva, ig1tur, cum qu!:!libet ex1stens 
in anima sit aeque praesens s1cut a11quid existens in 
1psa anima, sequitur quod62 quaelibet existens in 
an1ma est naturaliter sui ipsius ostensiva. Tamen 
et1am, quia quaelibet species ex1stens in an1ma se 
62 
1psam an1mae repraesentans potest esse extremum 
proposit1on1s mentalis, 1g1tur, cum nullum extremum in 
propositione mental1 s1gn1f1cet, nis1 natura11ter, 
sequitur quod quael1bet species in anima naturaliter 
sui 1psius est63 signifioativa. 
115.) Confirmatur tota conclus1o breviter sic: 
Nihil quod non64 est 111a species vel agens 1psam 
speciem sine impos1t1one vera vel aequ1valent1 a11qua 
species in anima s1gn1ficat; 1g1tur, praecise natura11ter 
sui 1ps1us et agentis propr1i est species existena in anima 
1Eatura11ter] significat1va. Antecedens arguitur ex 
hoc, quod quaelibet species quodl1bet aliud +mpon1 potest 
ad significandum, ut patere poterit inductive. Et 1st.a 
pro hao conolusione sufficiant. Quae conolusio non65 
est una simplex categor1ca de copulate extreme, sed 
virtualiter est una conjunctiva includens duas oategor1cas. 
116.) 66 Secunda conclusio: Nullum extremum 
proposit1on1s extra animam al1qu1d ex 1mpos1t1one sign1f1cat, 
n1s1 quod natural1ter et a priori significat extremum 
propos1t1on1s menta11s. Haec arguitur sic: Omnia 
terminus s1gn1ficans ex 1mpos1t1one subord1natur in 
63 
s1gn1f1Qando term1no mentali actu idem sign1f1oant1, 
67 
ex Aristotele, prime Perie r uenias , capitulo prime ; 
1g1tur, nullus terminus ex 1mposit1one a11quid s1gnif1cat, 
nis1 quod prius natura11ter significat terminus menta11s. 
patet consequent1a ex descr1pt1one 1111us complex! 
subordinare in significando. 68 
117.) 69 conf1rmatur ratio sic: Omni actua11 
significatione te:rm1n1 mental1s subducta, qu111bet 
terminus extra animam omnino 1ntr1ns1ce et extr1ns1ce 
se habe(n]t, sicut habu1t quando70 n1h11 s1gn1!1cav1t; 
1gitur, omni actua11 sign1f1cat1one termini mentalis 
subducta, terminus extra n1h11 significat. patet 
consequentia cum antecedente. 
118.) 71confirmatur 1 terum sic: Actua11s 
comprehensio talis rei a per talem terminum b est 
- -72 
oausa particularis et in actu quare b s1gn1f1cat 
. - -
m1h1 !; 1g1tur, desinente actu comprehensionis 1ps1us73 
! per b, desinit ~ s1gn1f1care !; sed ~non patest 
m1h1 significare ex impositione !' nisi in ratione 
sign1 mediet inter]? et ipsum ! terminus mentalis 
naturaliter significans mihi !• cum~ non determinat 
74 1ntellectionem meam plus ex natura sua ad ten~endum 
super ! 1 quam super75 a11ud ab~; 1g1tur1 pro omni 
mensura pro qua b ex 1mpos1t1one signif1cat m1h1 ! 1 
64 
in ratione signi mediat inter ~ et 1psum ! terminus 
mentalis naturaliter n1h1 s1gn1f1cans (5lvb) !; et 
ultra: 1gitur, quandocumque ~ m1h1 signif1cat !t 
prius natura11ter s1gn1f1cat ! a11quis terminus 
mentalis; et sicut argu1tur76 de~ ad!' sic argui 
potest de quol1bet termino significante ex impositione 
et ejus s1gnif1cato; igitur, nUllus terminus aliquid 
ex impositlone signlficat, nisi quad naturaliter et 
a priori significat terminus mentalis. 77 patet consequentia 
ultima ex hoc, quod, sicut terminus extra an1mam habet 
quod sit terminus in anima, ex oorrespondentia et 
subord1nat1one ad terminum mentalem, sic78 extremum 
proposition1s extra habet quod sit extremum,· ex 
subordinatione et correspondentia ad extremum propos1t1on1s 
in an1ma. <_Igitur, nullum extremum) proposition~79 
~xtra an1mam) 80 aliquid ex 1mpos1tione significat, 
nisi quod naturaliter et a priori significat extremum 
propos1t1on1s mentalis, quad est probandum. 
119.) 81 Tertia: Quidquid aliqua proposi tic vel 
ejus extremum denotat signif1care, 1psum necesse est 
quad actualiter significet. Et intellegitur 1ste 
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terminus 'necesse' prou~ determ1naret82 1nhaerent1am 
praedioat1 ad subjectum. Hoc probatur ostensive: qu1a 
s1 aliqua propos1t1o aliquid vel aliqua denotat s1gn1f1care, 
aut 1gitur alicui aut null1. Si nul.11, igitur non plus 
aliquid per ipsum ooncipitur. 83 
120.) Contra, s1 nihil aliud a se denotaret: 
sed, si nihil (a11ud) a se denotaret, _tune .n1h11 
a11ud intellectum. a se repraesentaret; ex quo formaliter 
sequitur quod nih11 aliud a se significaret; igitur, 
vel staret materlaliter vel omnino nihil denotaret. 
121.) Ad idem sic: Sit illud quod aliqua 
propositio extra animam dicitur84 denotare !• et 
propositio b. Tune quaero aut ~ denotat ! natura11ter 
aut ex 1m.pos1t1one; non naturaliter, cum sit · 
propositio extra animam; 1g1tur, ex 1mpos1t1one. 
Quo date, arguo propositum sic: 85! denotat ~ex 
1mpos1t1one; 1gitur, pro omni mensura pro qua~ 
denotat ~. subord.inatur 1ntention1 naturaliter 
s1gn1f1cant1 b; et ultra: 1g1tur, ~ sign1f1cat ~; 
1g1tur, a prime, ! denotat ~; 1g1tur, ~ s1gnif1cat 
~o Omnes consequentiae intermediae patent per ea quae 
86 de subordinations tennlnorum superius declarantur. 
66 
122.) 87Quarta88 conclusio: Nullum extremum 
propositionis in an1ma supponere potest pro 1psa 
propositione tota. Hoc probatur generaliter tam de 
aff1rmat1v1s quam de negativ1s 0 89 Et prime de 
aff1rmat1v1s argue prime sic: Omnis actus compositionis 
praesupponit naturaliter ordine naturae90 ea quae 1110 
actu componuntur; omn1s actus quo res expressa per 
praedicatum affirmatur de re expressa per subjectum est 
actus cemposftionis; 1g1 tur, omnis actus quo res expressa 
per praedicatum affirmatur de re expressa per subjectum 
praesupponi t necessario ordine naturae· ea quae 1110 
actu componuntur. Iste discursus 
cujus major ex se evi dens est. 92 
. 91 patet in primo primae, 
93 Et minor patet per 
94 Aristetelem, primo Periermenias, oapitulo primo, 
95et Commentatorem, 6° Metaphysicae, oapitulo ultimo, 96 
et per Aristotelem et Commentatorem, 3° lDe anima, textu 
comment1 2197 et commento correspondente.98 
123.) Sit 1g1tur !E_ aliqua propositio mentalis. 
Et s1t99 cactus quo res s1gn1f1cata per~ affirmatur 
de re sign1f1cata per~· Et arguo sic: ~ praesupponit 
ordine naturae tam significatum ! quam significatum b; 
sed £ ordine naturae non praesupponit1 ipsum £; 
1gitur, £non est significatum ! nee significatum ~. 
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rsta consequentia patet et de 1110 ordine naturae qui 
est inter causam et effectum distinctum, quia de 11io 
ordine intellegitur minor illa. Non en1m potest £ prius 
natura esse intuitive cognitum, quam sit in natura. 
2per idem, nee (52ra) £est pars alterius significati, 
eo quod sicut 4'_totum) sign~ficatuz:i ,23 praecedi t £, sic 
totum s1gn1ficatum4 ! praecedit £, cum c sit actus 
. d.15 unien totum significatum ! cum toto significato ]?, 
sumendo significatum pro supposito. Et sicut arguitur de 
ista propositione '!est]?', sic de qualibet in spec1a11 
argu1 potest; 1gitur, conclusio generaliter vera. 
124.) Secundo sic: Si sit possibile quod in 
aliqua propositione in an1ma pars suppon1t pro tote 
cujus est pars, sit in ista '!est~· sic, quad~' 
quad est praedicatum, supponat pro tota 111a propositione. 
Et argue hoc esse impossibile dupliciter: primo, per 
medium assertum a priori, et secundo ex ipso concesso, 
deducendo 1mposs1bile. Argue sic: Quaecumque duo se 
habent in ordine essentiali respectu tert11, respectu 
1111us tertii prius est 1llud quod in illo ordine est 
prius; notitia simplex et notitia complexa respectu 
i:psius animae sunt hujusmodi, quad respectu 1111us 
prius essentialiter est notitia simplex quam not1tia 
68 
complexa cujus ipsa est pars; igitur, etc. Oonsequentia 
patet, et major de se, ~o quod oppositum majoris est 
simpliciter impossibile. Et minor ostend1tur sic: Quae:iibet 
potentia 1ntellect1va acquirens notitia(~ per discursum 
essent1alem ordinem habentem ifi,n illo ordinJ respectu 
1111us potentiae, in 1110 ordine aliquid est prim.um, 
cum in essent1a11ter ord1nat1s procedere 1n6 infinitU!Il sit 
1mposs1b1le; sed nih11 poni potest pr1usquam7 notit1a 
1ncomplexa; 1g1 tur, noti tia (1n)complexa prior est 1110 
ordine, quam aliqua notitia quae magis appropinquat ad 
discursum. Haec conaequentia de se evidens est cum 
toto auo antecedente. Ex consequente, igitur, sic: 
Quaelibet notitia [1n]complexa mag1s appropinquat ad 
discursum, quam aliqua8 notitia inoomplexa ejusdem; 
igitur, respectu potentiae 1ntellect1vae acquirentis 
not1t1am per discursum, prior essentialiter est 
noti tia [est 'noti t~aJ incomplexa, quam no ti tia coriple:x:a, 
quod est probandum. 
125.) Oonfirmatur 11la minor breviter sic: 
Notitia incomplexa potest esse sine not1t1a complexa, 
et e contrario non; 1g1tur, not1t1a incomplexa est 
prior. 
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126.) Confirmatur 1terum minor 1lla sic: Quam 
adhaerentia conclus1on1s cogn1tae per praemlssas 
praesuppon1t in esse tali ad[.1n)haerentia.m praemissarum, 
tam notit1a complexa aJ.terius praem1ssae praesuppon1t 
notitiam habitam per extrema propositionis 1111us 
not1t1ae complexae; sed adhaerent1a conclusionis talis 
necessario praesuppon1t adhaerentiam praemissarum; 
1g1 tur, et not1 tia complexa al ter1us praeuiissae necessar1o 
praesupponit not1t1am hab1tam per utrumque extremum. 
9 Assertum patet, cum respectu ejusdem an1mae sit essent1a11s 
ordo utrobique. Ex isto sequitur formaliter oppos1tum 
hypothesis, 10 cum nihil essent1a11ter vel essential! 
ordine praesupponit se 1psum. 
127.) Confirmatur ratio 1 terum sic: Quaeli bet 
proposit1o quae est in an1ma suff1c1enter naturaliter 
repraesentatur intellectui per se ipsam. · Alioquin en1m 
asset processus in infinitum in med11s natura11ter 
repraesentantibus, quad natura abhorret. Igitur, nullum 
extremum proposit1on1s in anima natural1ter repraesentat 
1ntellectu!11 totam 1llam propos1tionem cujus est pars. 
Oonsequentia patet ex hoc, quod natura n1hil agit 
frustra, nee agere potest; sed quodlibet extremum 
propos1t1onis in an1ma naturaliter s1gnificat qu1dqu1d 
70 
61gnifios.t, cum un1atur actu1 naturaliter s1gn1f1cant1; 
1g1tur, nullum extremum a11cujus propos1t1onis in 
anima s1gn1f1cat totam illam propositionem cujus est 
pars. Sic 1g1tur argu1tur conclusio a priorio 
128.) A posteriori autem, deducendo ad 1mposs1 bile, 
argu1 tur brevi ter sic: ·Prius (52rb) natural1 ter intellectus 
1ntellegit sign1f1oatum per extremum istius propos1tion1s 
'a est b 1 quam habet actum. affirmandi significatum unius 
- _, 
extremi de a110, cum non a11ter affirmat quam intellegat; 
igitur, pr1us naturaliter ~ntellectus intellegit significatum 
1st1us tenn1n1 b, quam 1ntelleg1t significatum 1llius 
propositionis 'a est~·. patet consequentia, cum non 
prius intellegat istam propositionem, quam produceat 
eam. Patet haec de notitia 1ntu1t1va, de qu~ est sermo. 
129.) Et quad non prius 1ntellegit significatum 
12 1111us tennini b, quam s1gn1f1catum 1111us propos1t1on1s 
'!est b': data hypothes1, arguitur ex hoc, quad 
signif1oatum 1111us13 termini est s1gn1ficatum illius 
propos1t1on1s: sequitur, igitur, utraque pars contradictionis 
. 14 15 forma11s, hypothesi hac conceasa. Et pro ista 
16 
conclusione, cum 1111s quae prius dicuntur contra 
secunda,m opinionem~7 haec sufficiant. 
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130.) 18Quinta conclusio: Si in nu11a propositione 
1n anima potest pars supponere pro toto cujus est pars, 
1n nullo extra animam pars pro toto supponere potest. 
Haec sequitur immediate ex secunda conclus1one sic: 
Nullum extremum proposit1on1s extra animam al1qu1d 
s1gnif1cat, 19 n1si quod a priori sign1f1cat extremwn 
pro po si tion1s mentalis; 1g1 tur, si. null um extremum in 
proposi tione in an1ma supponat pro toto cujus est pars, 
nullum extremum propos1tion1s extra pro tote cujus est 
20 pars supponere potest. 
131.) 21Ad idem sic: Sit ·~est b 1 aliqua propos1tio 
in anima cui subordinatur extra an1mam ista proposit1o 
'£est d'. Tune quaero utrum. ~22 praeeise subord1netur23 
24 ! in significando, quatenus c hie supponit, · aut non. 
Si sic, propositum habetur, quod esset: 'Rem habet a 
pro suppos1to quam £ habet pro suo supposito.' s(1) £ 
non praecise subordinatur ! in significando, igitur a 
et a11eui alter1 in an1ma, puta toti 1111 propos1t1on1 
cujus ~ est pars, quia quodcumque aliud suppositum esset 
1mpert1nens. Et· si 25 sic, 1g1 tur e non est idem tenninus 
et in una sign1f1catione et in ai1a. Consequentia patet, 
cum unitas termini infertur ex unitate s1gn1f1cat1on1s. 
Et, per consequens, nullus tenninus unus extra animam 
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potest supponere pro tote cujus est pars, nisi a priori 
terminus 1n anima sic supponere posset. 
132.) Confirmatur: s1 26 £ habeat pro suppos1to suo 
tam illud quod27 ~ habet pro supposito, quam etiam tota.m 
propositionem oujus 1pse est pars, tune 1sta convertuntur: 
'.2 est ,g' et 1stae duae ca.tegor1ca.e: '.2 est _g•, pro 
supposito ~' et 'Haec proposit1o ~.2 est _g~ est d'; et, 
per consequens, d non praec1se subord1natur in sign1f1cando 
huic propositioni in anima ·~est b', nee alicu1_ejus 
parti. Et consequentia prior paret Ar·istotelem, pr1mo 
- . 28 
Per1ermen1as, ub1 ponit pro regula quad, si iste 
terminus 1 tun1ca' s1gnif1cat equum et hominem, quad 
ta11s propos1t1o 'Tunica est alba' non est s1mplex29 
categor1ca, sed aequivalet 1st1s duabus categoricis: 
'Equus est albus' 'Homo est albus'. Ex quibus sequitur 
conolus1o in tenn1n1s. 
133.) 30 <s>ed, qu1a 1stae duae ultimae conclus1ones, 
inter ceteras, magis videntur dub1tab1les, idea contra 
eas solum arguam, ut, objectionibus solutis, earum mag1s 
paterent31 ver1ta.tes. 32Argu1tur ig1tur prime sic: 
Terminus est sign1f1cativus ad placitum; 1g1tur, quamlibet 
rem 1nd1fferenter potest33 signif1care; omnis propos1t1o 
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est aliqua res; 1g1tur, omnem34 propos1t1on~35 qu111bet 
terminus potest significare; 1g1tur, cum pars propos1t1on1s 
sit terminus, videtur partem posse significare totam 
propositionem cujus est pars; st s1 sic, ig1tur et 
supponere pro toto. 
134.) 36secundo sic: Quamlibet rem terminus 
sign1f1cat quam reducit ad actum 1ntellegend1; sed totam 
propos1t1onem cujus ipse terminus est pars reducit 
tenninus ad actum 1ntellegend1; 1gitur, totam propos1t1onem 
cujus 1pse est pars terminus sign1f1cat. Minor videtur 
experimenta11s, ut frequenter, audito unico tennino, 
1ntelleg1t qu1s una~ magnam orationem. 
135.) Item, ab a111s37 arguitur sic contra38 
conclusionem hanc: In al1qu1bus pars suppon1t pro toto, 
s1cut 1n 1st1s 1Al1qu1d est' 'Ens est' 'Propositio est'; 
1g1tur, in tal1bus39: 'Falsum est' 'Sortes dicit falsum 1 
potest (52va) pars supponere pro tote cujus est. Probatio 
consequent1ae: cum aequaliter terminus pr1vat1vus se 
habeat ad suum s1gnif1catum, s1cut terminus positivus 
40 . 
ad suum. Et additur quod hoc <negare) non est, n1s1 
f1gmentum illorum qui aliter ad 1nsolub111a respondere 
non soiunt. 
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136. ) 41 42 Quarto sic : D1oat Sortes 1stam: 'Falsum 
dicitur a Sorte'. Audiat Plato subjectum . Tune, per 
illud, d1c1tur quod Plato 1ntelleg1t omne falsum; igitur, 
falsum dictum a Sorta; igitur, subjectum illud sic 
significat. Antecedens arguitur: Iste terminus 'falsum' 
est signum naturale omnis fals1 . 
137.) 43 . 44 Quinto sic : Haec 1ntent1o 'falsum' in 
anima est natura11s s1militudo cujuslibet falsi; ig1tur, 
repraesentat 1ntellectu1 aliquod falsum; sed a naturali 
s1gnif1cat1one et repraesentatione non cad1 t; igi tur, 
sic 1ntellectui significat; igitur, posita tali propos1tione 
in an1ma: 'Sortes dicit falsum', 'falsum' s1gn1ficat 
totum cujus est pars; 1gitur, etc. 
138 ) 45 to to it t 1m . 1 46 o sex , per auc r a es, pr o s c : 
ElC Aristotele, primo Metaphys1ca~, cap1tulo ultimo, 47 
contra ponentes omn1
1
a falsa, sic arguunt: "Qui vero 
omnia falsa, et ille se 1psum ", ub1 v1detur respondere 
talem consequentiam: 'Omnia sunt falsa; igitur, haec 
oratio est falsa: "Omnia sunt falsa"'; 1g1 tur, pars 
potest supponere pro toto cujus eat pars. Nam a11ter 
consequentia non valeret. 
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139.) Item, sic loquatur tantum Sortes et d1cat 
is tam proposi tionem: 'Deus est', et Plato 1stam: 
'Homo est asinus•. 48 Et non sint plures loquentes, 
n1s1 Sortes et Piat9, nisi tantum Cicero, 49 qui di cat 
1stam propositionem: 1 Solus Sortes d1c1t verum'. Et 
probatur quod iste terminus 'verum' in ultima propositione 
supponat pro tota illa propos1t1one. Arguitur sic: 
'Verum' supponit pro omni propositione vera; propositio 
dicta a C1cerone50 est propositio vera; 1g1tur, etc. 
140.) Item, sic ad idem: Omnia propositio significans 
praeoise sicut est51 est propositio vera; haec propositio 
'Salus Sortes dicit verum' est propositio significans 
sicut est; igitur, etco 
7 
141.) JI)ioat Sortes istas duas propositiones: 
'Homo est animal', et a11am quae sit ista: 'Omne dictum 
a Sorte est falsum', quae sit!• Tune! est falsum, 
ut patet; et a est in toto esse et dioitur de omni; 
1gitur, n1h11 conting1t accipere sub subjecto de, quo non 
vere dicitur praedicatum. Oonsequentia patet ex 
53 54 Philosopho, prime Priorum, et ulterius ex commento. 
Sed ! est aliquid subjecti !• cum! sit unum falsum; 
1gi tu·r, etc. 
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142.) 55Ad haec respondens, pr1mo56 tamen videndum 
est quid requ1r1tur ad hoc, quod terminus aliquis 
57 
aliquam rem potest s1gn1f1care ad placitum. Cum 
en1m s1gn1f1oare ad plac1tum d1st1nguatur contra 
s1gnif1care natura11ter per hoc, quod ad signum ad 
placitum requ1r1tur 1mpos1t1o ad hoc, quod sit signum, 
quae non requ1r1tur ad signum naturale, manifestum est58 
quad nullam a11am rem59 terminus s1gn.1f1care ad placitum 
potest, quam illam quam ex 1mpos1t1one ordinata ad talem 
rem potest signif1care; igitur, ad .omnem imposition~~ 
. 60 
praeex1g1tur notitia 1ntellectua11s tam re1 quae 
. 6 
debet s1gnif1car1 per terminum, quam etiam 1psius tennini 1 
qui debet talem rem sign1f1care; sequitur quod nUllam rem 
., 
potest tenninus significare ex 1mpos1 tione, ·nis1 1llam 
inter quam et tenninum talis ordo poter1t reperir1 . Hoc 
patet, cum a11ter 1mpossib1le est 1m.ag1nare vere 1mpos1t1onem 
f1er1 . Igitur, ubi talis ordo est 1mposs1b111s in 
intellegendo, imposs1b1le est talem tenninum. talem 
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rem s1gn1f1care; sed generaliter repugnat talem ordinem 
esse inter propos1t1onem et ejus extremum, quod prius 
propositio intellegatur, quam suum extremum, cum e 
contrario sit ordo essentialis in esse cognito . 
143 . ) 63 Sed contra istam 1mag1nat1onem, ut magis 
pateat, arguitur sic: I::.::ta 1maginatio tantum hoc 
concludi t, quod ipsa proposi tio prior est 4'ogn1 ta) 
ab an1ma intellectlva, quam pars supponat pro tota 
111a propos1t1one cujus est pars. Sed ex hoc non 
64 . 
1nfertur evidenter, quonia.m, postquam ipsa talia, 
77 
utrumque istorum: tam propositionem quam partem ejus, 
1nte11exer1t propr11s conceptibus, poss1t ipsa anima 
(52vb) 1mponere partem supponere pro toto. Quod argu1tur 
sic: Omnem rem potest terminus s1gn1f1care ad placitum 
quae distincta 1ntent1one vel 1ntent1on1bus ab 1ntentione 
termini potest 1ntelleg1; sed hujusmod1 est propositio 
respectu suae partis; igitur, etc. 
144.) Item sic: Voluntas est65 agens 11b<er)um; 
1g1tur, ex sua libertate potest imponere tenninum 1 
quamlibet rem 1nd1fferenter s1gn1f1care. Probatlo 
consequentlae: quia da oppositum, et sequitur quod 
respectu talis non est voluntas libere agens. 
66 145.) Sed 1sta non obviant 1mag1nat1on1 ex 
qua67 necessar1o prius intellegitur tam propositio 
quam pars ejus, quam pars illa supponat pro tota 111a 
Propositione cujus est pars; tune, necessario prius 
Propos1t1o habet significationem aliquam determinatam, 
et, per consequens, quodlibet ejus extremum, antequam 
a11quod ejus extremum supponat pro tota 111a propositione. 
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Sit 1g1tur totum significatum unius extremi pro tune!• 
et significatum a1terius extrem1 ~. ~t sit illa 
propos1tio £, et actus uniendi in illa propositione, 
quae dici tur "copula" d. Et argui tur sic: Impossi bile 
est£ manere, d corrupto; sed impossibile est d manere, 
nisi pro mensura vel tempore pro quo praecise a est 
significatum unius extremi ipsius £, et~ item significatum 
alterius extremi ejusdem; igitur, impossibile est c 
manere pro aliqua mensura vel tempore pro quo totum c 
est significatum ! vel b. Consequentia patet, cum totum 
£ modo non sit s1gn1ficatum ! vel b, ex hypothesi. Et 
etiam major, cum ipsum ~sit pars essentialis 1ps1us £• 
Minor autem arguitur sic: Impossibile est al1quam 
relationem manere, deducto altero ejus extreme; ~ est 
actus uniendi ! cum ~, qui actus vel est relatio vel 
necessario relationem includens; igitur, impossibile est 
~ manere, nis1 ! sit totum significatum unius extremi £, 
et b to tum si gni fi ca tum al te ri us. 
146.) 68 Confirmatur breviter hoc: Quam repugnat 
quod eadem relatio specifica sit inter individua distinctorum 
specierum, tam repugnat quad eadem relatio in numero 
sit inter b et aliquod aliud ab! quae est inter~ 
et!; unde necessario sequitur quad, si anima eliciat 
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actum componend1 respectu alicujus termini s1gn1f1cant1s 
c, quod ille eri t alius actus componendi, quam fui t actus 
-
mediante quo composuit a cum b. Et per hoc patet quod 
- -
assertum in pr1mo argumento69 est negandmn, prout iste 
texminus 1 slgn1f1care' convertitur cum 1sto termino 
•supponere'. 
147.) 70Ad secundum, de voluntate71 : patet quad 
consequentia non valet, quia, quantumcumque fuerit 
voluntas llbera, non poterlt aliquid velle, n1s1 respectu 
cujus potest esse vel fU.1t prius 1ntellegere, cum non sit 
poss1b1le ·al1qu1d esse volitum quod prius non fUit 
cogn1tum. S1m.111ter, non est magis libera respeotu 
1mpos1t1on1s, 72 quam respectu propr11 velle, cum tota 
libertate non potest habere velle respeotu mall quatenus 
malum. Tamen hoc sophisma de liberta.te multos decipit 
. 148.) Per hoc etiam patet ad primum prinoipale 
contra conclusiones, quando sic argui tur: "Terminus 
est s1gn1f1cat1vus ad placltum,~ etc. 73 Patet quad 
consequent1a non valet. 
149.) Ad secundum, cum assumi tur nQuamlibet rem 
terminus s1gn1f1 cat quam re duel t ad actum. 1ntellegend1 \ 74 
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conceditur consequentia. Negetur minor. Non en1m 
terminus post actum compos1t1on1s vel d1v1s1on1s repositus 
in memoria 1ntellectiva sic reducit ad actuni 1ntellegend1 
totam propositionem 1llam cujus 1pse est pars, quad, 
manente75 tenninus sic significante, sicut prius significavit, 
s1gn1f1cet ille terminus totam 111am propositionem cujus 
est pars. Quia haec est contradictio, (sedJ cum pr1us 
non significavit ' totam illam propos1t1onem. Sed sic 
tantum potest reducere ad actum 1ntellegend1 totam 1llam 
propositionem cujus 1psa est pars, (53ra) quod potest 
facere an1mam76 aliquis terminus s1b1 natural1ter vel ad 
placitum ~1gn1f1cans77 componere, sicut prius composuito 
Et haec conclus1o exper1mental1s est. 
150.) Vel potest brevius dic1 ad argumentum, 
'8 distinguendo de hoc compos1 to 're duce re ad memoriam'. 7 
Nam aliquid potest reducere aliud ad memoriam dupliciter: 
mediate vel immediate. Et mediate dupliciter: uno modo, 
79 80 quod n1h11 mediat inter 1psum et rem quae debet 
s1gnif1car1, nisi tenninus naturali ter significans illam 
rem; a110 modo, quando plura sunt media, tantum unum 
naturale, sicut accidit in proposito. Et isto ultimo 
modo reducere ad memoriam non est81 significare, sed 
solum duobus modis pr1m1s. 
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151.) 82Ad tert1um-, cum arguitur "In al1qu1bus 
pars supponit pro totott83 cujus est pars, nego illud. 
eoncedo ta.men consequentiam: 'Si pars posset supponere 
pro sue toto respectu termini pos1t1v1, quod etiam posset 
supponere pro suo toto respectu termini pr1vativ1', quia 
terminum esse privativum vel pos1t1vum 1mpertinens est 
ad casum 111~. 84 Quare terminus non potest supponere 
pro suo tote, ut pr1us dictum est. Argumentum tamen non 
ooncludit propos1tum85 suum, cum ad hoc fiat, ut probetur 
tenninum posse supponere pro suo toto. Et idea ca.sum 
addit, quod negare partem posse ·supponere pro suo tote, 
etc., non est, nisi unum f1gmentum 1llorum qu1 aliter 
nesciunt respondere ad 1nsolub1lia. Credo me scire quad 
\ ' 
d1scut!ent186 processum Philosophi 2° et 3° ]!.! anima, 87 
videtur satis et 1nnotesc1t quod concedens partem 
posse supponere pro suo toto, s1ve illa pars sit 
terminus po si ti vus si ve pr1 va ti vus, mu tat ord1nem 
essentialem actuum animae, s1 numquam esset propositio 
1nsolub111s in rerum natura. 
152.) 88 Ad quartum89: Concede oasum, quad Sortes 
d1cat tantum istam: 'Falsum d1c1 tur, etc.' Et cum 
addi t'!lr quo d Plato per istum terminum 'falsum' 
1ntelleg1t omne falsum, nego illud: non plus quam 
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Sortes, mediante se ipso, 1ntelleg1t Platonem.90 Et cum 
arguitur: "Iste terminus 'falsum·'" au di tus9l a Platone 
-
"est aignum naturale omnis .:f'alsi, n92 falsa est propos1 t1o, 
93 quia est signum ad plac1tum; 1g1tur, non naturale. 
153.) S1m111ter,94 .ex 1mpos1t1one s1gn1f1oa.t 
propos1t1onem falsam; 1g1tur, non naturaliter; sed, ex 
secunda conclusione principali,95 nullus terminus 
s1gn1f1cat in actu ex 1mpos1t1one, n1s1 tantum 1llud 
vel 111a quae ad actum 1ntellegend1 de facto reducit; 
sed sic non fac1 t iste in ~au isto; igi tur, etc. 
154.) 96Ad al1ud, de auctor1tate Philosophi in 
quarto Metaphys1oae, capitulo ultimo,97 d1co quod 
consequentia poteat d1c1 valere dupliciter: vel in se 
ve198 ad hominem. Haec d1v1s1o sic: Nam consequent!~ 
quae ab homine necessario est concedenda, contingenter 
respondendo, quae in se s1m1liter est neganda. Verb! 
grat1a: contra concedentem omnem hominem male respondere 
valeret haec consequentia: 'Tu es homo; 1g1tur, tu 
ma1e99 respondes', quae tamen consequentia in se non 
valet. [contr~ Ta.men concludi t tal1s consequentia 
contra hominem ita bene, sicut melior consequentia de 
mundo. Et forte sibi efficatius concludlto 
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155.) Sic in propos1to1 arguebat contra homines2 
tantum, qu1a contra Heracl1tum3 et Anaxagoram, 4 quorum 
alter d1oebat omnia esse vera et a11us dicebat omnia 
esse falsa, quorum opinio tu.it quod non potuit a11ter 
esse. 5 Contra eos arguebat Aristoteles non per6 
consequentias fonnales neque bonas sibi, sed tantum 
contra eos satis ooncludebat,7 ut deducendo eas ex 
concessis ab eis, quod aliqua propositio est vera et 
aliqua propos1t1o est falsa. 
156.) Sed opiniones eorum successive arguendo: 
. 8 
Contra Heraolitum qui posuit omnia vera, nee posset 
propositio esse, nisi esset vera: 9Arguit sic: 
Haeo propositio quam tu d1o1s: 'Omnia aunt vera' 
aut est vera (53rb) aut falsa. Si sit vera, . et ejus 
oppos1tum est propositio; 1gitur, ejus oppositum est 
10 propos1t1o fa.lea. Haeo consequentia est bona in se. 
Tam.en Heraclitus negaret eam, quia satis concederet 
oppositum pr1m1 princ1p11 dati a Ph1losoph1, eodem 
libro,11 quod est quod de quolibet dicitur affirmatio 
vel negatlo, etc. Et tamen hanc consequentiam quam 
:tacit Ph1losophus in textu non bene posset negare, eo 
quad ~uno fundatur super al1quod12 pr1ncip1um datum 
a Philosopho. Ideo argu1t sic contra eum13 : ODinis 
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propos1t1o est vera; oppositum 1111us propos1t1on1s est 
propos1t1o; 1g1tur, oppositum 1st1us propos1t1on1s est 
verum. Haec consequent1a non valet, cum nulla propos1t1o 
14 
vel extremum ejus potest supponere pro ejus formal! 
opposito, cum apud Heraclitum plus concedebat(u~ quam15 
prima consequent1a. Ideo mag1s per tales consequentias 
voluit Philosophus arguere contra eum, quam per bonas. 
Et haec eadem16 ratio 1deo movebat ad sic arguendum 
contra .Anaxagoram.17 
157.) Et allegare talem modum et fundare positionem 
super illum modum eat assumere auctoritatem Pl:Ulosoph1 
sine processu Ph11osoph1--1mmo contra processum Ph1losoph1. 
Nam frequenter auctor1tas unde18 1ntellectum et processus 
vooal1 ter contrad1cunt. Summenda est 1g1 tur. auotori tas 
Ph1losoph1 pro conf1rmat1one pos1tion1s ub1 Aristoteles 
ex 1ntent1one traotat mater1am 1llam quae debet tundari. 
158.) 19 Ad alium.20 di co: Concedo21 casum. Et 
ad argumentum, cum assum1tur (quod) 'verum' suppon1t pro 
omni vero: Nego 1llud. Sed ad plus: Non suppon1t, 
n1s1 pro omni vero a110 ab 11la propos1t1one cujus est 
pars. 
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159.) 22Ad aliam fonna.m. 23 : Concede consequens ad 
24 quod deducitur, quod propos1t1o dicta a Cicerone est 
propositio vera, nee illa repugnat 1111 exeeptivae dietae 
a Cicerone, quia per illas non exe1p1tur. 
160.) 25sim11e huic est ista: Ponatur quod a sit 
-
1sta: 'Deus <.es~ ', et .!?,: 'Homo est animal', et quod 
non sint plures propositiones praeter 1stam universalem: 
'Quodlibet verum.' est aliquod istorum'. Tune haec est 
vera: 'Quodlibet verum est aliquod 1storum', denotando 
per hoc 11storum' ~' ~' quae sit~· 
161.) Item, sint ! .!?, omnes propositiones, et sint 
affinnat1vae. Tune stat quod haec sit vera: 'Nu11a 
propos1 tio est negat1va'~ eo quod sequ1 tur ad eas, s1 
formetur. Quae s1m111ter sit o. 
-
Et s1m111a. 
162.) 26<D)eelar~tur .Primus casus27 sic: Dictio 
exclusiva addita subjecto attr1bu1t praedicatum subjecto 
et excludit tantum praed1catum illius propos1t1on1s ab 
opposite subjec1, ut sic dicendo: 'Salus Sortes 
curri t', attr1 bui t cursum Sarti et excludi t cursum ab 
omni a110 a Sorte. Non tamen excludit omnem motum28 
-
ab opposite subject!, sed tantum motum illum qui est 
cursus. Et causa: quia nullus a11us motus29 est 
-
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suppos1tum tal1s praed1cat1, sed tantum mo,!Us30 qui est 
cursus. Sic in proposito: Sic dioendo 'Solus Sortes 
dicit verum', haec d.1ct1o exclusiva 1 aolus 1 attribuit 
praedicatum subjecto. Hoc est, d1ctu attr1bu1t rem 
suppositam per praed1catum rei suppositae per subjectum, 
et exclud1t 111am expreasam per praed1catum ab opposito 
subject!; cum, 1g1tur, suppos1tum talis praed1cat1 
•verum' non s1 t 'tota 11la propos1 tio cujus est pars, 
illam non excludit ab opposite subject!; in casu, 1g1tur, 
1sta tantum propositio dicta a Sorte est suppositum 
1st1us praed1cat1 'verum.•31; unde, in casu isto 1sta 
propos1t1o 'Solus Sortes d1c1t verum' aequivalet 1st1s32 
duabus: 1 Sortes d1c1t verum' et 'Plato non d1o1t 
verum•. Modo non sequitur: 'Sortes d1c1t verum; et 
Plato non di( : t verum; 1g1 tur, C1oero33 non d.1c1 t verum' • 
Sic nee sequitur ejus convert1b111s. Et sic patet quod 
ad illud quod ulterius non proced1t. In tractando 
materiam 1nsolub111um diffusius, traotabo hu:jusmo di 
- 34 
soph1smata, propter juvenes, minus. 
163.) 35per hoc _et1am patet quod ult1mum argumentum36 
non conclud1t contra propositum ad formam. Ta.men concede 
casum, et concedo (53va) quod ! est falsum. Et ulterius, 
nego, cum d1catur quod "! est aliquod subject1 !n• Peccat 
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enim hoc argumentum pet1t1one pr1nc1p11. Deberet enim 
probare quod pars posset supponere pro toto c~us est 
pars. Hoc ta.men sine probatione assumit, cum d1c1t 
quod ! sit pars tal1s propos1t1on1s ! • Sic igitur 
patet ad objeotiones contra conclus1ones positas et 
adductas. 37 
164.) 38(H)is 1g1tur praem1ss1s, restat ad 
solutionem 1nsolub111um jam pos1ta applioare. Et 
pr1mo ad 1llud 1nsolub1le quod inter ceteras est 
mag1s oommuna . 39 4oPonatur 1g1tur quod sit un1cua 
Sortes, qui d1cat istam et nullam a11am: 'Sortes 
dici t falst.<.::.! ', et quod illa sic signifieet, quae 
propositio sit!• Tune quaer1tur utrum a sit propositio 
-
oategorioa vel hypothetica. m.co quod est mere 
categorica, ut paret ca.sum. Ig1tur, juxta compos1t1onem 
term1norum, tune sio: ! est propos1t1o categorica; 
1g1tur, ! est propositio vera vel talsa. Oonsequent1a 
tenet per d1vis1onem secundam. 41 
165.) 42 ' Respons1o: . Concede consequens . 
166. ) TUnc sic: a est propositio vera vela 
- -
est propositio falsa; sed ! non est propositio vera; 
1g1tur, ! eat propos1t1o falsa. Consequentia tenet a 
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tota d1sjunct1va43 cum opposito un1us partis ad a1tersm 
44 partem. 
167. ) 45Resp~ns1o: Concedo s1m111ter 1stam 
consequent1a.m, sed nego minorem. 
168. ) .Contra: CUjusli bet contrad1ctionis formatae 
oujus negat1va est falsa, ejus affirmativa est vera; 'a 
-
est propos1t1o vera' ~Nullum a est propos1t1o vera' sunt 
-
contrad1ctor1a formata, quorum negativa est falsa, per te; 
1g1tur, ejus aff1rmat1va est· vera; 1g1tur, ! est 
propos1t1o vera. 
169. ) 46Respons1o: Concedo consequens ad quod 
u1 timo deduc1 tur. 
170. ) 47aontra: ! est propos1t1o vera; et! 
est proposit1o simplex categorica, etc.; 1g1tur, ita 
est,48 s1cut49 ! praecise s1gn1f1cat primo . Consequentia 
patet ex supposit1one50 prima. 51 Sad! praec1se s1gn1f1cat 
primo quod Sortes d1c1t .talswn; 1g1tur, 1ta est, quod 
Sortea52 d.icit falsum . Et ulterius ex consequente sic: 
Ita est, quod Sortes dicit falsum; et Sortes praecise 
un1cam d.ic1t propos1t1onem, ex ()'3.su; igitur, non est 1ta, 
53 quod Sorte~~ dicit verum, quod est oppositum concessi . 
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171.) Respons1o, nega.ndo m1norem pr1m1 argument!, 
quae tu1 t 1sta: '! praecise s1gn1f1oat primo <quod> Sortes 
d1c1t falswn'. Non enim 1lla propos1t1o dicta a Sorte 
sign1f1ca.t quod Sortea dicit propositionem falsam, 
s1cut s1gn1f1cat illa minor. Ideo nego eam. Quomodo 
autem et quid propos1 t1o dicta a Sorte a1gn1f1cat statim 
patebi t 0 
172.) 55eontra: Haec est vera et concedenda, 
per te: 'Sortes d1c1t falaum'; 1g1tur, haec est 
concedenda a te: 'Sortes d1c1t propos1t1onem falsam'. 
Probatio: Nam formal1 ter sequ1 tur: Sortes d1c1 t 
falsum; 1g1tur, Sortes dic1t propos1t1onem falsam. 
Probat1o consequent1ae: Omne falsum est propos1t1o; 
1g1tu~, omne dicens falsum d1c1t propos1t1onem; et non 
propositionem veram; 1gitur, falsam propos1t1onem. 
Haec consequent1a est bona; et concedis antecedens; 
igitur, non babes negare consequens. 
173.) 561tem sic: ! eat propos1 tio <vers.)57; 1g1 tur, 
qui d1c1t !; d1c1t verur'; sed Sortes d.1c1t !: 1g1tur, Sortes 
d1c1t verum; et Sortes, ex C1lsu, praecise diclt 1stam 
propos1t1onem: 'Sortes d1c1t falsum'; 1g1tur, 1ta est, 
sicut 111a praecise s1sn1f1cat pr1mo. Consequentia tenet 
per d1v1s1onem pr1mam.58 Et 1lla praecise s1gnif1c-e.t 
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primo quod Sortes d1c1t talsum; 1g1tur, 1ta est, quod 
Sortes d1o1t falsum. Et sequitur: Sortea praec1se 
d1c1t unicam propos1tionem, et illa est falsa; igitur, 
Sortes non d1c1t verum. 
174~) 59Responaio ad primum: Sumendo hunc 
terminum 'falsum' s1gn1f1cat1ve, concedo quod ex 
1mpos1t1one et pro suo suppos1to a1b1 correspondet 
propos1t1o. Et sic sumendo, valet haec consequent1a: 
'Sortes dici t talsum; 1g1 tur, Sortes d1o1 t propos1 tionem 
falsam'. SUmendo tamen hunc termintnn. .'falsum' prout 
s1b1 non correspondet propos1t1o pro suppos1to, non 
valet oonsequent1a, sed consequens est 1mpert1nens 
anteoedent1. Et quia sic sumitur in proposito, si 
antecedens s1 t proposi tio dicta a Sorte, 1deo nego 
consequent1am. 
~ · ~ 
175.) Ad seoundam .tormam: Concede totum, 
quousque d.1c1tur "1ta est, quod Sortes dicit !alsum".62 
Nam 1b1 sumitur a11ter quam sumitur in proposito. Ideo, 
nego consequent1am 111am. 
176.) 63contra: Aut a est propositio vera aut 
-
falsa. 
177.) 64Respons1o: (53vb) D.1.co quod est propositio 
vera. 
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178.) Contra: ! eat verum; et Sortes d1c1t !; 
1g1tur, Sortes d1c1t verum. 
179.) 65Responsio: Concedo consequens. 
180.) Contra: Sortes tantum dic1t unam propos1t1onem, 
et 111a non est vera; 1g1tur, Sortea non d1c1t verum. 
181.) 66Respons1o: Concedo consequentiam. Et 
nego seoundam partem antecedent1a. 
182.) 67contra: Illa est convert1b111s cum una 
propos1t1one falsa; 1g1tur, illa est falsa. 
183.) 68 . Respons1o: Concede consequent1am, et 
nego antecedens. 
1~4.) 69eontra: Haec consequentia est.bona: 
'Sortes d1c1 t falsum; 1g1 tur, Sortes d1c1 t falsum.'. 
Et volo quod antecedens s1t propos1t1o dicta a Sorte. 
Tune quaero utrum consequens sit verum vel falsUL1. Si 
verum, et illud praecise s1gn1f1cat prime quad antecedens 
est !alsum; 1g1tur, antecedens falsum; et antecedens est 
propositio dicta a Sorta; 1g1tur, propos1t1o dicta a 
Sorte est falsa. Si detur quod consequens sit falsum, 
et consequent1a est bona; 1g1 tur, ante ce dens fal~, 
qu1a ex vero non sequitur, n1s1 verum. 
185.) 70Respons1o, d1st1nguendo de consequente, 
eo quod 'falsum' in consequente potest supponere pro 
toto antecedente vel potest esse convertibile cum 
praedicato antecedent1s. Primo modo non valet haeo 
consequentia: 'Sortes d1cit falsum; 1g1tur, Sortes 
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d1c1t falsum', plus quam tal1s: 'Canis curr1t;~1gitur, 
oa.nis curr1~', denotando per antecedens animal latrabile, 
et per consequens oaeleste sidus. Quia, sicut in hac 
consequentia, quamvis, secundum vocem, consequens 
convertitur cum antecedente, tam.en rea11ter non 
oonvertitur, sed est s1bi71 1mpert1nens, sic nee in 
prim.a consequens, secundum rem, convertitur cum 
antecedente, sic, ut pr1us dictum est, sumendo consequens. 
Quia tune 1ate72 est sensus: "sortes d1c1t falsum pro 
proposit1one." Nee valet consequent1a propter a11am 
oausam, qu1a argu1tur a termino stante mater1al1ter ad 
terminum atantem sign1f1oat1ve. Secundo modo sumendo 
hunc terminum 1 falsum 1, concedo consequentiam, quia sic 
consequens est convertib111s cum antecedente 0 
186.) Haec omnia ex praem.issis sic patet in 
propos1t1one dicta a Sorte: Hoc extremum 'falsum', cum 
a1t terminus communis in voce, species ejua est ens in 
an1ma; praeclse agentis propr11 extra an1mam est 
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natural1ter s1gn1f1cat1va, ex conclus1one pr1ma73; 
sed, cum sit extremum propos1t1on1s extra an1mam, n1h11 
s1gn1f1 cat, n1s1 quo d a priori s1gn1f1ca t extremum 
propos1t1on1s mental1s; sed oasus qui pon1t quod Sortes 
non d1c1t74 aliquam a11am excludit extremum proposit1on1s 
diotae a Sorta supponere pro a11quo a11075; 1g1tur, si 
pro76 a11quo supponeret, necessario pro ipsa propos1t1one 
cujus est pars supponeret; , sed hoc non permittunt conclusio 
quarta77 et quinta.78 Nee valet fictio ponent1um quod 
propos1t1o dicta a Sorte denotat Sortem dicere al1quam 
a11am, oum, eo quod aliqua propos1t1o al1qu1d denotat, 
1psum s1gn1f1cat. Et· d1c1t tertia conclusio s(tci). 79 
187.) 80Ex quibus formal1ter81 argu1tur sic: 
Iste t~rm1nus 'falsum' in.! non suppon1t pro .!, nee 
pro a11qua propos1t1one a11a ab!; 1g1tur, non suppon1t 
pro a11quo. Et sic patet quod in propos1t1one dicta a 
Sorta cum oaau est 1ncomposs1b1le quad al1qu1d a11ud a 
se hoc extremum 'falsum' det 1ntellegere. 
188.) 82sed contra hoc ob1c1tur sic: Sit!• ut 
pr1us, propos1t1o dicta a Sorte. Et dicat Plato istam 
a11am: 'Sortes d1c1t falsum', quae sit~· Et quaero 
utrum ·b sit propositio vera vel falsa. 
-
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189. ) 83l)1cendum quod ~est propos1t1o falsa, eo 
quod est simplex, etc. , quae non praec1se s1gn1f1cat 
pr1mo s1cut est . Consequentia paret suppos1t1onem 
secundam. 84 
190. ) 85contra: k est falsum; et b convert1tur 
cum!; 1g1tur, ! est falsum . 
191. ) 86D1cendum quod anteoedens est falsum pro 
' ' 
altera su1 parte . Non en1m k oonvert1tur cum!• cum 
aliquod extremum ~ supponat pro !• et nullum extremum 
in! suppon1t pro!• nee pro aliqua a11a propositione 
ab!• ut pr1us est declaratum; et ideo, alterum extremum. 
in a stat non sign1ficat1ve • 
... 
192. ) Contra: Alterum in! non stat s1gn1f1cat1ve; 
1g1tur, non stat eodem modo quo pon1tur stare per oasum. 
Probatio consequent1ae: Nam pon1tur per casum quod Sortes 
d1c1t istam: (54ra) 'Sortes d1c1t falsum', et quod 
illa sic aign!ficet. 
193.) D.icendum quod consequentia nori valet. Immo, 
et ver1tate, sequitur oppositum consequentis ex 1110 
antecedente, cum, per casum, concluditur ne supponat 
Pro a1~a proposit1one a se ipsa, ut prius declaratur, 
arguendo87 contra op1nionem tert1am88 ; et pro ipsa 
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propos1t1one cujus est pars .supponere non po~est, ex 
conclusionibus quarta89 et qu1nta9°; et 1deo, ex pr1ma 
conclusione,91 cum nihil ex 1mpos1tione s1gn1f1cat, 
praecise se ipsum 1ntellectu1 repraesentat. 
194. ) Contra: s192 iste terminus 'falsum' in a 
- -
propositione praec1se se ipsum 1ntelleotu1 repraesentat, 
a propos1t1o aequipollet: 'Sortes d1c1t talem vocem93 
-
tt:ra1sum" 1 • Consequens .falsum. 
195.) 94D1cendum quod consequens est verum95 
necessar1o sequens ex conclus1on1bus et ex casu. 
196. ) Contra: Iste tenninus 'fa.lsum' non exclud1tur 
a suo s1gn1f1oato quod ex 1mpos1t1one solet s1gnif1care, 
nee per ca.sum nee per a11quod aliud; 1g1tur, etc. 
197.) Dicendum quad 1ste terminus 'falsum' in a96 
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excluditur, ut prius dictum est, ne pro a11a propositione 
a se 1psa supponat; nee pro ipsa cujus est pars aupponere 
potest; et sic exclud1tur, quamv1s latenter?B ne pro 
a11quo supponat. Et ideo, cum dicitur in casu quod 
1lla sic significet, etc., deponitur, quamv1s non prima 
fao1e, hujus termini 'falsum' 1mpos1t1o . Propter 1lla 
s1gn1f1oat quad Sortes dici t f'alsum pro tali voce 
'falsum', quod, cum sit absolute possibile, sequitur 
quod totus casus est poss1b111s. 
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198.) Tertio, 99 pr1nc1paliter arguitur quod ! non 
est propoa1t1o vera, quia, s1 ! sit propos1t1o vera, 
- . 1 
1g1tur, a s1mil1, qui d1c1t se ease mentitum, 2 et 
pra.ecise illud, 3 diceret verum. Oonsequens falsum et 
contra Pbilosophum, 2° Elencho rum , capitulo de fallacia, 4 
ub1 in textu ponit 1stam propoaitionem: 5ttQui,n 1nqu1t, 
"jurat ae esae perjurum bene. jurat jurans hoc solum. tt 
199.) D1cendum quod consequent1a non valet, nee 
est 1b1 s1m111tudo, quanta.mad veritatem propos1t1on1s 
vel falsitatem. Sed est ib1 confirmatio totius propos1tion1s 
hujus. Nam 1b1, in 1110 capitulo, loquitur Aristoteles 
ex 1nt·ent1one de 1nsolub111bus, et idea, per Philosophum 
ibidem, confinnatur haec positio sic: Si en1m in illa 
propos1t1one 1ste terminus 'perjurus' supponeret pro a11a 
propositione ab illa6 cujus ipse est pars, non arguetur 
verita.s hujus exclus1vae 'Solum hoc jurans bene jurat 
se ease perjurum'. Exemplum: Si enim iste terminus 
'perjurus' supponeret pro tali propositione: 'Homo est 
asinus', tune consequen~7 esset 1mpert1nens anteoedenti, 
cum tune 1ste asset sensus: 11Qu1 jurat se esse perjurum 
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pro 1sta propositione 'Homo est asinus' ·bene <jura1) 
jurans hoc solum"; sed palam est quod haec oonsequent1a. 
non valet: 'Qui jurat se ease perjurum pro 1sta propos1t1one 
11Homo est a.sinus" bene jurat; 1g1tur, qui jurat se esse 
perjurum bene jurat jurans hoc solum'. Consequens enim 
1mpert1nens est toti antecedent!. Et 1deo haec exclus1va 
'solum' exclud.1t huno terminum 'perjurum' in propos1to 
ha.bare aliquam a11am propos1t1onem. pro suppoaito ab 1lla 
oujus 1pse est pars. 
200.) 8Est 1g1tur 1ste sensus Ar1stotel1s in 
tali bus proposi t1onUms: '.Qui jurat se ease perjurum, 
etc.': Prima propositio 1b1 inclusa est falsa, quae 
est 1sta: 'Qui jurat se esse perjurum'. Nam ista 
exclus1va 1 jurans hoc solum', ex vi exc1us1vae, exclud.1t 
sic jurantem al1qu1d a11ud jurare ab 1sta propos1t1one 
'jurans se ease perjurum', ut, s1 quis praec1se juraret, 'Per 
Daum, ego sum perjurus'. ~ec pro tota propos1t1one stare 
potest cujus 1psa est pars, quia hoc non perm1ttunt 
quarta9 et qu1nta10 ; 111g1tur, ex prima conclusione, 12 
praecise stat pro 1110 pro quo stetit absque omni 
1mpos1t1one. Nam sequitur: Iste terminus 'perjurus' 
non suppon1t pro a11a (54rb) propos1tione a se ipsa, 
neo pro se 1psa; 1g1tur, pro nulla suppon1t. patet 
oonsequentia et antecedens ex praem1ss1s. 
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2010) Et ultra sequitur: Iate terminus 'perjurus' 
non [non] suppon1t pro ai1a prdpos1tione; et praecise 
ex 1mpos1tione s1gn1f1cat propositionem; 1g1tur, n1hil 
significat ex 1mpos1t1one; stat, 1g1tur, omn1no s1cut 
stetit pr1usquam al1qu1d imponebatur ad s1gn1f1candum; 
sed, si fui13"set extremum propos1t1on1s talis: 'Sortes 
est perjurus' antequam imponebatur ad s1gnif1oandum, 
tune 11la propos1t1o fuisset falsa, sive fuisset in 
an1ma s1ve extra an1mam. Qu1a, sive sit 1p anima s1ve 
extra, sit 111a .!• Et argu1tur sic: a est aff1rmat1va 
de 1nesse, etc., non praecise s1gn1f1cens prim.a sicut 
est; 1g1tur, est propositio falsa. Consequent1a tenet 
per secnndam suppos1t1onemo 13 Et tune antecedens ex hoc 
argu1tur, quod in~ affirmatur tal1s terminus 'perjurus' 
de 1J.lo quad non est 11le terminus. Unde, jurans se 
esse perjurum dicit falsum dicens hoc solum. Et hoc 
est quod vult Ph1losophus per hano propositionem 'bene 
jurat'. Nam bene pejerare est male vel false jurare. 
Et sic, qui bene jurat se esse perjurum neoessario dicit 
fal'EIIIlo Nam aliter non bene jurat se esse perjurum. 
Et sic, ex 1ntentione Philosoph1, patet quod, posito 
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oasu 1110 qui reddit propositionem ease 1nsolub1lem, 
excluditur aliqu2d14 extremum 1111us propos1t1on1s ab 
111a specie suppos1t1on1s quam extra ca.sum 1nsolub111um 
ex oommuni modo tale extremum solet habere. 
202.) l5contra istam confi~ationem argu1tur,16 
arguendo quod Aristoteles in isto processu s1 t magi a ad 
oppositum 1111us op1nion1s, quam pro ea. Nam, ex 
Ph1losopho in illo, habetur quod 1nsolubile· est falsum; 
igitur, ex Philosopho in 1sto loco, non habetur quod 
1nsolub1le sit verum; allegare 1g1tur Aristotelem in 
hoc loco ad concedendum 1nsolub1le esse verum est magis 
destruere quam confirmare. 
203.) 1~D.tcendum quod 1ntent1o Aristotelis 
pr1nc1paliter in hoc loco non est ad concludendum 
insolubile fore verum vel falsum. Sed ad hoc est 
sua 1ntent1o, et ad hoc allegata, ut priua dictun est: 
quod, posito casu quo aliqua propos1t1o est 1nsolub111s, 
excluditur ab altero extrema 1111us propositionis supponere 
pro complexo. 
204.) Contra: Si sic, 1g1 tur neutra 1starum 
consequentiarum valeret: '!est propos1t1o 1nsolub1le; 
1g1tur, est propos1tio vera,' nee ista: 'a est propos1t1o 
-
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1nsolub111s; 1g1tur, est propos1t1o falsa•. Consequens 
falsum, eo quod tune respond~;ndum18 esset secundum 
qualitatem ad 1nsolub11e, sicut ad a11am propositionem. 
205.) Dicendum quod consequens est verum, eo quad 
al1quod 1nsolub1le est verum et a11quod 1nsolub1le est 
falsum. Et 1deo, bene rc;;spondendo, concedenda est talis 
propos1t1o vel neganda, admisso casu, secundum qua11tatem 
propositionis. patet consequentia. Et probatur19 
antecedena: Et prime quod20 al!quod 1nsolub1le est verum, 
sic arguendo: Aliquod 1nsolub1le est -simplex categor1ca 
affirmat1va de 1nesse et de praesent1 praec!se s1gn1f1ca.ns 
primo s1cut est; 1g1tur, a11quod 1nsolub11e est verum. 
Oonsequent1a paret suppos1~1onem primam. 21 Et antecedens 
argu1 tur de propos1 tione dicta a Sorte, quae_ s1 t _!, ut 
pr1us. Nunc sic: a 22 praecise s1gn1f1cat pr1mo quod 
-
Sortes d1o1 t falsum pro tali voce 'f'alsum'; et sic est; 
1g1tur, .! est propositio vera. patet consequentia et 
major ex prius declaratis. Et minor arguitur: Nam 
formaliter sequitur: Sortes dicit totam illam propos1t1onem: 
1 Sortes di c1 t falsum 1 ; 1g1 tur, Sortes di c1 t quaml1 bet 
vocem quae est aliquod extremum 1111us proposit1on1s, 
cum contradictorium 1ncludat quod d1cens 1llud quod est 
totum non dicat illud quod est pars tot1us; igitur, etc. 
:.; 
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Et quod aliquod 1nsolubile s1t falstnn patet in exemplo 
Aristotelis, ut prius declaratum est. 
206.) Contra: Concedere 1nsolub1le esse verum 
(54va) est negare regulas ab al11s pos1 tas in hao ma ... ~13ria, 
quae omnes ponunt omne 1nsolub1le fore falsum. 
207.) Dicendum quad 1lla quae ponuntur ab a111s 
non aunt regulae, eo quad fundantur super isto pr1nc1p1o 
false et 1mposs1b111, quod pa.rs potest supponere p~o 
tote cujus est pars. Cui pr1nc1p1o patet <quoa)quarta 
23 . 24 . 
oonclus1o et quints conclusio contradicunt. 
208.) 25Quarto princ1pal1 ter argu1 tur sic [Sic]: 
! est verum; 1g1tur, Sortem d1cere falsum est verum. 
Et ultra: 1g1tur, verum est quod Sortes d1c1t falsum 0 
209.) 26D1cendum, sumendo 'falsum' in consequente 
s1cut in antecedente, tune consequentia est bona et 
consequens verum. Et sic de secunda consequentia. 
Ali ter tamen sumendo, neu tra censequentia valet. Quia 
in antecodente sumitur 1ste terminus 'falsum' materia11ter; 
a1, 1g1tur, in consequente sumatur s1gn1f1cat1ve, non 
valet consequentia prepter var1at1onem med11. Posset 
tam.en negari utraque consequent1a, eo quod in neutro 
consequente est al1quid imped1ens 1stum terminum 'falsum' 
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ad supponendum s1gn1f1cat1ve, sicut est casus applicatus 
ad pr1mum antecedens. 
210.) 27 Quinto sic: .! eat verum; et suum contrad1ctor1um 
est; 1gitur, suum contrad1ctor1um est falsum. Consequens 
falsum, quia di cat Plato talem propos1 tionem 'Sortes dic1 t 
falsum', quae sit~· Tune oppos~tum ~est oppositum.<(',i); 
et oppos1tum. ~est verum; 1gitur, oppositum .! est verum; 
et! est ·verum; 1g1tur, duo contradictoria s1mul vera. 
211.) 28m_cendum quo d ~ et ! non convertuntur, quia 
! est propos1t1o vera et~ est propositio falsa. Et sicut 
a et b non convertuntur, sic nee contrad1ctor1a eorum 
- -
convertuntur, sed in s1gn1f1cat1one sunt total1ter dis~a:ratae. 
212.) 29contra: Probe quod.oppositum b est 
-
oppos1 tum a. Argui tur sic: Quidquid negatio negat, 
-
negat universaliter et distributive,3° sicut in ista 
propos1t1one negativa: 'Sortes non dicit falsum.', quae 
est~. negat1o negat hoc praed1catum 1 .talsum'; 1gitur, 
negat 1llam un1versal1ter et distributive. Tune sic: 
Negat distributive; igitur, negat hoc falsum de Sorte, 
et illud falsum, et sic de s1ngul1s; sed falsum dictum 
a Sorte est al1quod falsum; 1g1tur, negat falsum d.ictU!ll 
a Sorte. Ex quo sequitur <quad) haec propos1tio negat1va: 
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•sortes non dicit falsum' un1versa11ter negat quod hoc 
propos1t1o dicta a Sorta affirm.ativa particu1ar1s aff1rmat; 
1g1tur, est ejus opposita.; et ista eadem est oppos1ta ~31 ; 
1g1tur, oppositum b32 eat oppoa1tum33 !t quod est 
probandum. 
213.) 34Dicendum quod prima consequentia est 
bona. Et concedendum est totum quod deduc1tur, usque 
dicatur quod propositio dicta a Sorte est a11quod falsum. 
S1gn1!1cat en1m illa propositio quod aliquod falsum sit 
d1ctun a Sorte, quod in casu isto est negandum. Et sic 
argumentum ulterius non proced1t. 
214.) 35sexto sic: Sortes dicit falsum; 1g1tur, 
falsum d1c1tur a Sorte. Haec consequent1a est bona, eo 
quod arguitur ab activo ad pass1Vllm; et antecedens est 
verum, per te; 1g1tur, consequens. Vel concedes quod 
in consequent1a bona ex vero sequitur falsum. 
215.) 36D1cendum quod consequent1a eat bona. Sad 
antecedens eat m1h1 dub1um, et ·: consequens · a1m111 ter. 
216.) Contra: 'Antecedens est verum' sci tum a 
te ease ventm; 1gitur, antecedens non estate dubitandum. 
217.) 37D1cendum quod hoc assertum est falsum. 
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218.) 38cantra: Antecedens est39 propositio dicta 
a Sorte; et illa per te est vera. Et hoc dicis te bene 
scire, eo quod bene sequitur per te 1llam esse veram, ex 
oasu et veritate; 1gitur, 1llud assertum est verum. 
219.) 4on1cendum quod lateat me utrum 111a propositio 
quae est antecedens dicatur a Sorta, cum hoc non ponatur 
1n argumento, nee in casu pro argumento; et idea 111a a 
me est rat1onabiliter dubitanda. 
220.) 4lcontra: Pono quod 111a propositio sit dicta 
a Sorte. Et fiat argumentum ut prius.42 
221.) Dicendum quod, s1 tune subjectum consequentis 
sit terminus univocus cum subjecto antecedentis, baec 
consequentia est bona, et conaequens verum. 
222.) s1[1] autem consequentia non valet, sed est 
fallac1a ae<qu)ivocationis, (54vb) eo quod argu1tur a 
termino stante material! ter ad terminum stantem s1gn1f1cat1v:e, 
43adhu.c ad pr1nc1pale argu1 tur sic: !. est verum; 1g1 tur, 
Sortem dicere falswn est verum; 1g1 tur, Sortes di c1 t falsum.; 
igi tur, propos1 t1o dicta a Sorte est falsa. 
223.) 44 D1cendum, sumendo term1nos unifonniter, et 
deducta omni aequivocatione a terminis, prima consequentia 
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est bona, et secunda s1m111ter; sed tertia non valet, 
propter fallaciam aequ1vocation1s. 
224.) Simile est huic quodlibet 1storum: 'Sortes 
scr1bit falsum' 'Sortes audit falsum' 'Sortes intellegit 
falsum' 'Propos1t1o est• 45 'VerUill est• 'Falsum est' et 
hujusnodi, quorum quodlibet, ossu 1nsolub111um pos1to, 
est verum; et ideo ad quodlibet 1storum et ad omn1a 
s1m111a similiter est d1cendum. 
225.) 46(q)uia tamen aliquod insolubile simplex 
categoricum est falsum, 1deo de eo post insolub1le simplex 
categoricum et verum al1quid47 breviter est dicendum 0 
48ponatur, 1gitur, quod Sortes dicat istam et nullam 
a11am: 'Hoc est falsum'. Et sit illa propos1t1o omn1s 
propositio. Quod autem iste casus sit possib111s patet, 
arguendo contra op1nionem primam.49 Quae propos1t1o, 
propter brev1tatem et cert1tud1nem exprimendi eam, sit 
!.· Tune quaero utrum a sit verum vel falsum. 
-
Si falsum, 
et! est simplex categorica; 1g1tur, ~non praecise 
s1gn1f1cat primo sicut est. 1Consequent1a patet ex 
suppos1t1one ·secunda.5° Et tune arguo ex consequente 
sic: ! non praecise significat primo sicut est; et ! 
praeci.se51 s1gn1f1cat52 pr1mo quod hoc est falsum; 
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1g1tur, non est ita,53 quod hoc est falsum; igitur, hoc 
est verum. Consequent1a patet ex d1v1s1one secunda.54 
Si autem detur quod ! est verum, argui tur sic: ! est 
simplex categor1ca vera; 1g1tur, !55 praec1se s1gn1f1cat 
primo sicut <est), per eversam56 pr1mae suppos1 t1on1s57; 
et ! praec1se s1gn1f1cat primo quod hoc est falsum; 
1g1tur, !ta est, quod hoc est falsum; et ultra: 1g1tur, 
non est verum; 1g1tur, s1 !_est verum, non est verum. 
226.) 58D1.cendum quod ! est falsum, dist1nguendo 
de minor in eo quod potest esse propos1t1o dicta a Sorte 
vel a11a s1b1 s1m111s. Si 11la dicta a Sorte, consequentia 
non (valet), eo quod tune subjectum in 1iia· propos1t1one 
non supponeret [non supponeret] pro co~plexo, neque 
praedioatum..59 Quod sic ostend1tur: Sit en1m £ subjectum 
et~ praedicatum. Tune arguitur sic: Species ipsius ~ 
vel £non naturaliter s1gn1f1cat aliquam propositionem; 
nee hie ex impositione a11qua propos1t1o est suppositum 
.alter1us illarum; 1g1tur, in 1st.a propos1t1one 'Hoc est 
falsum', nee subjeotum nee praedicatum eu~ponit pro aliqua 
P!opos1t1one. Consequent1a paret secundam conclusionem,60 
quae dic1t quod nullum extremum propos1t1on1s aliquid ex 
1mpos1tione s1gnif1cat, n1s1 quad naturaliter, etc. 61 
Ig1tur, utrumque extremum in~ propositione supponit eo 
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modo quo supponeret, si neutrum extremuui. aliqua.ndo62 f'U1sset 
impos1 tum ad s1gn1f1candum. Consequent1a63 tenet per hoc, 
quod, si aliquod extremum in! al1qu1d ex 1mpos1t1one 
.64 
sign1f1caret, 1sto oasu posito, illud esset propos1t1o; 
sed nullam a11am propositionem ab 1psa propos1t1one cujus 
est pars potest ~ vel .£ s1gn1f1care et pro 1psa supponere, 
ut patet ex deduct1one prior165; 1g1tur, s1 pro a11qua 
supponeret .£ vel ~, 66 pro 1psa propos1t1one cujus .£ vel 
d est pars. Consequentia patet. Et consequens falsum, 
-
juxta quartam67 et quintam.68 conclusiones. Subjectum, 
1g1tur, in! tantum pro se ipso supponit, de quo non vere 
. . 
affi:rmatur 1ste terminus 'falsum'; et idea est, quod ! 
est propos1t1o fa.Isa. 
227.) 69sed contra istam responsionem potest sic 
argu1: Vel al1qu1d vel aliquid s1gn1f1cat primo; et non, 
nisi bane esse falsam, se 1psa demonstrata; 1g1tur, 
s1gn1f1cat se ease falsam; 1g1tur, cum casu, stat quad 
iste terminus 'falsum• pro suppos1to habet proposit1onem. 
·228.) 70rtem, sic: Hoc pronome;· demonstrativum 'hoc' 
·/ 
potest oausare natura11ter spec1em se 1psam s1gn1f1cantem, 
ex pr1ma conclusione,71 et quodl1bet aliud ex 1mpos1t1one; 
1gitur, hanc totam propos1t1onem cujus 1ste tenninus 
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demonstrativus 'hoc' est pars potest ejus species 
1ntellectui repraesentare. Tune ultra sic: Qu1dqu1d 
potest <specie~ 1llius termini 'hoc' repraesentare 
potest iste terminus 'hoc' repraesentare7 2; (55ra) sed 
totam propos1t1onem cujus 1ste terminus 'hoc' est pars 
potest species ejus repraesentare; 1g1tur, totam 
propos1tionem cujus 1ste terminus ~hoc' est par~) potest 
1ste termtnus .9hoc•73 repraesentare. 
~---·:.- -
' ' 
229.) 74.Dicendum ad pr1mum: Neganda est minor, 
quia ~ non s1gn1f1cat 111am propos1t1onem esse falsam, 
sed significat subjectum non sign1f1oat1ve sumptum 
ease 'falsum'. 
230.) 75Ad seoundam: Nego oonsequentiam assumpta.m 
pro secunda parte, quia, licet totum sit aliud a parte, 
totum ta.men cujus est pars ex 1mpos1t1one non .(potest) 
s1gn1f1care. OUjus oausa prius assignatur in arguendo 
pro conclusione quarta,76 et 1n respondendo ad argumenta 
quae aunt contra eam. 77 Ex quibus studioso causa hujus 
1mposs1bil1tat1s satis, credo, poterit apparere. 
231.) Ulterius: Etiam negatur secunda consequentia, 
qu1a, quamvis intellectus potest imponere speciem ex1stentem 
1n ipso ad s1gnif1candum totam propositionem extra an1mam 
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cujus terminus causans 1llam spec1em est pars, ta.men, 111a 
specie sic s1gn1f1cante ex 1mpos1tione, esse extremum 
propos1tion1s mentalls est 1mposs1bile, ut pr1us ostend1tur78; 
sed ad hoc, quod aliquod extremum proposi tion1s extra 
animam supponeret pro tota cujus est pars, requireretur 
a priori quod aliquod extremum proposit1on1s in anima pro 
eadem supponeret, ex conclusione79 secunda80 et probat1one 
conclus1on1s quintae. 81 Ex quibus patet quod consequent1a 
non conclu di t. 
232.) Retento tamen casu priori, a11ter argu1 
po test: Sit a, ut pr1us, propos1 tio dicta a Sorte. 
-
Tune a est fa1sum; et suum. contrad1ctor1tlm est; 1gitur, 
-
suum contrad1ctor1um est verum. Quae est !?.• TUnc arguo 
sic: !?, est verum; et !?, sign1f1cat quod ! non est falsum; 
1g1tur, ! non est falsum; et! est propos1t1o; 1g1tur, 
! est propos1t1o vera, quod est oppositum dict1. 
233.) 82Ad 1stud, dicendum ad pr1mum: Concede 
quod contrad1otorium ! est verum. Sed nego minorem 
respectu argument1, quae est quod lt s1gn1f1cat quod ! 
non est falsum. Nam, cum ! et !?, aunt contrad1ctor1a, 
ex posito, et in! 'falsum 1 83 solum se 1psum 1ntellectu1 
repraesentat, ex prius posit1s, requ1(r~tur quod in~ 
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subjectum non repraesentat !• sed solum ipsius ! subjectum, 
cum in contred1ctor11s oportet term1nos84 stare pro eisdem. 
Et sic ulterius argumentum non procedit. 
~ 
234.) 85s1m1le est: Ponatur quad ~rtes et Plato 
1nc1p1ant simul loqui, quorum Plato dicat 1 Falsum est hoc', 
et Sortes a11am s1b1 s1m1lem in terminis et in voce. Et 
sint ! ~ omnes propos1t1ones. Tune arguitur sic: a et 
-
b convertuntur. Quia de ~ est verum, et tune sic: 8. 
- . 
-
est verum; et~ est verum; 1gitur, nullum falsum hoc. 
rsta consequentia est bona; antecedens verum; 1g1tur, 
consequens. Et consequens est oppositum tam a quam b, 
- -
vel saltem ! vel ~· Si a est falsum, 1g1tur, b falsum; 
- . ;. -
1g1tur, a11quod falsum est hoc; et ultra: 1g1tur, falsum 
est hoc. Ista secunda consequentia est bona; et antecedens 
est verum; 1g1tur, consequens; et, per consequens, hoc est 
verum: 'Falsum est hoc'. 
235.) 85.Q,.. Ad istud respondendum est sicut ad pr1mum, 
d1cendo tam a esse falsum quam £, cum non sit aliqua 
propositio pro qua subjectum in! potest supponere, quia 
n~c 1psamet cujus est pars, nee a11a. Nam, si pro aliqua 
alia posset extremum in~ supponere, hoc esset pro ~· 
(si) in! supponeret pro £, requireretur quod ~ pr1us 
easet, quam esset actus componendi in ! pro ~. propter 
111 
quam causam nee extremum in ! potest supponere pro ~. 
nee extremum in~ potest supponere pro ~.86 Negandum est, 
1g1tur, quod assumitur, quod ab convertuntur, cum in 
- -
utra{que) subjectum pro se 1pso87 supponat, et subjectum 
unius non est subjectum alterius. Constat, et sic 
ulterius argumentum non proced1t. 
236.) 88s1mile est, si ponatur quad Sortes et 
Plato 1nc1piant sic loqu1 dicentes: •Vert.ml est hoc' 
'Verum est hoc', quae sint ! ~· Hoc posito, quod ! ~ 
sint omnea prop~sitiones, 89 deinde si proponatur quod b 
-
sit contradictorium a, ve190 concedendum est quod c est 
- -. 
verum.91 Et ad omnes deductiones (55rb)~respondendum est 
sicut ad prox1mum praecedens, et ad omn1a similia s1m111ter 
est dicendum. Et de 1nsolub111bus categor1c1s haeo quae 
dicuntur suff1c1ant. 
237.) (s)uperest 1g1tur, post 1nsolub111a simplicia, 
de oompositis al1qu1d d1sserere, et, propter faciliorem 
1ntellectum, a disjunctivis 1ncip1atur. Sit 1g1tur ~ 
1sta · disjunctiva.: 'Deus non92 est, vel disjunctiva prolata 
a . me est falsa•. ~t sit nu11a a11a prolata a me. Et 
te:rm1n1 sign1f1cent sicut oommuniter datur intellegere. 
Et non oportet addere, sicut communiter additur, quad 
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una disjunctiva sit omnis disjunctiva, quia quotquot 
fierunt disjunctivae a11ae, sive in conceptu sive extra, 
ab aliis prolatae vel fonnatae, n1h1193 ex hoc infertur 
a disjunctivam non ease 1nsolubilem, eo quod iste 
-
terminus 'disjunctiva' pro nulla 11larum supponit, cum 
nulla illarurn sit prolata a me. Tune quaero utrum a 
-
sit vera vel falsa. Si vera, et non pro prima parta; 
1g1tur, pro secunda parte. patet consequentia, cum non 
stat ibi plures partes. Arguitur, 1g1tur, sic: Secunda 
pars est vera; et est simplex categor1ca de praesent1; 
1g1tur, praecise s1gn1f1cat pr1mo sicut est; sed 1lla 
s1gn1f1cat primo quod 111a d1sjunct1va est falsa; 1g1tur,. 
ita est, quod est falsa; et ultra: 1g1tUr, non est vera. 
Si! sit d1sjunct1va94 falsa, 1g1tur secunda pars est 
falsa; et ultra: 1g1 tur, secunda pars non praecise 
s1gn1f1cat pr1mo sicut est. Consequentia tenet per 
suppositionem secundam.95 Et ultra: Ex consequenti, 
non significat primo sicut est; et 111a significat primo 
quod disjunotiva a me prolata est falsa; 1g1tur, non 
est 1ta, quod disjunctiva a me prolata est falsa; et 
ista. d1sjunct1va a me pro,lata est, ex casu; 1g1 tur, 
disjunctiva a me pralata96 est vera. Tenet consequent1a 
pe~ d1v1s1onem secundam. 97 
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238.) Item, arguat sic proferens illam d1sjunct1vam: 
prima pars d1sjunct1vae98 prolatae a me est falsa; et 
secunda pars d1sjunct1vae a me prolatae est falsa99; et 
non sunt plurea partes 1llius disjunctivae; igitur, 
. disjunctiva a me prolata est falsa. Ista consequentia 
est bona; et totum antecedens est verum; 1g1tur, coneequens 
verum; et consequens est secunda pars disjunctivae prolatae 
a me, vel convert1b1le cum ea; 1gitur, secunda pars 
d1sjunctivae prolatae a me est vera. 
239.) 1m1.cendum quad, 1sto casu · posito, a est 
d1sjunct1va falsa. Quod sic ostenditur: Iste tenninus 
'disjunctiva', qu12 est pars subjecti in: secunda 
categorica, praecise ex 1mpos1tlone signlficat duas 
categoricas vel plures, med1ante inter 111as 1sta 
con4unctione 'vel'. Modo, in isto caau, iste terminus 
'd1sjunctiva' nullam alia.m d1sjunctivam3 a se 1psa potest 
habere suppositum. Qu1a, s1 a11am, val a11am prolatam 
a me vel a11am non prolatam a me. Pr1mam non, qula hoc 
repugnat casui. Nee a11am, qu1a hoc non perm1ttit hoc 
complexum 'prolatum a me'. Nec4 pro tota disjunctiva 
cujus est pars potest supponere, ex quarta5 conclus1one6 
et quinta.7; 1g1tur, pro nulla dicjunctiva suppon1t; ~8 
ex 1mpos1tione solum 1mpon1tur ad s1gn1f1candum disjunctivam; 
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sequitur quad hie n1h11 ex 1mpos1t1one s1gn1f1cat; ex9 
prima 1g1tur conclusione,10 species ejus existens in 
an1ma praeter ipsa.m disjunctivam n1h11 aliud ab 1sto 
tennino 'd1sjunct1va' 1ntellectu1 repraesentat; 1lla 
1gitur propositio in anima cu1 subordinatur secunda pars 
illius d1sjunct1vae est talis: 'Iste terminus ttdisjunctiva" 
est "falsa 0 •11 ; et cum, ex secunda conolusione, 12 nullum 
extremum propositionis extra an1mam al1qu1d ex 
1mpos1tione significat, n1s1 quod natura11ter et a 
priori, etc. , extremum, 1g1tur, in secunda13 parte 
• 
disjunctivae extra solum pro se ipso supponit; sed de 
isto term.inc 1 d1sjunctiva• non vere affirmatur 1ste 
terminus 'falsum.'. Oonstat, propter quad d1sjunct1va 
est falsa . 
240 . ) 14Ad secundum in oppositum: eum . assum1tur15: 
! est falsum; igitur, 16 secunda pars! non significat prime 
s1cut est, concede consequens . Sed ulteriua cum 
assumitur quod17 pars 111a s1gn1f1cat pr1mo quod 
d1sjunct1va prolata a me est falsa, illa potest negari, 
eo quad ibi rationabiliter potest d1ci18 1llum terminum 
1disjunct1va 1 s1gn1f1cative supponere . (55va) Universe.liter 
potest dio1 ad quodlibet tale, distinguendo penea 
aequi vo ca·tionem, ·eo quo d ta11s terminus po test indif'ferenter 
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supponerel9 mater1al1ter vel signLf'icative. Si pr1mo modo, 
quaelibet talis est concedenda, qu1a vera. Si secundo 
modo, neganda, quia falsa. 
241.) Sed contra rationem 1llius20 pos1t1onis ob1c1tur 
breviter, sicut casus ponit quad et termini in ista 
d1sjunctiva sign1f1cat sicut dant commun1ter 1ntellegere 
[propos1t1onesJ; sed extr~ materiam 1nsolubil1um 1ste 
terminus 1 d1sjunctiva' et 1ste terminus 'falsum' et 
hujusmodi comm.uniter dant intellegere propos1t1ones; 1gitur, 
et in 1ata. 
242.) Sed !stud non movet, qu1a, quando dioitur 
quod casus ponit quod: termini sign1f1oant prout commun1ter 
dant 1ntellegere; sed 1ste terminus 1 d1sjunct1va' communiter 
dat 1ntellegere propos1 tionem; igi tur, 1sto ·casu posi to, 
dat 1ntellegere propositionem--patet enim quod consequent1a 
non valet, sed est fallacia consequentis. 
243.) 21Exemplum: Frater studiosus communiter est 
in choro, et s1m111ter commun1ter22 est in studio. Si, 
1g1tur, sio arguatur: Frat4r est ub1 communiter solet 
esse; sed commun1ter solet esse in chore; 1g1tur, frater 
est 1n choro--constat enim quod est fallacia consequent1s. 
Sequitur en1m e contrar1o et non sic. Nam bene sequitur: 
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prater communiter solet esse in choro; et jam est in 
ohoro; igitur, jam est ubi communiter solet esse. Sic 
est in priori argumento. Nam terminus communls commun1 ter 
solum se 1psum intellectu123 repraesentat, et terminus 
communis commun1ter24 aliud a se ipso repraesentat. 
Quando autem primo modo repraesentat et est extremum in 
proposit1one, suppon1t mater1a11ter; quando autem 1stud 
extremum est extremum et suppon1 t secundo modo, suppo~d t 
s1gn1f1ca ·~ive. Arguere, 1g1tur, ex hoc, quod terminus 
commun1s aupponit sicut comm.uniter solet supponere, quod 
supponit s1gn1f1ca.t1ve, est peccare fa11ac1a consequentie. 
244.) Oonf1rmatur25 tamen pos1t1o sic: Quilibet 
terminus respectu hujus26 verb1 'est• 27 1nd1fferenter 
potest pro se ipso vel pro alio a se ipso supponere; 
qu111bet 1storum: 'disjunctiva' 'conjunctiva' 'exclus1va' 
1 except1va' 'verum' 1 falsum 1 et hujusmodi est hujusnod.1; 
1g1tur, qu111bet istorum, etc. Minor autem non solu:n 
est uni us, sed mul torum volent1um, et quasi 01:m1U!Il qui pro 
regula general! ponunt quod omnls terminus, s1ve communls sive 
proprius, supponens respectu verb1 vel praedicati, quod 
ex natura suae signif1cation1s non determinat subjectum. 
ad unam speciem suppos1 tionis, (et) quod 1nd1fferenter 
potest 1llud subjectum habere ~28 suppositionem vel 
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245.) Al11 enim generalius ponunt, qui ponunt quod 
nee verbum nec29 praedicatum potest determ1nare subjectum. 
Dicunt qu1dam (quod> respeotu cujus1<1beV verbi, 
generaliter potest terminus communis s1ve proprlus 
indifferenter habere unam suppositionem vel a11am. Si, 
1g1tur, ponatur al1qu1s casus cum quo et30 ver1tate 
non stat terminum aliquem habere unam suppositionem, 
non tamen excludit ab 1110 term1no31 aliam. Ille 
casus non est negandus, quamvis non poterit esse cum 
1110 oasu, quod terminus habeat suppositionem personalem, 
se d, quia cum ·1110 casu stare po test, quo d terminus 
habeat suppos1t1onem material~,32 quam aeque nata est 
havere e1cut personalem, oasus, tamquam poss1b111s, est 
general1ter admittendus 0 
246.) Confirmatur ratio: Omnia casus est Sdmittendus 
qui, juxta form.am terminorum 1111us oasus, est poss1b111s. 
Et hoc maxima a sophistis. 33 Nam aliquem talem oasum 
negare non est, nis1 fUga volent1um vel non soientium 
respondere. Sed 1ste casus qui ponit quod sit unica 
.. 
propos1t1o tal1s: 'Sortes dic1t falsum' vel talis 'Deus 
non est vel d1sjunct1va a me prolata est falsa', juxta. 
formam term1norum, est poss1b111s; igitur, qu111bet 
tal1s ·est a soph1st1s concedendus.· Probatur minor, 
ostendendo quod oasus positus pro prima propos1t1one est 
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poss1b111s, juxta formam terminorum. casus enim ille 
quattuor habet partes, quarum prima est quod sit unicus 
Sortes; secunda, quod d1cat 1stam propositionem: 'Sortea 
d1c1t falsum'; (55vb) tertia, quod 1lle Sortes non dicat 
aliquam aliam; et quarta, quod ista propositio s1gn1ficet 
juxta compos1t1onem terminorum, et quod 1st1 tenn1n1 ejus 
repraesentant 1ntellectu!34 quad communiter solent 
repraesentare, et, .ex consequenti, ipsa propos1t1o sic 
repraesentet. Omnes tres primae partes ex se evidenter 
sunt pass1b1les, et ad-1nv1cem compass1b1les. Et quad 
quarta sit cum a111s composs1b111s patet satis ex hoc, 
quod iste terminus 'falsum' communiter se ipsum intellectui 
repraesentat, ut quilibet in se ipso, noh solum. de isto 
termino, sed de quolibet alio termino communiver viso 
vel audi to poteri t exper1r135; et, si sio solum in ista 
propositione repraesentet, constat quod 1lla particula 
in se est pass1b111s, et cum a111a composs1bil1s36; 
igitur, cum sic ipse communiter repraesentet, sequitur 
quad in casu possibile est 1stam propasitionem 'Sortes 
dicit falsum' s1gn1f1care sicut ejus termini communiter 
dant 1ntellegere; et sicut arguitur de 1sto casu, s1o 
de quolibet a11037 1n hac mater1a argu.1 potest; 1g1tur, 
qu111bet casus in hac 4nater1a) communiter positus est 
poss1b111s; 1g1tur, et admittendus. 
247.) Oonf1rmatur 1terum. sic: Sit a terminus 
-
aequivocus habens E. £ ~ s1gn1f1cata. Tune sic: Ex 
hoc, quod ponitur aliquis casus excludens ! habere ~ 
sigl11f1oa·tum, cum hoc, quod ille oasus permi tti t ! 
habere ~38 s1gn1f1oatum~ ille oasus est poss1b111s, 
ut, s1 oasus solum excluderet 1llum terminum 1 can1s 1 
ad supponendum pro marina belua, non propter hoc 1lle 
casus esset negandus, eo quad potest sUpponere pro 
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alio suo s1gn1f1cato; 1g1tur, cum 1ste terminus 'falsum' 
et iste terminus 1 d1sjunct1va', quando supponunt pro 
s1gn1f1cato ab 1111s d1st1ncto, exclud1t ex hoc a11quem 
talem term1num supponere pro sign1f1cato ab eo distincto, 
<lion) excludit ex hoc aliquem term.1num talem pro se ipso 
. . 
supponere39; qu111bet, 1g1t~r, tal1s casua est poss1b111s, 
cum in uno quem fac1 t poter1 t esse verus. 40 · Mul ta a11a 
vera exempla adduci possent pro positione 1sta, qu~e 
41 
studioso derelinquJJJ;l.tur. 
248.) Habita 1g1tur hac declaratione, ex qua apparere 
poterit qualiter in hujusmod1 1nsolub111bus supponunt, 
fac111ter ad omnia argumenta quae sunt in hac materia 
poterit responder1. Nam, si sic arguatur, retento oasu 
priori, quod ! sit haec disjunctiva: 'Deus non est vel 
d1sjunct1va a me prolata est !alsa', cujus secunda pars 
sit b; et tune, s1 sic arguatur: Ad omnem propositionem 
-
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falsam sequitur suum dictum ease falsum; ~est (falsum); 
igitur, ad~ sequitur suum dictum ease falsum; 1g1tµr, 
d1sjunct1vam prolatam a me esse falsam est falsum; et 
ultra: 1gitur, falsum est quad d1sjunct1va prolata a me 
est falsa; tune sic: Falsum est quod disjunotiva prolata 
a me est falsa; 1gitur, non est 1ta, quod disjunct1va 
prolata a me est falsa; et est vera vel falsa, ex quo est 
propos1t1o, ex secunda div1s1o·ne42; 1g1tur, ! d1sjunct1va 
prolata a me e·st vera. 43 
249.) Sed 1stud non movet, 1ntellect1s is tis 
pr1ncip11s. Nam prime, cum assumi tur quod Had omnem 
propos1 tionem falsam 11 , illud rat1anab111~er poteri t 
negar1, cum n1h11 s1~ verum vel talsum, prout hie est 
sermo de vero et falso, nisi propos1t1o, ex Ar1stotele, 
44 pr1mo Periermenias, oap1tulo de oratione, ub1, per hoc 
d1sjunctum 'verum vel falsum', essent1a11ter d1stingu1t 
propos1t1onem a quolibet quod non est propositio; dictum 
autem propos1tion1s non est propos1t1o; et 1deo, dictum 
propos1t1on1s nee est verum nee falsum. 
· 250.) Ratio et1am super quam communiter fundatur 1lla 
major assum1t falsum. Nam ratio dicitur ab 1111s qui 
concedunt 1llam majorem, quod ex omni propos1t1one falsa 
sequitur suum dictum ease talsum: hoc, quod quaelibet 
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propos1t1o s1gn1~1cat suum dictum. Sed hoc simpliciter 
est fB.lsum, cum dictum propo.s1 tionis a1 t oratio 1nf1n1 ti va 
s1gn1f1cans idem indeterminate;· quoad suppos1 tum, quod 
oratio 1nd1cat1va quae est propositio ·s1gn1f1cat 
determinate. 
251.) Consequ1tur45 cum illa (56ra) majore et tota 
consequentia: Haec conse.quentia non valet46: "D1.sjunct1 vam 
prolatam a me esse falsam est falsum; ••• igitur, falsum est 
quod d1sjunot1va prolata a me est falsa", propter 
variationem med11, ut frequenter prius ostensum est. 
252.) Simile est, s1 ponatur 1a·ta disjunctiva: 
'Rex aedit vel disjunctiva prolata a te est tib1 dubia', 
quae sit omn1s disjunct1va pro~ata a te. Ad quod, et 
ad omnes similes d1sjunct1vas quae realiter insolub1les 
aunt, per omnes, sicut ad primum cons1m111ter est 
d1cendum. Et ideo de d1sjunct1v1s suff1c1ant. 
253.) 47Pro conjunctiyis autem sic: Hoc exemplum 
ponatur, quod Sortes tantum dicat 1stam conjunctivam: 
'Tu es homo', denotando responsalem, 'et aliqua 
conjunctiva prolata a Sorte est falsa•. 48 Et sit unus 
Sortes49 omn1s Sortes. Et pos1to,50 s1cut in omnibus 
prioribus, aupponitur quod ista conjunctiva s1gn.1f1cet 
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juxta composition~m terminorum, cujus conjunctivae secunda 
pars s1 t !• Et quaeritur utrum a sit verum vel fa.lsum . 
-
Si verum, et prima pars c~njunctivae 1111us est vera; 
1g1tur, tota conjunctiva es~ vera; et aliqua pars 1111us 
conjunctivae s1gn1f1cat primo quod conjunctiva prolata est 
falsa; igitur, ita est, quad conjunctiva prolata a Sorte 
est falsa; et hoc . s1gn1f1oat !; 1g~tur, ! est falsum; 
et ultra: 1g1tur, a non est verum. S1 igitur detur in 
-
pr1nc1p1o quod ! sit falsum, arguitur sic: Sit b data 
-
conjunctiva. b est falsum; et b est aliqua conjunctiva 
- -
prolata a Sorte; 1g1tur, al1qua conjunct~va prolata !51 
Sorte est falsa . Ista consequentia est bona; et antecedens 
totum est verum; 1g1tur, consequens; sed consequens est 
secunda pars conjunctivae prolatae a Sorte, vel convert1b111s; 
ig1tur, conjunctiva prolata a Sorte est vera. 
254. ) 52sed, 1sto oasu posito, dicendum est, eo 
quod a est proposit1o affinnat1va de praesenti praeoise 
-
s1gn1!1cans prime sicut est, ex prima conclus1one53 
supposita virtute oonclusionis quartae . 54 55Ad formam 
argument!: Conceditur tota deduct1o, quousque ad minorem 
ult1m1 argumenti, quae est 1sta, quad consequens est 
seounda pars oonjunctivae prolata a Sorte. Illa enim 
est neganda, ut frequenter pr1us ostenditur. Non enim 
est ista para conjunctivae, sed alia sibi s1m111s in 
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voce, cum extrema in illis pro diversis supponunt. Si 
tamen ponatur quod sit convert1b1lis cum illa prolata 
a Sorte, tune negan~a est consequentia, eo quod tune 
in argumento ·com.mi ti tur fallacia aequ1 vocat1on1s. 
255 . ) 56De exclusivis autem sit hoc exemplum: 
'Tantum Sortes dicit falsum• . Et sit ista propositio 
omnis proposi tic, quae sit ~. 57 Tune quaeri tur utrum a 
- . -
sit proposi tio ve.re. vel falsa. Si vera, et praecise 
significat prime quad tantum Sortea diclt falsum; 1g1tur, 
verum est tantum Sortem dicere falsum; et uitra: igitur, 
Sortes58 dicit falsum; et Sortes dicit propositionem; 
1g1tur, d1c1t propositionem !alsa.m. Si d1cas quo d a 
-
est propositio (tals~, 1g1tur non est ita, ~icut ! 
primo s1gn1f1cat; et a prime significat quod. tantum 
-
Sortes dicit falsum; igitur, non est 1ta, quod tantum 
Sortes dicit falsum; igitur, vel Sortes non [non] d1c1t 
falsum vel a11us a Sorte d1c1t falsum; sed nullus a11us 
a Sorte dicit !alsum, per casum; 1g1tur, non est 1ta, quod 
Sortes dic1t falsum; et Sortes dicit a; 1g1tur, a non 
. - - . 
est falsum; 1g1tur, s1 ! est falsum, ! non est falsum . 
256.) Sed 1stud et omnia s1m111a, 1ntellectis 
prioribus, fac111ter dissolvuntur. ~ en1m in 1sto casu 
pos1to est propoaitio vera, eo quod sua convertib111s 
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est vcra, quae est ta11s59: 'Solus Sortea d1c1t talem 
vooem "falsum"'· Quam ease suam oonvert1b1lem6o 
oonclusio61 pr1ma62 secunda63 quarta64 et quinta65 sat1s 
mani.t'estant. 66 Ad argumentum autem respondendum est per 
omnia sicut ad prox1mum praeoedens. 
257.) 67Exemplum autem de except1v1s sit tal1s: 
'Nullus praeter Sortem d1c1t verum'. Et ponatur 
cons1m111ter sicut prius, et sim111ter tune per 
omnia est dicendum •. 68 
258.) Si autem ponatur sic casus, quod Sortes 
tantum d1o1t 1stam 'neus est', et Plato tstam 'Homo 
est asinus', et tert1us istam 'Solus Sortes dicit 
verum', quae sit!:• tune! non est insolubile, ut 
69 paret desor1pt1ones prius positas, eo quod quilibet 
terminus in ! suppon1 t pro complexo qui 70 oommun1 ter 
pro complexo supponere (56rb) solet. Et 1deo de 
talibus, non hie, sed convenienter 1n obligationibus, 71 
quae sentio et de al11s, 1nferam, prout possum. ])e 






!our Texts on Insolubilia from John 
_,.......,..o..;;.=-
D.Unbleton's Summa logicae ~ 
philosophiae natural1s 
126 
The following texts of John JDUmbleton are used by 
anonymous author of the treatise edited above as the 
basis for his discussion of the "pr1ma op1n1o 11 • They 
are taken from the first part of DUmbleton • s SUmma 
log1oae ~ ph1losoph1.ae natur!ll!. The texts have 
been transcribed from one manuscript only, vat. lat. 
6750. They are in no sense critically edited. The 
manuscript has been examined in m1cro!1lm copy only. 
a) f. 5ra: 
Tertia conclus1o: NUlla propos1tio in anima per 
1ntent1onem (5rb) s1mpl1cem, sed per complexum, 
comprehend! tur •••• 
b) f. 5va: 
Quarta conclus1o sequens ex tertia est haeo: 
CUjuscumque propositionis sign1!1cant1s pro complexo 
aubjectum vel praedicatum est propositio et alter1 vel 
utr1que propos1t1o correspondet. Nam si sit propositio 
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1n an1ma, patet, per tertiam conclusionem, subjeotum vel 
praedioatum vel utrumque esse propos1t1onem, eo quod 
nulla 1ntent1o simplex1 propositionem s1gnif1cat. Si 
tal1s propos1t1o s1gn1f1cat pro complexo et sit propos1t1o 
extra animam, tum n1h11 extra s1gn1flcat, n1s1 quatenus 
est comprehens1o per idem ab an1ma, ut patet per primam 
conclus1onem; 1g1tur, nullus terminus extra s1gn1f1cat 
propos1t1onem, n1s1 in an1ma e1dem2 propos1tion1 propos1t1o 
corre spondet. 
c) f. 5va.: 
His praepos1t1s jam probatis, superest responsionem 
1nsolub111um cum solutione objectionum tangere. 3JI>escript1o 
1nsolub111s ta11s est: Insolubile est propos1t1o quae, ex 
apparent1 oasu poss1b111 pos1to4 admisso, concluditur esse 
vera et falsa. Haec patet juxta communes casus 1nsolub111um. 
Primo, posito quod unica sit propos1t1o quae sit haec: 
'Verum est', cujus nomen sit_!, causa ver1tat1s vel 
falsitatis ass1gnetur, quia .! est propos1t1o aignificans 
a11qua11ter pro complexo (5vb). patet, per secundam et 
quartam conclusionem, subjectum vel praed1catum .! esse 
propos1t1onem, vel alter! vel utrique propositionem 
corres_pondere, quare casus non est adm1 ttendus. 
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Eadem responsio danda est, posito hoc: Quaelibet 
propos1t1o sit haeo: 'Falsum est' vel 'NUllum falsum est', 
vel talis: 1Propos1 t1o est•. 
d) :r. 4ra: 
Tertio. pono a propositionem solum5 s1gn1f1cantem 
- . -
taleum ease praeo1se. ~ tunc6 non fals1f1cat se propter 
s1gn1f1cat1onem veram7 quam habet; igitur, propter falsam 
s1gn1f1cat1onem, etc.a Et, per consequens, ~ non9 
s1gn1f1cat solum quod falsum est, cujus oppositum pon1t 
bae c posi t1o. 
Ad 1llud sic: Si 1ta est10 !• quod est falsum, 
posito casu comm.uni• 1g1tur allquall propos1t1o est 
suppos1tum hujus termini 'falsum'; sed nulla est propositio, 
n1s1 ~; nee !12 ~st suppos1tum istius termini 'falsum', 
n1s1 propter s1gn1ficationem falsam; 1g1tur, ! non solum 
s1gn1f1cat sicut est 1n oasu commun1. 
APPENDIX B 
Two Texts ot William of Ockham 
on Insolub1lia and Self-Reference 
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The-following texts are taken from Ockham's 
Tractatus logioae (: Summa log1cae ), Paris: ~ohannes 
Higman], 1488 (Hain *11948). They are in so sense 
critically edited, but are simply transcriptions of 
that incunabula edition. Certain obvious errors have 
been corrected, however, and, in one case, a homoeoteleuton 
has been expanded, following the readings of vat. lat 952, 
f. 117ra and Cambridge, Gonv~lle & Caius, 464/571, f. 58va. 
These two manuscripts have been examined in photocopy 
onl)". , : I 
a) a passage from Ockha · 's treatise on obligationes 
(Tractatus logicae III, 3, 38, t. l07vb): 
Obl1gation1s autem multae species assignantur, 
sc111cet 1nstitutio, petitio, positio, deposit1o, 
dub1tat1o, et sit verum. Inst1tut1o est a11cujus 
vooabul1 nova 1mpos1t1o pro tempore d1sputation1s, et 
non vult duratura •••• De 1sta specie dantur aliquae regulae. 
Una est quad numquam pars potest significare totum cujus 
est pars. Sed ista regula ca.pit instantiam. Nam in 1sta 
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propos1t1one 'Omnia propos1t1o est vera', subjectum 
significat totam propos1t1onem. Sim111ter, idem potest 
s1(g)n1f1care se; ergo, pars eadem ratione potest 
~1gn1f1care totum. Antecedens patet. Nam hoc nomen 
'vox' s1gn1f1cat omnem voce~, et per consequens se ipsam. 
S1m111ter, hoo nomen 'nomen' s1gn1f1cat omn;a nomina, 
quia omni nom1n1 competit def1n1t1o nominis; ergo, 
se 1psum s1gn1f1cat. Ideo dicendum est quod, quamvis pars 
posset a1gn1f1care totum cujus est pars, tamen talis 
1nst1tut1o non est semper admittenda. Quando enim, per 
1nst1tut1onem partis habentis eandem 1nst1tut1onem, 
totum s1gn1f1catum mutaretur a ver1tate in falsitatem, 
et e converse, tune non est'talis 1nst1tut1o adm1ttenda. 
b) Ookham's Inaolub111a (Traotatus log1cae III, 3, 
45, f. 109rb-vb): 
Circa 1nsolub111a est sciendum quod non ideo dicuntur 
sophismata aliqua 1nsolub111a, quia nullo mode possunt solvi, 
sed quia cum difficultate solvuntur. Unde aciendum quod 
1nsolub111a sophismata aunt, quando, per consequentias 
apparentea quae v1dentur regular1 per regulas necessar1as, 
ex propositione a11qua cont1ngente infertur sua opposita, 
quae 1deo dicuntur 1nsolub111a, quia difficile est tales 
consequent1as 1mped1re. Et tal1a argumen-(l09va) ta 
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non possunt fier1, nisi quando actus humanus resp1c1t 
1stum term1num '.:falsum' vel aliquem consim1lem aff1nnative, 
vel hunc term1num •verum' vel a11quem cons1m11em negative, 
sicut est de 1sta: •sortes dic1t falsum', et de ista: 
'Sortes non d1c1t verum'. Et fit hoc modo 1nsolub1le: 
Inc1p1at Sortes sic loqu1: "sortes d1c1t falsum 0 , et 
n1h11 aliud loquetur. TUnc quaeritur an Sortes dic1t 
verum an falsum. Si dicas quod Sortes d1c1t verum, et 
non d1c1t, n1s1 1stam propositlonem: 'Sortes dicit falsum'; 
ergo, haec est vera •sortes d1c1t falsum.'; ergo, si d1c1t 
verum, d1c1t falsum. Si dicas quod Sortes d1c1t falsum., 
ergo haec est vera •sortes d1c1t talsum'; et Sortes dicit 
hoc; ergo, Sortes d1c1t hoc quod est verum, et, per consequens, 
Sortes dicit verum. Et 1ta, si Sortes d1c1t falsum, Sortes 
d1c1t verum, isto casu posito. Illud argumentum d1c1tur 
1nsolub1le, quia de d1ff1c111 solvitur. 
Et idea ad solutionem 1st1us et omnium aliorum est 
sciendum quod tal1s propos1t1o contingens ex qua debet 
1nferr1 sua repugnans vel habet hunc term~num 'falsum• 
val aliquem cons1m1lem, vel hunc terminum 'verum' ~el 
aliquem consimilem.1 Si primo modo, o:portet quod--
sit aff1rmat1va, et tune debet d1c1 un1versal1ter quod 
propoa1t1o est falsa. Unde, s1 Sortes 1nc1p1at sic 
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loqu1 'Sortes d1c1 t falsum •, et n1h11 a11ud di cat, 
dicendum est quod 1lla propos1t1o est falsa. Si autem 
1nc1p1at sic loqui 'Sortcs d1c1t falsum', non posset 
f1er1 tale argiF1entum apparens. 51 autem proposi tio 
h,abeat huuc tenninum 'verum' vel aliquem consimilem, 
oportet quod propositio supra quam fundatur 1nsolub1le 
sit negat1va, et tune est concedendum quad 111a propositio 
est vera, sicut, si Sortes 1nc1p1at sic loqu1 'Sortes non 
d1c1t verum', concedendum est quod haec est vera. 
Et si arguatur quod haec sit vera 'Sortes non d1c1t 
vei-um'; et sOrtes d.1c1 t hanc propos1 tionem; ergo, Sortes 
d1o1 t hanc propos1 tionem ve~am, re.spondendum est quad 1lla 
. 
consequent1a non valet: 'Sortes d1c1t hanc propos1t1onem; et 
haec .propos1 t1o est vera; ergo, Sortes d1c1 t propos1 tionem 
veram'. Et ratio hujus negat1on1s est qu1a, in 1sta 
propos1t1one 'Sortes non d.1c1t verum', praed1catum non 
potest supponere pro tota illa propos1t1one cujus est 
pars, quamvis non praecise ~ropter hoc quad est pars ejus. 
Et ideo 1sta propos1t1o 'Sortes non dicit verum' aequivalet 
1st1 'Sortes non d1c1 t aliquod verum ab 1sto 11Sortes non 
d1c1t verum 11 '. Et idea, siput non sequitur: 'Haec est 
vera; et Sortes d.1c1t illam; ergo, d1c1t al1quam veram 
propo~1tionem ab 1sta', 1ta non sequitur: 'Sortes dicit 
1stam prcposi tionem 11Sortes non d1c1 t verum H; et haec 
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est vera; ergo, Sortes d1c1t verum', et hoc qu1a, sicut 
dictum est, 1stae duae aequivalent: 'Sortes non d1c1t 
verum' et 'Sortes non dicit aliquod verunt ab 1sto'. 
Et eodem modo dicendum est proport1onab111ter ad 
argumentum praecedens, secundum quod, quando Sortes incipit 
sic loqui: 'Sortes dicit falsum', et quaeratur an Sortes 
elicit verum ,- aut falsum, dicendum est quod neo dicit verum nee 
falsum, sicut concedendum est quod nee dici t a11ud veru.m nee 
aliud falsum ab isto. Et 1deo non sequitur: 'Haec est 
falsa "Sortes d.1ci t falsum "; et Sortes d1c1 t hano 
propos1t1onem; ergo, Sortee dic1t falsum•, sicut non 
sequitur: 'Sortes dicit hoc; et hoc est falsUlll; ergo, 
d1c1 t a11ud falsum ab isto •, et hoc quia istae duae 
aequi valent: 'Sortes d1c1 t falsum' et 'Sortes die! t 
aliud falsum ab 1sto'. Et propter hoc p.rima· consequent1a 
non valet, qu1a in 1sta 'Sortes d1c1t falsum' praedicatum 
non potest supponere pro ista propositione. 
Et s1 d.1oatur: "Hie argu1 tur ab 1nfer1or1 ad super1us 
sine negatione et sine d1str1but1one; ergo, consequent1a est 
bona", d1oendum est quod illa consequentia non valet, n1s1 
quando illud super1us in 1110 consequente potest supponere pro 
illo infer1or1. Unde in ista 'Homo est animal', si 11 'animal' 
non pQsset supponere (109vb) pro homine, haec consequentia 
non valeret: 'Sortes est homo; ergo, Sortes est animal'. 
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In 1sta autem propos1t1one 'Sortes d1o1t falsum.', praedicatum 
non potest supponere pro tota propos1t1one; 1deo, non sequitur: 
•sortea dic1t hoc falsum; ergo, Sortes d1o1t falsum'o 
Per praedicta potest studiosus respondere ad omn1a 
insolub111a, s1 solvendo ea vel1t naturam 1nsolub111um 
advertere, quod rel1nquo studiosis. Et 1sta de in~olubilibus 
pro nunc sufficiant. 
APPENDIX 0 
Five Texts from Thomas 
Bradwardine's Insolubilia 
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The following texts of Thomas Bradwardine argue 
that a part of a proposition oan stand for the whole 
proposition of which it is a part. They are used by 
the author of the Insolubil1a edited above as arguments 
against his fourth and fifth conclusion~. Other texts 
of Bradward1ne's Insolub111a used by the author are cited 
above, p. *29. 
In this part of his Insolub11ia, Bradwardine is 
refuting the opinion. of .. those who attempt to solve 
insolubles by restricting terms, so that they do not 
permit a term to stand for all its s1gnif1cates or for 
all its singulars. Of those who take this approach, 
l 
some solve the insolubles secundum quid~ s1mp11ci t er. 
It is these with which Bradwardine is concerned here. 
The texts have been tr~nscribed from Bruges, 
' Bibliotheque publique de la ville, MS 500, ff. 134r-
143v. This manuscript contains several passages which 
seem to be corrupt. Such passages have been omitted in 
the following iranscriptions, even though they seem to 
be integral parts o! Bradward1ne's arguments. The 
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establishment of the oorrect text Will have to await the 
examination of the other manuscripts of Bradwardine's 
treatise. The purpose here is simply to provide some 
evidence that the author 1s in fact using Bradward1ne's 
Insolub111a. 
The manuscript has been examined in microfilm copy 
only. 
a) f . 134vb; cf. above, par. 138: 
In .:f\tndamento2 vero est triplex part1um, secundum 
num-erum radicum suarum . Nam illud .tundamentum obtinet 
tres radices. Quarum pr1ma pars pon1t quod pars non 
potest supponere pro toto cujus est pars. Secunda d1c1t 
quod pars non potest supponere pro opposite sui tot1us . 
Tertia pon1t quad pars non potest supponere pro convert1bil1 
cum suo toto nee ejus opposite in talibus pr1vativ1so 
Peccatum autem primae radicis apparet, quia pars 
potest supponere pro toto, ut patet per Aristotelem, 4~ 
Metaphys1cae, cap1tulo ultimo in f1ne,3 ub1 argu1t contra 
omnes ponentee4 sic, dicens: "Aco1d1t autem in quoque5 
quad fundamentum est de6 talibus orat1on1bus 1psas 
se 1psas destruere." Et addit paulo post7: "Qui vero 
omn1a falsa, et ipso se 1psum", ubi 1ntend1t talem 
consequentiam: 'Omnia sunt falsa; ergo, ista orat1o 
est falsa•. Quae tamen non valet, n1s1 pars pro suo 
to to supponeret. 
b) Ibid., immediately folloWing text a); cf. 
above, par. 137: 
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Secundo, sicut ha.ea 1ntentio 'falsum' in anima est 
naturalis s1m111tudo cujusl1bet :tals1, ergo vere 
repraesentat intellectui quodl1bet falsum; et ab illa 
naturali sign1f1cat1one et repraesentatione non cadit; 
ergo, s1gn1f1cat 1ntellectu1 suum oppositum. 
c) f. 135ra; cf. above, par. 135: 
Quarto sic: In a11qu1bus pars potest supponere pro 
toto, sicut in istis: 'Aliquod est ens' 'Vox est' 
1Propos1t1o est'; ergo, et8 in talibus pr1vat1vis, quia 
non po test •••• Posse t au tem fing1 hae c ratio f Si pars pro 
suo toto supponeret in talibus, sequeretur eandem propositionem 
ease veram et falsam, et quod 1nsolub111a nullo modo possent 
solve. Neutra sequitur, ut 1n sequentibus ostendetur. Hoc 
1g1tur non est, n1s1 figmentum 1llorum qui ad 1nsolub111a 
nequeunt respondere. 
d.) ~., immediately following text c); cf. 
above, par. 136: 
Quinto, sit~' Sorte dicente, 'Falsum dicitur a Sorte'; 
et audiat Plato subjectum tantum. Tune Plato per 11lud 
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1ntelleg1t9 omne falsum in un1versal1; ergo, et 
'Falsum d1c1t a Sorte'; ergo, subjectum 1111us •••• 
quia est vox s1gn1f1cat1va ad plac1tum; ergo, poteat 
1mpon1 ad repraesentandum quodcumque., 
e) - ~.; cf. above, par. 141: 
Septimo sic: D1cat Sortes tantum 1stam 'Omne 
dictum a Sorte est falsum•, quae sit!• Tune a est 
falsum. Et 1b1 est ease in suo toto, ut oonstat, 
et d1c1 de omn110; ergo, n1h11 est subjecti de quo 
non d1c1tur praed1catum. Consequentia patet per 
def1n1tionem d1c1 de omni posita primo Pr1orum11 
1n textu d1cente: "m.c1mus autem de omni praed1car1 
quando n1h11 est subject! de quo al terun non d.1caturu. 
Sed ! est al1qu1d subjecti ~; et qu1a ! est12 falsum, 
et subjeotum ! est ••• (f. 135rb) •••• Illud patet ex 
s1gn1f1cat1o nom1n1s. Si en1m pra.edicatum dicatur 
de anni subjeot1, ergo de hoc, quia argu1tur: De 



















List of Abbreviations ot 
-- -
Works Frequently Cited 
Minio-Paluel~o, L~ Aristoteles r,a.tinus 
("Union academ1que in ternationale: Corpus 
pbilosophorum med.11 aevi academ1arum 
consociatarum ausp1c11s et cons111o editum"), 
Bruges-Paris: nescl6e de Brouwer, 1939- • 
Albert of Saxony. Insolubil1a (published With 
his Soph1smata), P~ris: F~l1X Baligault, 1495, 
folios unnumbered. (Hain 582). 
/ . . 
Bochenski, I.M. Formale Log1k ( 0 0rbis Academicua: 
Problemegesch1chten der W1ssenschaft in Dolcumenten 
und narstellungen"), Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber, 
1956. 
Hain, Ludwig. Re~ertor1mn B1bl1o~raph1cum in 
quo L1br1 Omnes !0000 Arte TYEograph ca InventS:-
1§48~ !.£!Annum M]!, 4Vo1s., Milan: G.G. G8rl1ch, 
Averro1s commentaria et 1ntroduot1ones in omnes 
Iibros Aristotel1s cum--eorum versione l'a:e1na, 
Venice, apud Juntas;-I2v., fs52-1574. 
Paul of Venice. Log1ca magna, Venice: Albertinus 
(Rubeus) Vercellensis, for octavianus Scotus, 1499 
(Hain *12505). 
Mediaeval Studies, Toronto: 
of Mediaeval sl;udies, 1939-
Pontifical Institute 
• 
Aristotle. Periennenias,·Boethius tr., L. 
Minio-Paluel!o, ed., ~ 2, 1, pp. 1-38. 
Migne, J.P. patrologiae cursua completus ••• 





William of Ockham. Sum.ma logicae, Philotheus 
Boehner, O.F.M., ed., ("Franciscan Institute 
Publ1ca.t1ons, Text Series No. 2°), st. 
Bonaventure's, N.Y.: The Franciscan 
Institute, 1951. Boehner's edition is 
incomplete, stoppint at the end of the prima 
part tertiae Sartis. References to later 
s c ions of t~e work are given according to 
the incunabula edition, Tractatus logicae, 
paria: Q'ohannes Higman], 1488 (Hain 11948). 
John DUmbleton. Summa lo~1cae et ph1loso~b1ae 
naturalis, MS vat. fat. 6 5o. 





Thomas B_radward1ne. Insolub111a, MS Bruges, 
Biblioth~que publique de ia vi!ie, 500 1 ff. 134rb-143va. 
Moody, Ernest A. Truth and Consequence in 
Mediaeval Logic ( 11 StUdie"STn Logic and tne 
Foundations of Mathematf cs, u L.E.J. Brouwer 
et al., eds.), Amsterdam: North-Holland 
PUbl:Lslling Company, 1953. 
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Notes ~ !h!?. Study 
(to p. ,,1) 
l. For a bibliography of the material from 1868 
to 1958, see Francesoa R1vett1 Barbd, L'antinomia 
del mentitore nel pensiero contemporaneo da peirce 
a-¥arskI, 681-'599. The more important items from 
this literature are gathered together, with Italian 
translations, Ibid., 334-6~r7. There is no comparably 
convenient bibl!Ography of the material after 1958. 
2. ·· See the important texts in Bertrand Russell, 
~athemat1ca1 Logic as Based on the · Theory of Types," 
The .American Journal of Mathemati cs, 30 (1908), 222-
m; and llt'red North-:\lhi tehead and Bertrand RUssell, 
Pr1nc1p1a Ma~ emat1oa., ~nd ed., I, "Introduction, tt 
ch. 2, pp. -:;·1 -65. 
3. Espe oially as pres en te d by Tarski, "JDer 
WS.hrhe1 tsbegr1f.f' in den formal!sierten Spraohen, n L. · 
~laustein, tr., Stud1a Ph;ilosophica 1 (1935), 261-405. 
·Reprinted 1n Rivett! Barbd, ~· .£!!.., 392-677. 
4. For brief histories of this recent work, see 
FL, 448-467, esp. 448-450; and John van He1jenoort, 
""Logical Paradoxes," in~ Encyclopedia g£ Ph1loaop y , 
V, 49fo 
, 
5. Cf. the remarks by Bochenski, FL, 275-277, 
esp. his statement that the developmen"t9of the problem 
from Ockham to Paul of Venice is almost completely 
unknown (p. 277). The text edited below is from this 
period. 
6. Bochenski states that the earliest known use 
of the work '1nsolub1lia' in a technical sense occurs 
in Albert the Great (FL, 276; · cf. Albert the Great, 
Lib~ II eLenchorum, tract. 3, o. 2, in Opera omnia, 
Viv s ed., II, 691): 
Attendendun1 etiam, quad super hunc locum soph1st1cum 
[1.e., secundum quid et simplici ter] f1 t solut1o 
1nsolub1lium: insolubilia autem dico quaecumque 
talis sunt, quae qua[e]cumque parte contrad1ct1on1s 
data de ducuntur ad opposi tum et inconveniena, 
sive ad redargutionem, ut hoc: aliqu1s jurat 
se perjurare, aut jurat verum, aut non. 
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There may, however, be yet an earlier use of the 
work in its technical sense, dating from the second 
quarte r of the thirteenth century. The Old F~ench 
poem La bataille des .VII. artst by Henri d 1.Andel1, 
conta ins the following-rrneS:-- 1Ele se desfent d 1 
1ssolubles,/ De solucea et de fallaces." (lines 
425f. Cf. Louis John Paetow, The Battle of the 
seven Arts, 59. on the date, 'Tbrd., 34.) I am-
grate f'iil""'to Albert Judy, o.P.,-ror calling my 
a.ttention to this :passa~e. 
-- A1though the word 1nsolubil1a' was used in 
a· technical sense to refer to sophisms of a certain 
kind, there is no ev1denc~ that the work was used at 
this time to refer to strictly semantic ant1nomies. 
The arliest known explicit use of the work '1nsolubil1a' 
to refer to semantic ant1nom1es occurs in Lambert of 
Auxerre'a Summuiae lo~icales, written sometime before 
i253 (Cf. my unpublis ed paper "Aristotle's Sophistici 
Elench1 and the Mediaeval Development of the Problem 
of Semantic .Ant1nom1es to the End of the Thirteenth 
century".). 
7. see, e.g., the excellent article by W.V. Quine, 
"The 1fays of Paradox," in The ways of Paradox and Other 
Essays, 3-20; and John Buridan, So~'Eism9 on Meani'nf 
and Truth, Theodore Kermit Scott, :r., ch:-8, pp.80-223. 
8. Van Heijenoort, .2.E.• .211•• 49. 
:- 9 • QU1 ne , .2.£. .£!!• , 7. 
10. .!EJ:..!!., 11. 
11. Not enough detailed 1nfonnation is available 
to warrant an:~r final judgment about the circumstances 
surrounding the Megarian-Stoio origin o~ the problem 
in antiquity. Cf., however, I.M. Bochenskit Ancient 
Formal Logic, 100-102· .£li, 150-153 (sec. 23}; Benson 
Mates, Stoic Lo gic, 84, and the references in these 
place.s. 
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12. The following quotations are from F.P. Ramsey, 
1!!! Foundations 2.f Mathematics , 20-21. 
13. The exclusiveness of this dichotomy is open 
to question. Cf. van Heijenoort, ~U?.· .£.!.!., 49. 
14. On the parva lo c: ca11a and what they comprised, 
cf. the quotatio n from the Copulata Tractatuum Lo gicalium 
in Ph1lotheus Boehner, Mediaeval Los;i c : An outl ine of 
lli ))evelopment .f.!:9.!E. 1250 !2 _£. - 1400, p. IT7, n. 13.-
15. Ibid. 
16. In fact, he devotes a mere two paragraphs 
to them (pars. 255-56), and but a single, very brief 
paragraph (par. 257) to the similar ~•exceptive 1' type 
of insolubles. 
17. Cf. James A. Weisheipl, O.l?., 110ckham and 
Some Merton1ans 1\ !!.§ 30 (1968), 196 & 202-204. 
18. df. Edward A. Synan, 0 The 'Insolubilia' of 
Roger Nottingham, O.F.M., '1 !:!.§. 26 (1964), 270. 
19. Cf. A.B. Emden , ! Biograpllicel Re giste r of 
the Universi t y of Oxford to a.d. 1500 . On the 
identifica ti on Of the autnors of ~codex, se e J ohn 
E. Murdoch and Edward A. Synan, 11 Two Question s on the 
Continuum : al t er Cha tten (?), o.F.M., and Adam Wodeham, 
o. F.M. 11 , Francis can studi es 26 (1966), nintroduction 11 , 
II, pp. 2'2~- 232 . 
20. Em den, .212.• ill· 
21. par. 1. 
22. pars. 3-102. 
23 . par. 104. 
24. pars. 105-109. 
25. par. 111. 
26. pars. 112-132. 
.·. 
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'Z7. pars. 133-141. 
28. pars . 142-163. 
29. pars. 164-224. 
30. pars. 225-236. 
31. pars. 237-252. 
32. pars. 253-254. 
33. pars. 255-256. 
34. par. 257. 
35. par. 258. 
36. par. 1 . 
37. f. 46v. Transcription mine. 
38. Grabmann's transcription has 'solvetur'. er. 
Martin Grabmann, .Die Introduotiones in log1cam des 
Wilhelm ~ ShyreSW'Ood Ct naoh l26'f)-;-~E1nle1tung", 
P• 2o. . 
39. The text goes on to say that this description is 
too general, and gives a more precise definition. Cf. 
Grabmann, 2.1?.• ~. , 21. 
4o. !§!, the inc1p1 t . 
41. SL, III, 3, 15, :r. l09rb. Of. below, Appendix 
B, b), Po ~30. 
. 42. SL, III, 3, 15, f. 109va. er. Be,low, Appendix 
B, b), p.!'31. 
43. The same notion is perhaps expressed by the anonymous 
author of an Insolub1lia preserved in the MS Rome , Angel . 
1017 (R. 6. 32), ff. 14a-19b, 1nc1pit: ttrnsolubile est 
diff1c111s ••• u. (Cf. Gaudens E. Mohan, O.F.M., 11 Incipits 
of Lo gt cal Writings of the XIII th-XVth centuries, •1 Francis oan 
Studies 12 (1952), 409. 
. . 
- - - lNotes to pp . 11-*14) 
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44. SL, III, 3, 15, f. l09rb. Cf. below, Appendix 
B, b), p.l30. 
45. Compare this passage With the inci~t of the 
unascribed :oe insolubili bus found in the Er rt MS 
Amplon. Qu. -,95', 1. 1o4: " sciendum quod insolubilia 
sophismata sunt, quando ••• " (Of. Mohan, .2.E.• cit., 459). 
perhaps this is a copy o! Ockham's chapter on-Tnsolubles, 
lacking the first sentence. 
46. par • 111. 
. 47. par. 258. 
48. ~· 
49. pars. 3, 4, . 5-23. 
50. SLPN. 
199-207. -
On DUmbleton, cf. We1she1pl, ~· ~., 
51. par. 3: Mquo propositio redditur 1nsolub1lis". 
52. pars. 109-110. 
53. "s1gn1.f1cat juxta compos1 t1onem tem1norum" 
(par. ~46). The point is that the proposition mean 
what one would expect it to mean, judging from the terms 
and the way they are put together. This proviso is 
presumably to exclude the po ssi bili ty that So rte s 
utter the proposition 1 Sortes dicit falsum•, and mean 
by that something quite different from what is ordinarily 
meant--for example, that the king is sitting. 
54. par• 246. 
55. SLPN, f. 5ra. Of. below, Appendix A, a), p. 126. 
-
56. SLPN, f. 5va. Cf. below, Appendix A, b), p. 126. 
Cf. also ~clearer reference to this same conclusion in 
par. 21. 
57. par. 5. 
. . 
(Notes to PPo •14-*16) 
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58. In the statement o! the argument in r.ar. 5, the 
text has 0 s1gn1f1cat aliqua11 ter pro co::nplexo '• Compare 
the statement of the second conclusion, in the same par. 
par. 21 has 0supponi tH. 
59. The first conclusion (!OUmbleton•s third) 1s said 
to be involved in this argument (par. 5), but it does not 
in fact appear. Contrast "per tertiam ad quartam 
conolusionom n in par. 5, and t1patet per secundam et 
quart.am oonclus1onem 11 in lJUmbleton' s text, f. 5vb (of. below, Appendix A, o), p. 127). Nevertheless, 
the third conclusion does play a role, insofar as its 
function 1s to ground the fourth conclusion. Of. 
D.Unbleton's statement of the argument for the fourth 
conclusion, f. 5va (below, Appendix A, b), pp. 126f.). 
60. SLPN, f. 5va-vb. Of. below, Appendix A, c), 
pp. 127f.-




63. Synan, .2R• cit. The anonymous treatise edited 
below immediately preceeds Nottingham's treatise in MS 
Bri t1sh Museum, Harley, 3243, the unique extant MS in 
which either treatise is contained. 
64. Cf. ~., 270, the colophon, and also above, p. *7. 
65. Synan, .2.12.• cit., 269 (par. 36). Roger did 
not think, however, tiiB:t this example is a real insoluble. 
Of. ibid., 268 (par. 53): 11Et ta.ntum pro recta solutione 
insoruoilium nunc ultra notandum. quod mul tae sunt 
propositiones quae conceduntur ease 1nsolubilia, et 
tamen non sunt ...... 
66. A few brief remarks Will suffice to point out 
certain obscurities. 
1) The first three arguments involve the notion 
that there 1s a mental proposition which corresponds to 
each spoken or written proposition, and to Which the spoken 
or written pro~os1tion is subordinated. This is not the 
same as the first opinion•s fourth conclusion, which 
concerns only mental propositions corresponding to the 
extremes of certain spoken or written propositions. 
(Notes to pp. •16-*18) 
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cf., for example, pars. 8, 9, 10 and 12. In par. 
10, the phrase 'illa esset i mpossib111s' must refer to 
the proposition in the soul corresponding to the whole 
of the spoken proposition' "ttRex sedet~ est proposl t1o 
vera', and not merely corresponding to the predicate 
of that spoken proposition; otherwise, the argument is 
unintelligible. 
2) The argument in par. 11 is problematic. 
proposition b stands either for itself or for another 
(propos1t1onT. The second alternative does not se em 
to have been adequately considered. Perhaps the laet 
sentence of the par. is meant to deal with this part 
of the dichotomy, but the relevance of that sentence 
to the argumentation ls not clear. 
3) The last sentence of par. 12 may, 1 t seems, 
be expanded as follows: · 0 Propos1 tio in ~ et( iam) sol um 
tal1s (propositlo--1.e., solum vera propositio--) in 
anima oorre spondet. 11 
4) pars. 13-17 are presumably meant to treat the 
second half of the dichotomy set up iri the second sentence 
of par. 12, even though the ground has shifted somewhat. 
; 5) Par. 19 is an argument against the first opinion's 
fourth conclusion (cf. par. 18). Yet it also cons titutes 
a direct refUtat1.on of the argument's third conclusion. 
6) The fifth argument (pars. 21-23) adumbrates the 
author's own solution. 
67. pars. 3, 4, 24-44. 
68. par. 3. 
69. par. 4. 
70. The statement of these principles is taken from 
par. 24. 
71. This seems to be connected With the notion of 
material consequence ut nunc or sim~liciter. er. Tc, 
73-79, and.£':&, 222-220-('G'ecs. 3o:t2.93o.16) . --
72. The argument is given in par. 25. The last step 
is not explicit in par. 25; cf., however, par. 24. 
73. ASI: 
· Quantum ad secundum sit prima suppositio: Omnia 
propos1t1o est affirmativa vel negat1va. Secunda: 
Omnem propositionem aff1rmativam esse veram est idem 
(Notes to p. *18) 
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ease pro quo supponlt ejus subjectum et praedicatUIIl. 
Et, e converse, se lpsam ease falsam est non idem esse 
pro quo supponit ejus subjectum vel praed1catU!ll . 
Tertia suppos1t1o: Omnem propasitionem negativam 
esse veram est non 1dem esse pro quo supponlt subjectum 
ejus et praedicatum. Et, e converse, et ipsam esse 
falsam est esse idem pro quo supponi t subjectum et 
praeoicatum ejus, et e converso. Quarta est: Omnis 
propositio affirmativa significat idem pro quo 
supponit ejus subjectum et praedicatum . Et hoc 
manifeste ostendit nobis copula in ea affirmat1va. 
Quinta: omnis propositio negativa slgnificat non 
ease idem pro quo supponit ejus subjectum et 
praedicatum. Et hoc man1feste ostendit nobis copula 
in ea negativa , sexta suppositio: I:mpossibile est 
eandem propos1 t1onem esse veram et falsam . 
Quantum ad tert1um, sit prima conclusio: Omnis 
propositio affirmativa significat se esse veram •• • • 
Secunda conclusio: Omnis propositlo negative. 
significat se esse veram •••• Tertia conclus1o: Omnis 
propos1t1o mundi s1gnif1cat se esse veram • •• • Quarta 
conclusio: Omnis propos1t1o affirmat1va significans 
se esse veram et se ease falsam est falsa • • •• Quinta 
conclusio: Omnia propositio negat1va significans se 
ease veram et se ease falsam. est falsa •••• septima 
conclusio: Omni propos1tion1 copulativae contradicit 
una disjunctiva compos1ta ex partibus contradicentibus 
partibus illius copulativae. 
John Buridan seemn to have at one time agreed with 
Albe r t' s vi ew. Cf. his So£h1smata , c. 8, so ph. 7; Eng. 
tr. by Theo dore Kermit Seo t , Jahn Buridan: Sophisns 
.2E! Meaning ~ Truth, 194 . - -
74. par. 26 
75 . Bruges, Bibl. pub . , MS 497, ff. 43rb-44va. . 
or. A. ~e Poorter, catalo~ue des manuscrits · de la 
bi bliotb?: oue publioue dea ville de -Bruges.-- Thfs 
same MS c~nta ins two otner-"works bY:-Robe r t Fland: 
a Conseauen tiae (ff. 4lra-43rb), inci ;p i t: 11Nota q uod 
consequentia dividitur duobus mod1 a , nam queda.m est 
formalis et quede.m mater1a11s 11 , explic t : 11 ••• vel aliud 
s1 t impossib1le . Expliciunt consequt ni;ie Roberti Flandt1; 
and an Obligationes (ff. 44va- 46ra ) , 1ncipi-t : 11Uotandum 
primo est quad obligatio 11 , .§!XI?licit: trHec autem de 
(Notes to pp . *18-*20) 
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obl1gation1bus sufficiant. EXplic1unt obligationes 
Roberti Fland. 1• To the best of my knowledge, this 
Robert Fland is known only through these three works 
preserved in this unique MS. 
76. Ibid., f . 43rb. The exrl1c1t (f. 44va) is: 
11Pro solut1one ad 1nsolub111a su flc!an t dicta hec. 
Expliciunt 1nsolub111a Fland. tt 
77. Buridan, 
.2.E.• ~ • • 195. 
78. par. 27. 
79 . pars. 28-44. 
Bo. par. 28. 
81. par. 29. 
82. ttnullum omnino habent (soil. deductiones) 
coloremo 1• (par. 28) -
83. par. 30. Compare this approach to the author's 
own fourth and fifth conclusions, pars. 122 and 130. 
84. pars. 3o-4o. 
85 . par. 41. 
86. pars. 42-44 . 
87. pars . 3, 4, 45-64. 
88. par. 4. 
89. par. 45. This opinion is similar to the nore 
elaborate fourteenth opinion in paul of Venice 1 s list of 
fifteen solutions (LM, f. 194ra): "Ad quo d ostendendum, 
praesupponit quod 1n-nui1a propositions pars supponit pro 
tote cujus est pars, nee convertib111 cum toto, nee 
antecedente ad t otum. Ex quo patet quod 1sta propositio 
'Sortes dicit f sum' s1gn1f1cat quod Sortes dicit falsum--
non qu1dem fa.lsulll quod 1pse dici t, sed falsum d1st1nctum 
ab 1110; sed quia nihil d1c1t, n1s1 1stam propositionem, 
ide o ipi;Ja est falsa.. 11 
This fourteenth opinion, however, ultimately regards 
insolubles as instances of the fallacy of accident. {~.) 
(Notes to pp. *21-*23) 
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90. Of. below, Appendix B, b), PPo 130-134. 
91. par. 4. 
92 . par. 45. 
93. par. 63 . 
94. o:r. below, Appendix B, b), p. 133. 
95. Appendix B, b), PPo 130-134. 
96. par. so. 
97. Of. below, Appendix B, a), pp. 129f. Ockham 
nevertheless realizes the conflict between this and his 
solution to insolubles, and explicitly excludes insolubles 
from t he possibility o! having a part which stands for the 
whole ( Ibid}. 
-
98. par. 46. 
99. I t is not clear whether this refers to the general 
concl usion of the opinion as a whole, namely, that some 
i nsol uble s are true .and some false, a conclusion which 
t he autho r of the present :breatise would conf1rr:,, or whether 
i t r e fers only to t he first principle, that a part cannot 
s tand for the whole of which it is a part, a principle 
which Ockham accepted without proof, and which the author 
of this treatise would agree to be true. 
1 . par. 46. 
2. pars. 48-50. 
3. pars. 51-54. The autho r seems to use the words 
'a1gn1f1care 1 and 'aupponere' a t times almost interchangeably. 
He Will frequently sWitch from one to the other in the course 
of an argument. Par. 130 provides a good example of this . 
4. pars. 55- 62. 
5. par . 63 . 
6. par. 64. 
(Notes to pp. * 24-*27) 
7. Of. pars. 122 and 130. 
8. pars . 133-163. 
9. pars. 3, 4, 65-102. 
10. par. 65. 
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11. The statement of these principles is taken from 
par. 66. 
12. Cf. Roger Nottingham , Insolubilia, E.A. Synan, 
ed., 260, 262 ( pare. 2, 15): 11Pr1ma conclusio s it 
ista: Omnis propos1t1o vera eatenus est proposi tio vera 
quatenus ipsa aliqualfter primar1o s1gn1f1cat, e t 
naturaliter antecedenter sic est quemadmocum ipsa propositio 
primario s1gn1f1 cat. 
• • • • • 
"Et causa est quia .a. esse verum 1nfertur ab 1111s 
sicut a priori et · a causa, et :-a:-'esse verum infert 111a 
sicut effectus infert suam causam,-e:c-naturaliter posterius 
suum prius, qu1a, sicut declaratum est, . a. esse verum 
dependet ex .a. a11qua11ter Erimario s1 r · ficare et 
natural1 ter aiitece denter Sic esse qualldL• ipsum primario 
sigrilficat, et per Com.mentatoFeiii"'"°ub1 supra, compos1t1o in 
re est causa ver1tat1s propos1t1on1s, et secundum .Algazelem, 
prime Metaphysicae capitulo 10: •rnter oausam et causatum 
est ordo natura!is' et solvi tur 1nstant1s. 11 
13. ' In par. 3, the fourth opinion is said to be 
11 cujus fundame11tum est quad quaelibet proposi t1o 1nsolub111s 
anteoedenter s1gn1ficat se esse veram et falsam." The 
sense of this is not altogether clear. It does not seem 
. quite to confonn to the exposition of the opinion given 
in pars .. 66-67. 
14. par. 67. 
15. m_, t. 192va. 
16. par. 65 . 
17. pars . 69-82. The second of these arguments, 
given 1.n two forms in pars 71-72, is totally inadequate. 
The conclusion, that 11omn1s propos1 t1o vera est vera", in 
no way refutes the fourth opinion. Nor, indeed, is 1t the 
(Notes to pp. *27-*29) 
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desired conclusion, Which, according to par. 71, was to 
}lave been 11quod ! sit verum vel falsum "• 
18. pars. 83-85. Tb.ere are three arguments. The 
first, par. 83, is a rather sophisticated argument to 
the effect that, if an insoluble is neither true nor 
false, then, by the same re~soning, the author's own 
principles are neither true nor false, and thus no 
true or false conclusion can follow from them. The 
second argument, par. 84, is against the opinion's 
notion th.at nothing can presuppose itself. It shows 
that this principle says too much. The third, par. 85, 
argues that there are many intelligible species which are 
signs of themselves and yet are nevertheless true. These, 
according to the opini·on 1 s first conclusion, must therefore 
presuppose themselves. 
19. par. 87. 
20. par. 86. 
21. pars . 88-90. 
22. pars. 91-93. Par. 92 seems to reason as though 
a were 'Antichristus non est', rather than 'Antichristus 
potest non ease'. It would seem that! signifies 
primarily Antichristum posse non ease , not, as in par. 
92, Antichristum non es se. ~aU'ttiOr 's point still 
s tands, however. - -
23. par. 94. 
24. pars. 95-96. 
25. par. 97. 
26. pars. 98-99. 
27. pars. 100-102. 
28. par. 109. 
29. par. 110. 
30. l!?.!.!!· 
otes to Po. 29) 
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31. W'e1sheipl, 110ckham and Some Merton1ans 11 , 190. 
32. ~. c. 6, f. 136vb. 
33. MS has romotae. 
--
34. MS has est ut. 
--
35. Bradwardine's treatise seems to have influenced 
Paul of Venice's treatment of the matter. The extent 
of this influence cannot be evaluated Without further 
research. The following 1 tems, however, ought to be 
noted: 
1). Paul of Venice expl1c1 tly denies that his 
solution is original, but rather refers it to his predecessors. 
Of. below, point 4. . 
2). Both opinions conclude that insolubles are 
false propositions. Of. below, n. 36, and FL, 29lf. 
3). Both opinions include as a supposition the 
principle that a part can stand for its whole. Of. TBI, 
£. 137ra : "Tertia (soil . suppos1t1o) est ista: parspotest 
supponere pro toto et'Eijus oppos1to et convert1b111bus 
eorundem 11 ; and LM , f. 195ra : "Ultimo suppos1t1o est 1sta: 
pars propos 1 tionIS po test supponere pro suo to to cujus est 
pars et pro quol1bet pertinente ad 1psum." 
4). More 1mportnat, the following passage of LM, f. 
194rb; closely resembles the passage of Bradnardinequoted 
in the text above: · 
Pro declaratiane qu1ntadec1mae op1n1on1s, quam 
scio valent1um fuisse ant1quorum, tree articuli 
inferuntur •••• Quantum ad primum s1 t haec prirna 
d1v1s1o: Omne 1nsolub11e aut or1tur ex actu noatro 
aut ex propr1etate vocis. Actus nostri sunt 
dupl1ces: qu1dam 1nter1ores et quidam exteriores~ 
Inter1ores sunt hi qui f1unt ut 1Jnag1nar1, cog1tare, 
et hujusmodi. Exteriores sunt 1111 qui f1unt ex 
parte corporis, ut d1cere, loqui, et s1m111a. Et 
ista stmt 1nsolubil1a or1ent1a ex actu nostro: 
'Sortea dic1t falsum' 'Sortes 1ntelleg1t falsum' 
et s1m111a. Voces autem proprietates sunt ut sub1c1, 
appellare, ease verum vel falsum, pro se ease verum, 
pro a110 a se non esse verum, pro se et pro alio 
(f. 194va) a se et ita de se falsum, et non ease 
falsum pro se vel pro a110 0 Unde hujusmod1 
1nsolub111a: 'Falsum est' 'Nullum ve rum est' 
'Propos1t1o non ver1f1catur pro se • et 'Aliqua 
(Notes to pp . *29-•32) 
propos1t1o non appe11atur a suo subjecto vel 
praedicato' ex proprietate voois nascuntur. 
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36. ~' f. 137ra-va, the discussio~f the second 
conclusion, which is: 0 s1 aliqua proposi tio significat 
se esse veram vel se esse falsam, ipsa s1gnif1oat se 
esse veram, et est falsa . " ( f . 137ra) 
37. Cf. pars. 135-138, 141, and below, Appendix c, 
pp. 135-138. 
38. par. 119. 
39. par. 186. The argument in this par. is another 
instance in which the author seems to use the terms 
'sign1f1care' and 'supponere' interchangeably. 
4o. Cf. , however, the nconolus1on n on which the 
second opinion is based, par. 24. 
41. par. 104. 
42. Cf. par. 245, where there is an implicit reference 
to this division, although no explicit apf.eal to it. 
There the distinction is put jLn terms of 'material" and 
"pe rsona.1 " suppo si t1ons. 
43. .!Q, 24 • 
44. par. 104. Cf. above, 
45. !Q., 24!. Cf. also SL, 
-
46. par. 104. 
47. pars. 69-82. 




50 . par. 111 • 
. 51 . par. 237. 
p . 217. 
p. •6. 
I, 64-69, pp. 177-188. 
52. pars. 255-257. Cf. SL, II, 17, p. 268: ttciroa 
primum sciendum est, quod 1stae dictiones 'tantum' et 
(Notes to pp. *32-*34) 
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'solus• faciuut propos1t1ones exclus1vas". Ibid., 18, f• 277: 1101rca primum sciendum, quad tales 8Yii'Categoremata 
praete r- 1 'n1s1 1 faciunt propositiones, in quibus 
ponuntur, esse except1vas. 11 
53. Boethius, De syllosismo hypothet1co, PL 64, 835. 
'.Lb.ere are further suodiv1S1ons, which are not relevant here. 
54. Peter Abelard, Dialectica, IV, 1, L.M. De R1jk, ed., 
472. Cf. ulso the ed1tor 1 s introduction, pp. x1111-x11x. 
5~. Peter of Spain, Summulae log1cales, tract. 1, I.M. 
Bochenski, ed., 7 (par. 1.22). 
56. ~, III, 1, p. 217. 
57. U1,, II, 6, t. 124va. 
58. Of., e.g., '1i1111am of Shyreswood, S~cate~·oremata, 
J. Reginald O'Donnell, ed., MS, 3 (1941), 59~0 an 8'2f.; 
and Peter of Spa., n, srncategoremata, Venice, 1580, ff. 272r-
283r. 
59. Cf. Peter of Spain, Tractatus expon1b111um, in 
The Sum:rnulae Logicales of Peter of Spain, Joseph P. 
Mullally ed., 104. - -
60. .§!!, II, 11, p. 252. 
61. De inesse, as opposed to a modal pro ?O si ti on, 
de modo ormod:aiia. Cf. SL, II, 1, p. 218. 
-- -
62. par. 105. 
63. par. 106. 
64. par. 107. 




67. !§.!, the first two de scr1pt1ones. 
68. The folloloJing remarks about aff1rmat1 ve propos1 t1ons 
are construed mostly be way of contrast with what the 
(Notes to pp . •34-*37) 
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author explicitly says about negative propos1t1on 1n 
pars. 107-108. 
69. par. 109. 
70. Cf. the discussion above, pp. •12f., •28f. 
71 . This is yet another case of the author's use o! 








Of. above, p. •12. 
par. 112. 
76. The first part of the supporting argument 1n 
par. 114 is not altogether clear. · 
77 . par. 116. 
78. par. ·119. 
79. The statement of this conclusion in par. 119 is 
problematic. There it seems to say that if a · proposition 
or its extreme denotes that something signify, then that 
thing must, in fact, actually signify. The supporting 
argument in par. 119 and the one in par. 120 do not seem 
to be to the point. Perhaps there is a lacuna in the text 
here. The argument in par. 121, however, as well as the 
appeal to the conclusion in par. 186, clearly supposes 
that the conclusion mean that whatever a proposition or 
its extreme denotes, it must signify. On the reason 
for stating this conclusion, cf. above, p. •30. 
Bo. par. 122. 
81 . pars. 122- 129. The contradiction mentioned in 
par. 129 seems to be that, on the one hand, the sign1f1cate 
of the term is understood before the significate of the 
proposition (proven in par. 128), and, on the other hand, 
it is not (par. 129) . 
82. par. 130. 
(Notes to pp. •37-•40) 
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83. par. 258. 
84. par. 186. Cf. the discussion above, p. •3o. 
85. E.g., the fourth and fifth suppositions, pars. 
108 and 109. 
86. par. 133. 
87. pars. 133-141. 
88. pars. 142-163. The argument in paro 150 seems 
to shift the grounds of the d1scuss1on from 'reducere ad 
actum intellegend1' to 'reducere ad memoriam'. 
The point of the argument in par. 152 is that, just 
as Sortes does not, in apprehending himself, thereby 
understand Plato (much les s a11 men)' so too Plato, in 
apprehending the spoken tenn-ri'alsum does not thereby 
understand every falseho od. one cannot necessarily pass 
from the apprehensio!)bf one thing to the understanding 
of another thing or other things. In the case of the 
spoken term 'falsum', the reason for this is th.at it is 
not a natural s1gn--1ts signification is merely con-
ventional. The inference from the apprehension of 
the spoken term 'falsum• to the understanding of 
every falsehood is thus, at least, only accidentally 
valid, since it depends on the contingent tact of the 
term's conventional imposition. Compare the reply carefully 
With the text of the original objection, par. 136. 
89. Cf. above, p. *29 and n, 37. 
90. The problem presented by the. arguments against 
the third opinion has already been observed. ct. above, 
pp. •23:f'. 
91. pars. 164-258. 
92. The progression from par. 176 to par. 183 is a 
good example of thiso 
93. pars. 164-224. 
94. The second seems to begin at par. 188, with the 
setting up of a new casus. Par. 198 be§ins abruptly 
with 0 Tert1o, princ1pal1ter arguitur ••• •. 
(Notes to PP • *40-*41) 
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95. The argument 1n pars. 168-170 is structured 
as follows: In par. 168, the opponent states the author's 
position, to which the author assents in par. 169. Then 
the opponent argues on this basis to the opposite con-
clusion, in par. 170. 
In pa~.173, with the premiss •a est propos1t1o 
vera', understand 'per te '. -
In pars. 186-187, with each occurrance of 1a11quo 1 
or 'al1quo a110', understand 'complexo', or a similar 
word. The point is not that the term does not stand 
for anything whatsoever, but that it does not stand 
for any proposition. 
Note the use of the word 'propositio' in par. 200. 
The argument in par. 235 seems to be based on the 
implicit assumption that Sortes and Plato begin to speak 
sim ul tane ou sly. 
In par. 238, understand the second part of the 
antecedent, namely' .•et :ae cunda pars disjunctivae a me 
prolatae est talsa , as an hypo thesis. 
96. The following summary is a distillation of the 
author's presentation in pars. 164-258. 
97. Of. par. 111. 
98 . pars. 122 and 130. 
99. By an "appropriate" proposition is meant, for 
instance, a disjunctive proposition for which the term 
1 d1sjunct1va.' in an insoluble can stand, or a proposition 
spoken by Sortes for which the term 'falsum' oan stand in 
the proposition 'Aliqua propos1tio dicta a Sorta est falsa' . 
There may or may not be other propositions which are 
irrelevant to the insoluble at hand. 
1. ·o:r . par . 186. 
2 •• er. the fifth supposition, par. 109 . 
3. er. par. 200. 
4. Cf. par. 197. 
s. Of. par . 193. 
6. Cf . par. 209 . 
\Notes to pp. •41-*45) 
160 
1. Of. par. 164. 
a. Cf. par. 186. 
9. Cf. par. 193. 
10. pars. 194-195, 197. 
11. par. 205. 
12. Of. e.g., pars. 188-190, 210-213. 
13. par. 224. It is not clear how propositions such 
as 1Proposit1o est' and 'Verum est' fully satisfy the 
author's criteria for an insoluble. For it is not the 
case that from them "sequ1 tur utraque pars contradiction1s" 
(par. 1). 
14. par. 224. 
15. Of. par. 45; and par. 46: "quamv1s ista opin1o 
s1 t vera ••• ••. On the latter remark, see n. 99 to P• *23. 
16. Of. par. 226. 
17. par. 239. Tl~e argument in par. 239 say-s nothing 
about the supposition of the term 1falsa• in the insoluble, 
but only about the supposition of 1 disjunct1va'. It would 
seem, however, that the author's argument in par. 226 
would apply here as well. 
18. par. 254. 
19. par. 256. The oasus posited in par. 255 stipulates 
only "Et sit 1sta proposi tio omnis proposi tio, quae s1 t a.-• 
This is clearly not sufficient, for, as is evident in -
the reply, the solution depends on the notion that it is 
Sortea who utters the proposition. 
20. par. 256. 
21. par. 257. 
22. par. 258. 
23. Of. above, n. 58 to p. •14, n. 3 to p. *23, n. 39 
top. •30, n. 71 to p. *35, and the edition below, pas sim , 
(Notes to pp . *45-*50) 
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but espec1a11y par. 146: tt1ste terminus 'significare • 
converti tur cum is to term ino 'sup pone re'". 
. . 
24. Cf. above, pp. •32f. 
25. pars. 71-72. Cf. above, n. 17 to p . •27. 
26. Cf. above, pp . *23f. 
'Z7 . par. 164. 
28 . par. 225. 
29 . par. 226. 
30. Of. par. 186, and above, pp . *40f. 
31. par. 55; cf. par. 52. 
32. Cf. pars. 89 and 98. 
33 . Cf. par. 205. 
34. par. 98 . 
35. Y1,, II, 15, ff. 192rb-195vb. 
36. on ampl1ation, see !!!, 200-202 (~. 28.01-
28. 12), and !Q, 53-58. 
37. LM I, 2, f . 22ra. 
-
38. Ibid. , ff. 22ra-23va. 
-
39. Albert of Saxony also explicitly asserted the 
principle- -without discussion. Of. albert of saxony, 
Perutili s lo~ica, II, 10, Venice, 1518, f . 16rb: 
"nec!iiia regula : Quando non ponitur terminus ampl1at1vus 
in a11qua propos1t1one, tune subjectum 1llius non ampliatur, 
sed per propositionem illam denotatur solum supponere 
pro eo quod est •••• " 
4o. William Heytesbury, Re gulae sol vendi soph1smata, 
c. 1, Venice, 1494 (Hain *8437), ff . 4va-7rb . On 
Heytesbury, cf. W'e1 she1pl, ''O ckham and Some Mertonians, n 
195-199 . 
(Notes to pp. *50-*52) 
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41. Cf. Weisheipl, "Roger Swyneshed, o.s.B. , Logician, 
Natural Philosopher, and Theologian, u in oxford Studies 
Presented !2, ,Daniel callus, 245. 
42. Cf. Wei sheipl, 110ckham and Some Merton1ans," 
196 and 209f • 
43. W"eisheipl, "Roger Swyneahed ••• ," 244!. ; and 
CUrtis ~ilson, William Heyte sbury: Medieval Logic 
~ ~ .fil..:!! .2.f. Ma thema t1 ca i Physics, 25-28. 
44. Cf. above, p. *18. 
45 . ! catalogue .2.f. ~ Harleian Manuscripts !.!! ~ 
British Museum ••• , I II, p. ll. 
46. John E. Murdoch and Edward A. Synan, uTWo Questions 
on the Continuum: :WSlter Ohatton (?), O.F.?4 •. and Adam 
Wod.eham, O.F.M.," Franciscan Studies 26 (1966), 0 rntroduct1on ", 
II, pp. 225-232. Several items In the codex have already 
been edited and published. Cf. the references, 11.:.!.!!• 
Synan argues "that the gatherings were bound 
together and paginated pefore the five scribes copied the 
twenty-eight pieces that constitute the collection." 
(Ib1dT ' 225) . This statement is based on the observation 
tnat •although the folios of this codex are paginated in 
succession to the number 159, t he fact that eight folios 
(numbers 9, 10, 32, 44, (45), 46, 65, and 66) are wanting 
has occasi oned no gaps 1n the t exts that br1.dge the missing 
leaves. •• ( Ibid. ) Preswn.ably, then, the codex was first 
bound togetner--1.nd paginated, t hen several leaves were cut 
out, and finally the texts were copied. 
In fact, however, there are no texts that bridge the 
missing leaves . The first item in the codex ends on f. 8v. 
Folios 9 and 10 are missing, and folios 11 and 12 are 
blank. The second text in the codex begins on f. 13r. 
Likewise, the third text in,,the codex ends on f. 42v. 
Folios 43-46 are missing. ~he fourth tex~ the treatise 
on insolubilia edited below, begins on f. 46r. Similarly, 
the eighth item in the codex ends on f. 64v. Folios 65 and 
66 are lacking. The ninth text begins on f. 67r . 
Thus, in no case does the text of a work pass over the 
missing leaves. Instead, in each ca5e, the gaps occur 
after the end of one text and before the beginning of the 
next • . From this 1 t must be concluded, not that the leaves 
were cut out before the texts were copied, but rather 
probably just the oppos1 te. J!'or, had the leaves been 
(Notes to pp. *52-*54) 
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removed before the texts were copied, one would have 
expected that, in one or more of the cases, the text 
would have bridged the gap . It 1s not likely mere 
coincidence that, in each of three cases, the text 
preceed1ng the missing leaves happens to end in the 
second verso column of the last folio before the cut. 
It argues, on the contrary, that the cuts were made after 
the texts had been copied. 
This conclusion is supported by the fact that on 
the verso sides of five folios are found "catchwords" 
(ff. 24, 36, 54, 136, 148). A catchword is useless if 
the folios are bound together before the text is copied, 
and even more useless if the folios are also paginated. 
Thus, it may be plausibly argued, not only did the scribe's 
work precede the cutting out of the leaves, but it 
preceeded even. the bi~ding together of th~ gatherings. 
47 • . Of. above, n~ 19 to p. *7. 
48. In this regard, of. Walter w. Skeat, ed. , 
The Vision of William concerning Piers the Plowman, 
V:-1, B. paS-us xii, p. 382, line 269: ~e of 
Sortes ne of salamon•no scripture can telle." I 
am grateful to Mr. Peter Erb for calling my attention 
to this line . 
49 . Cf. below, pp. 140f. 
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Notes to the Text 
---
(to par. 1) 
1. In the MS the treatise begins without title. 
The title "rnsolub111a" is taken from the expli c1 t, 
p. 124. 
2. A marginal note is obscured between the folios 
ot the codex; only a superscript 'm' is clearly visible 
in the microfilm. 
3. Throughout the treatise, the scribe has left a 
blank space at the beginning of each major division of 
the text, so that the ca.pi tal might be filled in later. 
In fact, however, the capitals were never supplied. 
Other such blank spaces are found at the beginnings 
ot pars. 24, 45, 65, 103, 133, 162, 164, 225, 237. 
4. Aristotle, Physics, II, 3, 194b32-195a2, especially: 
"cum enim dicitur 'Quare ambulat Sortes?'! et dicemus propter 
hoc, quod suum corpus sanetur. Et hoc dicto, redd.imus causam. 
Et sim111ter illa quae sunt apud motum alter1us inter 
illud et finem intentum, verb1 grat1a, sanitas ex 
d1m1nut1one et purgatione et potatione med1c1nae et 
1nstrument1s, quoniam omn1a 1sta intenduntur propter 
f1nem.u (Junt., v. 4, f. 6oa-b). · 
5. · The reading is highly conjectural. -The abbreviation 
is illegible, and may have been touched up, al though there 
is clearly a 1 t 1 written superscript on the right. 'Sit' 
or some similar word is demanded by the context. The 
sense is clear in any case. 
6. Averroe::;, In II Physicorum, tx. c. 31 (on 195al5-
26), esp.: "noctori'iiduxi t rat1oc1nationes super hoc, et 
d1x1t: 'Illud enim propter quid', etc., id est, quon1am 
illud propter quid, quia est nobiliua 1111s, quae 
quaeruntur propter illud, est bonum intentum per illas 
res, et ideo est causa omn1~n 1llarum. Agena enim et 
materia non sunt, nisi propter ul timum f1nem. tt ( Junt., 
v. 4, f. 6lg-h). 
7. mlrg. [)efinitio patet (ge)neraliter juxta <o)mnes. 
The note s partially obscured between the folios. Cf. above, 
pp. *9-*ll. 
(Notes to pars. 2-5) 
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8. mar~. Re sta t quattuor <op1n1)ones, partially 
obscured be ween ~ folios. 
9. !!! ~val falsam, but deletes it. 
MS has pro posi to . 
--
10. 
11. MS has falsum . 
--
12. 
13. The meaning of this last sentence is not 
altogether clear. It does not seem to confonn to the 
exposition of the fourth opinion given in pars. 66-67. 
14. marg. .(Prim~ op1n1o, partiallz obscured between 
the folios. 
-
15. casum • • • hegaf: MS has 's1mplio1ter negat casum 
inaolub111um 1 , w1 t a e tter 'b' over 's1mplio1ter', a 
letter ' a' over 'casum ' and a-letter •a• over '1nsolub111um'. 
Throughout the MS., the scribe uses the letters •a• and 
'b' in this manner to indicate words to be inserted into 
tne text, or to indicate a chanfe in word order. The 
word or words marked With an •a are to be placed in the 
text before the letter 'b' . Other examples occur in pars. 
24, ~07, 112 and 155. -
1 6. marg. 
the folio s . - ............... _ 
17. marg. 
18 . marg . 
the folios. 
<secuncPa op1n1o, partially obscured between 
~erti~ opinio, partially obscured between 
<Quarta) op1n1o, partially obscured between 
19 . MS adds an illegible abbreviation, but expunctuates 
1 t . 
20. 1.e., the third in t he list of conclusions in 
John Dumbleton's treatment of 1nsolubil1a, on which the 
present discussion is based. Cf. SLPM, £. 5ra: 0 Tert1a 
oonolua1o: Nulla proposi tio i n aniiil"a""per 1ntent1onem (a/b) 
simplicem, sed per cor.iplexumJ comprehencl1 tur." For other 
texts of DUrnbleton, cf. below, Appendix A, pp. 126-128. 
(Notes to pars~ 5- 8) 
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21. 1.e., ·numbleton's fourth. SLPN, f. 5va: 
~Quarta conolusio sequens ex tertia est haec: OUjuscumque 
propos1t1on1s sign1f1cant1s pro complexo subjectum vel 
praed:l:catum est propos1t1o, et alteri vel utr1que 
proposi t1o oorrespondet." 
22. !§ ~ uterque . 
23. The sentence is somewhat garbled. Of. par. 21 
for a more intelligible statement of this conclusion. 
MS has aequaliter. 
--
!Q.!: aliqua11ter, ·£.!• par.~. 
25. MS unclear. 
26. Of. Dumbleton's analogous a rgument, SLPN, f. 5va, 
and below, Appendix A, c), pp. 127t. This opinion bears 
some resemblance to the fourth in Paul of Venice 1 s list 
ot fifteen solutions (!H II, 15, f . 192va). Cf. above, 
p. *15. 
27. har,. (contr~ opinionem primam, partially obscured 
between .l..!. ol1os. 
28. in the genitive . The author frequently uses 
letters for the oblique cases, as well as for the 





Of0 ~. f. 4ra, and below, Appendix A, d), p. 1280 
co.rr. in MS. 
!§.. ~ tennini 'falsum', ~ del . 
MS has ea. 
--
33. o:r., rather, .ll).Unbleton's arguments against the 
third opinion (Cf. above, n. 29). 
34. MS adds a, but del . 
-- --
35. MS adds suppositionem, but del 0 
-- --
36 .. MS has: !· 
--
37. MS adds non, 
--
but del . 
--
(Notes to pars. 8-14) 
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38. ?1§. ~ est. Emend for the sense of the argumento 
39. On the argument in th1s par., cf. above, n. 66 to 
p. *16. 
4o. marg. Secundo arguitur. 
41. ?:.{2 adds ! false a bbrev. 12£ aeque, but delo 
42. On the argument in this par., cfo above, n. 66 to 
p. •16. 
43. On the meaning of this passage, ~. 
44. marg. JDeduo1tur conolus1oo 
45. On the argument in this par., cf. above, n. 66 to 
p. *16. 
46. .£2£.!• ~ st1at. 
47. ~· !!:2!!!. non. 
48. The scribe had written 'affirm.are', and then 
corrected it to 1a!finnatur' without deleting the 're•. 
49. On the argument in this par., cf. above, n. 66 
p. *16. 
50. marg. Tertio argu1 turo 




52. ~~est, ~ fil· 
to 
53. MS has what appears to be 'es' with a stroke over 
it ('ens'?), followed by 'et'. 
54. MS adds est, but del. 
--- ---
55. On the argument in this par., cf. above, n. 66 to 
p. *16. 
5(5. On the argument in pars. 13-17, ~· 
57. Reading uncertain. 
,• 
(Notes to pars. 14-18) 
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58. Ho§~ suppositionem, ~ ~o 
59. M.§ ~ est, ~! ~. 
60. ll§ ~ 4 5, .!ll!! ~. Margo 
contra quartam. conclusionem. 
Quinto (sic) 
-
61. !§. ~ correspondet. 
62. marg. Nota beneo 
63. marg. Contra hoc argui tur. 
64. MS abbrev. ydepca • 
----
65. Some idea of the meaning of 'praedicatio directa' 
can be gained from the example of !• ~' c and d, at the 
end of the paragraph, and from the fact that it is opposed 
to 'prae·dicatio ident1ca•. Ookham uses the expression 
1 praadioat1o d1recta 1 at least twice, associating it With 
true propositions and With predicating a genus of a species: 
1tAl.1 ter accipi tur 'subiectum' striate et sic die! tur sub1e ctum 
omne 1llud, quod sub11citur in propositione vera, ubi est 
praedicatio directa, et sic est homo subiectum resf.ectu 
an1mal1a, sed non econverso" (SL, I, 30, p. 85); 1Aliter 
accipitur 'praedicatum', quod praedicatum in propositione 
vera, in qu~ est praedicatio directa. Et sic 'animal' 
est praedicatum respectu 'hominia,' sed non respectu 
1lap1dis.' (_§&, I, 31, p. 86). 
66. Posterior .Analytics, I, 4, 73bl6-24, James of 
Venice tr., ~ 64, 717: "Quae ergo dicuntur in s1mpl1c1ter 
sc1b111bus per se sic sunt, sicut esse praed1cat1s, aut inesse, 
propter ipsaque sunt et ex necessitate, non enim cont1ngat 
non esse, aut s1mpliciter, aut opposita, ut lineae aut 
rectum,- aut obliquum, et numero aut par aut impar, est 
enim contrar1orum, aut pr1vat1o, aut contradictio in 
eodem genere, ut par aut 1mpar in numer1s secundurn quod 
consequitur; quare a1 necesse est affirmare, aut negare, 
necesse est et quae sunt per se, inesse . " The point of 
the reference seems to be that, within the sphere of 
predication, the disjunction •identical or direct" holds, 
so that the statement that every predication is either 
identical predication or direct predication is equivalent, 
within· the limited sphere of pre di cation, to the riaw of 
Excluded Middle. 
(Notes to pars. 18-22) 
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67. MS adds de, but del. 
- -- ---- -
68. The description does not appear 1n this treati se. 
Cf. above , Po •6. 
69. ?!.§ ~ distincta. 
70. ~ ~ demonstrabile. 
71. !:1§. ~ propos1t1on1s , ~ ~· 
72. ~ ~ ! false abbrev. for demonstrativae, ~ ~· 
73. !:1.§ ~ est. 
74. This seems to be a rather interpretative reference 
to Posterior Analytics II, 5. There Aristotle argues that 
essential nature cannot be inferred by the method of 
division. Of. esp. 9lbll-23, James of Ven1ce tro, PL 
64, 747: uAt vero neque per div1sionem via est syll0g1zare 
sicut 1n resolut1one circa figuras dictum est. Nequaquam 
enim necesse fir rem illam esse, cum haec sint, sed s1cut 
neque 1nducens demonstrat. Non en1m oportet conclusionem 
1nterrogare, neque in concedendo esse, sed necesse es t ease 
cum sint 1lla, et s1 non dicat respondens, utrum homo 
animal eat, aut 1nan1~atum? postea accip1t animal, non 
syllogizat; 1terum omne animal, aut gress1b1le, aut 
aquaticum, accepit gress1b1le, et hom1nem esse totum 
animal gressiblle, non necesse erit ex dictts, sed 
acc1p:1.t et hoc. Differt a.utem n1h11 in mult1s, aut 
i n pauc1 s s1 c di cere, 1 dem enim est. tt A much more 
explicit statement occurs in the passage of the Prior 
Analytics ( 01n resolutione circa f1guras" ) referred 







MS has d1stincta. 
- -
77. M.§. ~ demonstrare. 
78. marg. <Quinto) argu1 tur 
folios. 
, partially obscured between 
79. Tenn1nat1on unclear in MSo 
Bo. MS adds s, ~ ~· 
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81. MS adds ma, but del. 
-- ~----
82. MS adds est, but del. 
-- --..-
83. in is·ta propos1 tione: MS has et 1sta propos1 t1o. 
The emendation is made in order 10 Coiiform to the major 
premiss: 0 qu1a subjectum in ista propositione ••• "; and 
to the singular verb: 'suppon1t'. 
84. MS ba.s 
--
quam. 
85. marg. Secunda opinio. 
86. marg. Prima suppos1t1o. 
87. marg. Secunda suppos1t1o. 
88. marg. Oonclusio. 
89. et significato •• falsum: MS has et se ease falsu.m 
s1gnif1cat, with a 'b' before the TSe-r--and an 'a' over 
'significat'. Of. aoove, n. 15 to par. 4. 
90. marg. oasus pona.(tur>, partially obscured between 
~folios. 
91. Throughout this paragraph, the author seems to 
use 'a' and 'b' interchangeably for the proposition 
'Sortes d.icit-falsum'. 
92. marg . Cum -casu <argui tur) quo dl1 bet inso q.ubile) 
ease falsum , part1a11y obscured between ~he folios. 
93. a ~: MS has ab. 
94. sign1f1cat se non: MS has non s1gn1f1cat se. 
--
95. MS has cum. 
--
96. The originator of this opinion is unknown. It 
agrees substantially With the solution of Albert of saxony 
(Cf. ASI). The author does not seem to have had Albert in 
m1nd,"li'Owever, for Albert's suppositiones and conclusiones 
do not include those listed in par. 24. Cf. above, n. '73 
to p •. *18. 
97. MS adds a vertical stroke, but del. 
(Notes to pars . 26-28) 
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98 . Perhaps it is this variation on the second 
opinion that is attributed to a certain Robert Fl.and 
(i.e., of Flanders?) in MS Bruges, Bibl. publ. de la 
ville, 497, f. 43rb: "Insolubile est proposi tio signans 
primo et principaliter sicut est, et ex consequent! 
aliter quam est • • •• " Buridan mentions what 1s perhaps 
this same pos1t1on·in his Sophismat c. 8, soph. 7, 
Eng. tr. by Theodore Kenn. it Scott, John Buridan: Sophisms 
~ Meaning ~ Truth, 195. Cf~ above;-pp. ~18!. ' 
99. In par. 26, the phrase 11stud dictum solum est 
soph1st1cum' clearly implies a pejorative use of the ' 
term 'sophisticum'o Here, however, the phrase 1 soph1atice 
arguitur sio' introduces and argument that is cogent and 
penetrating, one which is by no means •sophisticum• in 
the pejorative sense. 
The term 'sophists. I was used in the Middle Ages, 
w1 thout pejorative connotation, to denote ttundergraduates .. 
who took "an active part in the public disputations de 
soph1am.at1bus, for Which reason they Were known as --
1aophistfiei fi (James A. Weisheipl, o.P., Ucurriculum of 
the Faculty of Arts at Oxford in the early Fourteenth 
century, n MS 26 (1964), 134. Of. also Ibid., n. 32). 
The author 01 the present treatise twioe\i'S'es the work 
in th1~ sense in par. 246. I n the present paragraph, 
then, the word 'soph1stice' seems to be used in a sense 
derived from this usage, and may thus be glossed 
approximately as follows: ''as one would argue in a 
clisputat1on E!_ sophism.at bus".· Thus .use d, no dis-
paragement i s intended. 
1. soil.: secundario, et non pr1ncipal1ter, a11ter 
qunm ,est-;--
2. marg. Contra 1stem op1n1onem. 
3. MS adds p, but del . 
-- ---
4. Cf. Lewis and Short, A ta tin Dictionary, s. v. 11 color'' 
IIB2b: 0rna bad sense, t.t.'1). e ., :Ce cbnicai ermJ, !,!! 
artful concealment of a fault, a lratext, 2a111ation, 
excuse. 11 11·om a rhetor1co-lega!rad1t1on. Cf .t e.g., 
Cicero, IDe orato r III, 25 (Oxford, 1783, I, 303J: 
0ornaturigitur oratio genere primum, et quasi colore 
quo dam, et succo auo 11 ; Qu1ntil l1an, Ins t! tutio orator1a 
IV.11.88 (Butler ed., II, 98): "sunt qu edam e t 
Notes to pars. 28-35) 
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falsae expositiones, quarum in faro duplex genus est: 
alterum . ,.; alterum, quod est tuendum dicentis ingenio. 
Id interim ad solam verecundiam pertinet, unde etiam 
mihi videtur die! color, interim ad quaestionem. ~' Of. 
also Vocabularium iurisprudentiae romanae, s . v. 'coior'. 
The sense here is that, if the first supposition is 
refuted, the de duct ions from 1 t will lose .even the 
pretext of validity. 
5~ ?1§ ~ falsum, ~ ~· 
6. marg. Contra pr1mam rationem. 
7. tl§. ~quad, ~ ~!· 
8. marg. Secundo contra rationemo 
9. !!§-~ quad, ~ ~. 
10. ~ ~ totius, ~ ~· 
11. marg. Tert1o contra rationem. 
12. Abbrev. illegible . 
13. The scribe has used this word three times in 
this paragraph, writing it in each case 'depta•, with no 
abbreviation mark of any kind, 
14. marg. Confinnatur istao 
15. in marg. 
16. categories, 5, 4a34-b2, ed1 tio oomposi ta (vulgata), 
L. Minio-Paluello, e d,, AL I, 2, p . 5.5: 11oratio a utem 
et placitum 1psa quidem 1mmob111a omnino perseverant, cum 
vero res movetur contrarium circa eam fit; oratio namque 
pennanet eadem eo quod sedeat al1qu1s, cum vero res mota 
sit, a11quando qu1dem vera, aliquando au tem falsa fit; ••• n 
17. marg, Quarto contra rationemo 
18. 1nterl1n, 
19. marg, Quinto contra rationem, 
20. MS seems to have 1agat'. Yet, there is an oblique 
stroke over the second •a•, as if it were an 1 1 1 0 
( Notes to pars . 35- 42) 
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21. ~ an1ma III, 9, 432b20, Moerbelce tr. , with 
St. Tho:na1:> .Aquinas, In .Ar1stotelis librum De u.nima 
comlllentc..rim, .A.nge11"17. Pirottu, u . :P . f ea..:-2:::i~: 11S1 
lgi cur n(nura. n1h11 faci t frustra, • •• • Cf. also De 
a.mna. III, 1 2, 434a3ot ed. ill•, 274 : \\ ••• s1 n1 ldI 
f ri.t~ ia•a fa c1 t na tura. • 
22. ll.§ ~ propos1tionlll1l. 
23. marg, Confirmatur ratio . 
24. tl§. ~ pars, but del , 
25 . The MS seems to have read •tennlnorum', but the 
first part of the word has been crossed out. 
26. li.§. ~ nam . 
zr o marg. Contra hoc, quod pars potest supponere 
pro to to cujus est pa rs . 
28 , 
..£2.!!· fror:i quoli bet • 
290 marg. Sex to contra ra tionem . 
30 . Soph. el . 13, 173a34-38, James of Venice, tr. , 
~ 64, l02~u-230:! 0 D\1pl\ml au tE=;m, et duplw d1m1 d11 1 dem 
est. Si ig1 tur duplum est dim1d11 duplum, ert t dim1d11 
dimidii duplu.'ll, et rursu:u s1 pro duplo duplum d1mid11 
ponatur, ter eri t . dict1ll.11 d1mid11 d1m1d11 di.mid.ii 
duplum (1:J! has 'diplum'). 
31. £2.!l:• from du bi um. 
32. ~· f!.2E. dubium •• 
33. MS has se d. Emend for sense, and to parallel 
Aristotle'T'i t&xt. 
34. rnarg . Quod nulla propositio extra a111n1 am potest 
supponere pro toto cujus est parso 
35 . The descr iption doea not appear in this treatise . 
Of. abov~, p . *6• 
36. marg. Contra secundam suppositionem. 
(Notes to pars . 42-48) 
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37. For this rule, cf. !Q, pp . 87f. (rule *2 . 01), 
and references there. 
38. Reading uncertain. 
39. MS abbrev has been touched up, but seems to 
read 'quo'. !12 adds conceditur, ~ ~0 
4o , It is the copulative hypothetical proposition that 
is the basis of the argument in this paragraph. For the 
kinds of hypothetical propositions, cf., e . g., ~' II, 1, 
p . 217 . 
41. For this rule, cf. 1Q, pp . 87!. (rule •2. 02), 
and references there. · 
42. ma!:S.• Tertio (.!!.!£) (.opinio), partially obscured 
between the-rolios. 
43. tt.§._ adds pr1, J2l!.1 ~· 
44. ~ ~ nulla. For the emendation, cf. the 
parallel statements of this prii1ciple, pars . 3 and 55. 
45. The opinion is that o! William of Ockham. Of • 
.§I:! III, 3, 45, f. l09rb-vb. The 'tertio inci dental1ter' 
passage arises from a confUsion. Contrast 1t with the 
statement of the opinion in par. 4. On this opinion, 
cf. above, PPo *20-*22, and Ockham's text, below, Appendix 
B, b), PP• 130-134. 
46. !:!.§ spelling loyca. 
47. mlrg. Hie arguitur, proban ( do) conclus1ones 
ex princip is, partially obscured between ~ folios. 
48 . har~. Prima con(clusio)(?), partially obscured 
between ~ r.'olios. 
49 . ~· Prima probatur. 
50 . 1.e . , nar11 . 
51. The following text expresses the same thought, 
al though 1 t does not use the tenn 'inferiora' : ~'Termini 
categorematic1 finitam et certa.m· habent dign1ficat1onem, 
sicut hoc nomen 'homo' aignificat omnes hom1nes, et hoc 
(Notes to pars . 48-49) 
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nomen 'animal' omnia an1ma11a, et hoc nomen 'albedo' 
omnes albedines. u ~ I, 4, p. 15. 
52. ba%~· Secundo contra (op1n1one::n), partially 
obscured e ~e en ~ folios . 
53. There seems to be no single text where this 
notio~s explicitly expressed. It can be gathered, 
however, from a combination of several of Ockham's 
statements, such as the fol lowing. According to the 
first of these texts, the s igni f1cat1onof terms by 
1mpos1 tion requires their. ,subor dination to concepts or 
intentions in the soul. ~he second passage argues that 
these universal concepts are aota of understanding by 
which singulars are understood in a confused manner. 
a) SL, I, 1, p. 9): "D1co autem voces esse 
s1gna subord1nata conceptibus seu 1ntent1on1bus 
an1mae, non quia propr1e acc1p1endo hoc vocabulum 
's1gna 1psae voces semper s1gn1f1cent 1psos 
conceptus animae primo et proprie, sed qu1a voces 
1mponuntur ad s1gn1ficandum 1lla eadem, quae per conceptus 
mentis s1gn1f1cantur, 1ta quod conceptus primo naturaliter 
al1qu1d sign1ficat, et secundar1o vox s1gn1f1cat 1llud 
idem, in tantum quod voce instituta ad significandum 
aliquod s1gn1f1catum per conceptum mentis, si conceptus 
ille muta.ret signf1catum suum, eo ipso ipsa vox sine 
nova 1nst1tut1one suum signifies.tum permuta.ret • • •• Et 
sicut dictum est de vocibus respectu passionum seu 
interitionum oonceptuum, eodem modo proportiona11ter 
quantum ad hoc tenendum est de his quae sunt in scripto 
respectu vocum." 
b) Commentarium !.!! Per1hermen1as , c. 1, Boehner 
ed., in his "The Realistic aonceptuali sm of William 
Ockham u, Trad.1 tio 4 (1946), 323f.: ' ••• Accipio cogni tionem 
communem sive confusam, quae correspondet 1st1 voc1 'homo' 
vel 1st1 voc1 'animal', et qua ero: aut aliquid inte111gitur 
1sta cogn1t1one, aut nih11 . Non potest dici, quod n1h11; • • • 
Si aliquid cognosc1 tur 1sta cogni tione, au·t aliquid in 
anima aut aliquid extra an1mam . Si a11qua res extra 
animam, et non res universalis, quia nulla ta11s est, ••• 
ergo aliqua res singularis cognoscitur tali cognitione; 
sed non mag1s una quam a11a; ergo vel quaelibet vel nulla; 
sed non nulla, ergo quael1bet 1ntellig1tur. Et ita, quando 
1ntellegerem omnem hominem vel formarem istam propos1t1onem 
in an1ma: Homo est animal, ego intellegerem omnem hom1nem, 
et ita intellegerem et cognoscerem multos homines, quos 
numquam nov1 nee de qui bus umqua.m cog1 tav1. Quod videtur 
1nconven1ens •••• 
(Notes to pars. 49-52) 
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"Ad pr1mum potest d1c1, quod tali intellectione confusa 
intelliguntur res singulares extra, sicut habere 1ntellect1onem 
hom1n1s confUsam non est al1ud quam habere unam cognitionem, 
qua non magis 1ntellig1tur unus homo quam a11us, et ta.men 
quod tali cogn1t1one magis cognoscitur sive 1ntel11gitur 
homo quam asinus •••• 11 
54. corr. in MS. 
55. secundum quid propoa1tio est: The phrase is 
rather ell1pl1cal. 'secundum quid' does not here mean 
11in a certain respect\ but rather 0according to the 
nature or 'quidd1tas' 11 • For 'propos1 tio est', understand 
'per quad propositio est' or a similar phrase. This · 
interpretation is supported by the 'eadem natura in specie' 
of the last sentence in the paragraph. 
56. The repetition seems to be likely a scribal error. 
The slight variation of word order does not seem to change 
the sense of the expression. 
57. corr. from paris. 
-
58. .§!! III, 3, )8, f. 107vb. Cf. below, Appendix 
B,. a), pp. 129f • 
59. marg. Nata bene. 
60. t1§. ~ suppon1 t, ~ del. 
61. marg. Probatur secunda conclusioo 
62 0 11§. ~ 1ste termini, ~ del. 
63. marg. Secundo contra op1n1onem. 
64. Here and in par. 55, Ockham's doctrine can be 
~athered from the following text (SL, I, 72, pp. 194f.): 
Pro quo est 1ntellegendum, quod tune terminus supponit 
personaliter, quando supponit pro suis sign1f1cat1s vel 
pro his, quae ~erunt sua significata vel erunt vel 
possunt esse. ~t sic 1nte111gendum est prius dictumo 
Quia dictum est prius, quod 'significare' uno modo 
sic ac91pitur. Hoc tamen intelligendum est, quad 
non respeotu cuiuscumque verbi supponit pro 1111s, 
sed pro 1111s, quae significat stricte accipiendo 
1 sign1f1care', supponere potest respectu cuiusoumque 
(Notes to pars. 53-56) 
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verb1, si al1qua ta11a s1gn1f1cet. Sed pro 1111s, quae 
fUerunt sua significata, non potest supponere n1s1 
respectu ve~b1 de praeterito. 
"Et ideo quaeli bet talis proposi tio est d1stinguenda, 
eo quod ta11s terminus potest supponere pro his, quae 
sunt, vel pro his quae fuerunt . S1m111ter pro his, 
quae erunt, non potest supponere n1s1 respectu verb1 de 
fUturo; et ideo ista propositio est distinguenda, eo 
quod terminus potest supponere pro his, quae sunt, vel 
pro his, quae erunt. Similiter pro his, quae possunt 
esse s1gnif1cata, et non sunt, non potest supponere nisi 
respectu verb1 de possibili' vel de contingent!; et ideo 
omnes tales sunt d1st1nguendae , ea quod subiectum. potest 
supponere pro his, quae sunt, vel pro his, quae possunt 
ease, vel pro his, quae contingunt esse." 
On this notion of "ampl1ation", cf. the discussion 
in FL 200-202 ( secs. 28.01-28.12), and TO 53-58. (Both 
discussions fo li'O'W'"pr1marily t he texts 01' Albert of Saxony.) 
The principle that the· author here attributes to ockh.am 
is of fUnda.menta.l importance to the author's own solution. 
Cf. above, pp. •47-•49. 
65. marg. Tertio contra opinionem. 
66~ marg. Quarto contra op1n1onem. 
67. Of. Perierm. 6, 17a34-36, p . 9: "Et sit hoc 
contradictio, adf1nnat1o et negatio oppositae; dico 
autem opponi eiusdem de eodem, non autem aequivoce 
et quaecumque cetera taliwn determ1namus contra soph1st1cas 
importunitates.~ On th~ 'historical significance of 
this passage in the development of theories of fallacy, 
cf. L.M. De Rijk, Loe1ca Mode rnorum: ! Contrib tion !Q. 
the His torz .!?!, Early Te rm1nis t foe;Ic, I : ill! the 
TWelfth Century Theori es .Q.f Fal a cy, passim. 
68. MS adds non, but del. 
-- -- -
69. MS del. (?) 
70. MS adds ab, but del . 
-- --
71. marg . Contra secundum. 
72. Cf. above, n . 64 to par. 52. 
73. marg •. Secundo. 
(Notes to pars. 56-61) 
74. M.§ adds rationem, ~ fil• 
75. !1§. ~ verum, ~ ~· 
76. MS has ~. corr. 1nter11n. to !• 
Tl. !!§ ~ Probo consequentiam, :!lli,! ~o 
78. 1nterlin. 
79. !!§ spelling loyce. Cf. par. 46. 
Bo. mars. Tert1o. 
81. ?:!.§ ~ f, ~ ~· 
82. !:1§. ~ Sorte, ~ fil• 
83. marg. Quarto. 
84. in marg. 
85. corr. from terminus. 
--
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86. This or a similar addition seems necessary in 
order to make the consequence work. 
87. ~· Quinto. 
88. si quo d: !!! margo 
89. marg. Nota d1v1s1onem. Cf. below, n. 90. 
90. barg. Contra secundam uartem divis1on1s. There 
seems to e a lacuna here. The ltdi vision mentioned in this 
and the prev1ouc marginal note does not appear to refer 
to anything in the text as it stands in the MS. Moreover, 
the present paragraph is clearly (cf. the last sentence) 
a reply to an argument based on the assumption that some 
term in the proposition which Socrates says stands 
"confuse tantum11 • But nowhere above has this been 
mentioned. Judging from the fonn. of the reply, the 
missing argument presumably maintained that the argument 
in par. 60 does not hold, because some extreme in a stands 
oonfua·e tantum. 
91. MS has confusa. 
--
(Notes to pars. 62-66) 





MS has una. 
--
MS has particula. 
--
!1,2 a dds aliquam ai1am, ~ ~· 
sc11. pon1 tur. 
-
97. marg. Tert1o d1c1t ista op1n1o. 
98. See the discussion above, pp. *2lf. 
99. !!.§. ~ di eta, ~ ~1.· 
lo MS has one extra m1n1m. 
2. marg. Quarta op1n1o. 
3. Abbrev. unclear. 
4. ~~quarto (4° f2!. 4). 
5. ·Abbrev. had one extra minim, but cor.::·. 
6. !:1.§ adds :. be, but fil• 
7. M.§ ~ necessar11s, ~ ~· 
8. marg. Hie ostend1t def1n1tionem prim am 
op1n1on1s. 
9. marg. Secunda def1n1 tio. 
10. mars. Suppos1t1o pr1ma. 
11. marg. SUppos1 tio secunda. 
12. marg. Conclus1o prima. 
13. marg . Conclusio secunda. 
14. marg. Tertia conclus1o. 
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1stius 
15. The scribe had written 'nullum', but deleted this 
and inserted 'omne' above the line. 
- (Notes to pars. 67-74) 
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16. marg . Haec tertia argui tur. 
17. Emend from the statement of the first conclusion, 
par . 66. 
18. MS has verum 0 
--
19. For this rule, cf • .!Q 88 (rule *2.05), and 
references there. 
20. !1§ ~ 1n, ~ ~· 
21 . The author of this opinion is unknown. It 
corresponds perhaps to the sixth opinion in Paul of 
Venice's list of fifteen solutions. Cf. I:!M. II, 15, 
f. 192va. On this opinion, cf. above, pp. *25-*27. 
22. harg. Contra quartam op~oneuV, partially obscured 
between ~ folios. 
23. MS adds a false start for 'rationem', but del . 
24 . MS leaves a blank space here, for no apparent 
reason,. at the beginning of a line . 
25. aliter quam: MS has a11qualiter. With 
'aliqua11ter' the conclusion-would in no way follow 
from the premisses, nor would it prove the consequence, 
as the author claims. 'Aliter quam' seems demanded by 
both consi.derations. 
26. marg. Confirmatur consequent1a. 
27. batg. Secundo contra op<1nione~, partially 
obscured e ween ~ folios. 
28 . Tennination unclear in MS. 
29 . 1nterl1n. 
30. On the arguments in pars . 71 and 72, cf. above, 
n . 17 to p . *27. 
31. marg, Tertia contra op1nionem . 
32. marg. Quarto contra opinionem . 
(Notes to pars. 74-77) 
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33. MS adds 
--
ista, ~ fil• 
34. Perhaps deleted in MS. 
35. MS adds 
--
verae, Efil fil• 
36. marg . Quinto contra op1n1onemo 
37 . Abbrev. unclear. 
38 . A highly int erpretative reference (ut collig1 
potest ) to Posterior Anal~tics II, 5, esp. 9I'Sll-23, 
James of Ve nice, tr. , ~ 4, 747. For the text, cf. 
above, n. 74 to par. 20. The remark t .here about the 
passage from the Prior Analytics is applicable here as 
well. 
39 . marg . Sexto contra conclusionem . 
46. li§ ~ fass, ~ fil• 
41. ·ne anima III, 6, 430b26f. In trans . with Averroe s' 
commentarY: F. Stuart Crawford, ed., Averroi s Cordubens1s 
commentariuro ma~um in Aristotelis IDe anima libros, 463: 
11Et d!cere allqud deaiiquo, sicutaffirmatio, et omne 
compos1 tum, est verum vel fal sum. 11 
42. Averro es In III De anima , tx. c. 26, Crawford 
ed., loc. c1 t.: ''Etpredicarc per intellectum al1qu1d 
de allquo ,--sI'cu t a ffirmat i o et negatio, est compos1t1o 
per aotionem 1ntelle ctus. Et omne compos;. tum est verum 
vel falsum. In 1ntellectu 1g1tur mater1al1 semper 
inveniuntur ver1 tas et falsi tas aam1xte; et hoc est 
proprium hu1c 1ntellectu1 . " 
43. MS has hoc . 
--
44. marg. Septimo contra conclus1onem. 
45. Perie rm. 4, 17al-5, p. 8: 11Eat autem oratio 
omnis qui dem si gnificativa non s1cut 1nstrumentum, sed 
(quemadmo dum dictum est) secundum placitum; enuntiativa 
vero non omnis, sed in qua verun vel falsum inest; non 
autem in omnibus, ut deprecatio oratio est, sea neque 
vera rieque falsa." 
(Notes to pars. 77-80) 
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46. Prior Analytics I, 1, 24al6f., Boethius tr., 
L. M1n1o-Paiuello, ed., AL III, 1, p. 5: 11Proposi tio 
1g1tur est oratio affirm'a-Ei va vel negative a11cuius de 
aliquo.n 
47. ~~ca, ~ fil• 
48 . marg.: Aristoteles, Periennenias. 
49. Perierm. 10, 20a34f., p. 21: ~Semper enim 
vel veram esse ve l falsam necesse est negationem. it 
The edition refers to MS carnutens1s, bi bi, munic. 
497, which has the 'esse' after 'falsam',and 'negationem' 
and 'necesse est' transposed, as in the present paragraph. 
50 . marg.: Boethius, prime Topicorum. 
51 . Boethius, De differentiis to?:lcis, I, PL 64, 
ll 74B: uProposi t1oest orcLtio verumi Um.ve s!"gn1f1cans. 11 
52. marg. .Anselmus (!i.§. spelling Ancelmus) . 
53 . ~ spelling Ancelmus . 









Quid 1g1tur t1b1 v1detur 1b1 ver1tas? 
Nih11 a11ud soio nisi qu1a cum signifioa.t 
esse ~uod est, tune est in ea ver1·tas et est 
vera.' 
Reading uncertain. 
.Anselm, loo. cit.: 
Ad quid--i:acta"est aff1rmatio? 
Ad s1gn1f1oandum esse quad est. 
Hoc ergo debet. 
Certum est. 
Oum ergo s1~n1f1cat esse quod est, s1gn1f1cat 
quo d de bet. ' 
MS adds est vera, but del . 
-- -------
58. et ••• lineam: The phrase is sli~htly elliptical. 
Understand 11et rect1 tudo sicut ad lineam •, or a similar 
reading. 
(Notes to pars. Bo-83) 
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59. Anselm, .Q.E.. cit., o. 11, p. 191: 
"M ••• ,Aut S1 de-'alicuius corpor1s absentia 11nea 
dubi te tur an re eta ai t, et monstrar1 potest 
qu1a in nullam partem flectitur: nonne ratione 
coll1g1 tur quia rectam 1llam esse necesse est?" 
6o. !§. !M! f, ~ fil· 
61, marg, Ar1stoteles, 6° Metaphysicae . 
62. A highly interpretative reference, read presumably 
in the light of Averroes' commentary (of. below, n. 63): 
Meta;phys1 cs E, 4, 1027bl 7-22, :r. 151L-M: 11~t loquamur 
de vero ente, quod non est siout falsum. Est enim in 
compositione et d1v1s1one, et universaliter in div1s1~ne 
contrad1ctoriorum: quia habet aff1rmationem, secundum 
quod est verwn, et secundum quod est compos1 tum habet 
negationem a11quam, et secundum quod est d1v1sum habet 
fals1 tatem istius d1 v1s1on1s, quae est contradict1o •. " 
63. Averroes, In VI Meta., tx. c. 8 (on Meta. E,4, 
1027bl7-22), Junt. 'V: B; r:-f52D-E: " ••• id es-r,-vera 
enim aff1nnat1va s1gnif1cat oompos1t1onem in ent1bus, et 
vera ~egativa d1v1sionem. Et qu1a idem ens 1mposs1bile 
est quo~ sit compos1tum et divisum 1ns1mul, ideo, s1 
affizmativa tuer1t vera, negativa erit falsa, Et quasi 
dicat, affinnativa autem quia est vera, est ens in 
compositione, quasi ~beret negat1onem, cuius falsitas 
ex1st1t in d1v1s1one. Quoniam cum affinnat1va est vera 
per compos1t1onem, negativa est falsa per d1v1s1onem. Et 
s1m111ter, quando negativa est vera per d1V1s1onem, 




MS adds contra posi tio, but del, 
~- ----
l1.§. ~ a11a. 
1nterl1n, 
67. The sense is: "And now let this be a•¥t 
- -· 
68. MS has omnia. 
--
69. Postertor Analytics II, 4, 91al4-17, James of 
Venice · t r,, PL o4, 746: 11 Syl log1smus enim a.liquid de 
aliquo monstra per medium, sed quid est, propriun quidem 
est, et in ea quod quid est praedicatur, hoc autem necesse 
est convert1. tt 
(Notes to pars. 84-88) 
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70. The scribe has· written one minim too few. Cf. 
below, n. 86 to par. 88 0 
71. ~adds eo quod Plato non est pater, but~· 
72. Not to be found in Avicenna, Metaphysi ca VI , 5. Cf. ~erhaps, however, Metaphysica , VI, 2, Venice, 150~, f. 9lvb: 
••• unaquaeque igi tur causa e st simul oum suo causate • • • 
tune omnis causa est cum sue causato •••• igitur verae 
causae simul sunt cum suis causat1sn; and Ibid., VI, 3, 
f. 93rb: "Inquantum autem causa nondum refe'rtur ad 
causatum, causatum ease non est necesse, quia non est 
necesse suum esse, nisi inquantum causa refertur ad illud; 
et tune fit; propter has 1g1tur tres 1ntent1ones causa 
est dignior ease causat1; 1g1 tur causa dignior est causate." 
73. R§ ~ s1mul1 tate, Jlli.~ .££!.!:• 
74. 1nterl1n. 
75. The description does not appear in this treatise. 
Cf. above, p. *6. 
76. ll)e anima III, 6, 430b27-29, Crawford ed., 463: 
"Et non "ozlillis intellectus, sed qui dici t qui di tate rei, 
est verus, non qui dici t a11qui d de aliquo. 11 . 
77. Averroes, In III De an1ma, tx. c. 26, Crawford 
ed., 464: "Ide st, et 00n Iii omni a ctione 1s.t1us 
intellectus inveniuntur veritas et falsitas admixte, 
sed actio que est 1nformat1o est semr.er vera, non actio 
que est predicare aliquid de aliquo.' 
78. MS has ipsa. 
--
79. Sic, terminus in anima ••• vera non est: 1!l marg. 
Bo. marg. Tertia contra pos1t1onem rat1on1s (!!.£). 
81. Reading uncertain. 
82. H.§ ~ 4 tam, ~ del .• 
83. M.§ ~ quarta . 
84. 1nterl1n. 
(Notes to pars. 88- 95) 185 
85. The scribe has written one minim too many. 
86. The scribe has written one minim too few. Cf. 
above, n. 70 to par. 84. 
87. MS adds a point, but del. 
88. H.§. ~ definitionis . Cf. the last sentence of 
the par. 
89. ~ ~ 1pse, ~ fil• 
90. M.§ ~ consequentia patet, but ~· 
91. marg. Hie secundo arguitur ad idem. 
92. H.§ ~ fui t, Jlli.! ~. 
93. .£2!.!• from determinarat, 2£ perhaps from declarat. 
94. li.§ ~ temporis, ~ fil· 
95. mar,. Ostenditur quod (1nterl1n.) defin1t1o 






!§. ~ a11a, written~!!!.~. Emend for sense. 
For this rule, cf. !Q 88 (rule *2.05) and references 
!:!.§ ~ a11a, ~ ~· 
On this par., cf. above, n. 22 to p. *28. 
1. marg. Commune concluditur secundam definitionem 
esse falsam. 
2. MS adds non, but del. 
-- -----
3. marg. Contra primam conclusionem. 
4. ~ ~ quae . 
5. ti§. ~ partes, ~ fil· 
6. [2 seems !Q_ ~ veritat1. 
(Notes to pars. 95-102) 
7. MS adds what is perhaps the beginning of a 
repition of 'ut', but del. (?) 
8. H§ ~ vertatem ( ?) , ~ fil• 
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9. The sentence is very obscure. The force of the 
'non' carries over into 'exigit': non dependet ••• ut 
exigit, 1.e., it does not depend.u"Sc)tliat it r equires--
1.e. , it does not require. Ut exigit ad unum esse 
ve ritatem s1r;nr;- so that 1t---cloes not require ~truth 
of a sign for a thing ( 1'unum ") to be (being::= veri tas 
s1 gnif1cat1 ?) It is not clear which is the subject of 
1sequitur 1 , 'veritas signi' or 'veritas signi ficat1 1 • 
In either case, it seems that the reason(~ quod ••• ) is 
insufficient to establish what it is supposed to support, 
namely that the truth of that which is signified does 
not depend on the truth of the sign. 
10. ·. ·~ ~ proposi-P1one, _£ut fil· 
11. M,2 ~ Sortis, .EE.1 expunc. 
12. !1.§ ~ax, ~ ~· (False start for 'Ant1chr1st1'). 
13. s1gn1f1catum falsum: l:1.§. ~ s1gnif1cato falsoo 
14. 1:t§. ~ sicu t, ~ del . 
15. ~ ~ ax, ·~ fil• Cf. above, n .· 12. 
16. marg. Aristoteles. 
17. Metaphysics A, 29, l024bl6-l025al2, passim, Junt. 
v. 8, f. i41F-L. 
18. MS adds potest, but del . 
-- ----
19. MS leaves a blank space, in the middle of a line. 
20. .22..!:!:• .f!:2!!!. possent. 
21. Not t o be found in gop~. el. II (1.e ., chs. 16ff.). 
But cf. perhaps, So~~· el., , 69a!'l-21 ( in book I), James 
of Venice, tr., PL , lol5 (emphasis added): "S11gitur una 
propositio est quae unum de uno postulat, et simplioiter erit 
propositio talis interrogatio. Atqui quoniam syllogism.us 
~ propositionibus ~, redargut1a ·autem · syllogismus , ~ 
(~otes to pars. 102-109) 
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redargutio erit ex prolositionibus •••• contradictio, quod 
erat propriumre'dar~ut oni s , •••• " This is the nearest 
lr!"Sto tie comes inhe Soph. !:!• to making the statement 
attributed to him. 
22. MS adds falsum, but del. 
----- --
23. marg. Prima divisio. 
24. Cf. above, pp. *30f. 
25. The discussion does not appear in this treatise . 
Cf. above, p. *6. 
26. marg. l:>ecunda di visio. 
27. marg. Tertia divisio. 
28. ?:!.§. ~ insos, ~ fil• 
29. ct. above, pp. *31-*33. 
30. marg. Prima supposit1o. 
31. marg. Secunda suppos1t1o. 
32. marg. Tertia supposit1o. 
33. sicut praesentialiter: MS has praesentialiter 
sicut, with a 'b' over 'praesentiSI'iter' and an 'a' 
over the 'sicutT. Cf. above, n. 15 to par. 4. -
34. MS adds primo, but del. 
-- --
35. marg. Quarta suppositio. 
36. !1§. ~ res, ~ fil• 
37. On the first four suppositions, cf. above, pp. *33-*35. 
38. marg. Quinta suppos1tio. 
39. Reading very uncertain. 
4o. H.§. ~ dub1a. 
41. MS has qui. 
--
(Notes to pars. 110-112) 
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f. 136vb. Cf. above, pp. *28f. 
44. corr. .!.£2!. non. 
-
45. 
_m, ill· ill· Cf. above, p. *29. 
46. Cf. above, p. *29. 
47. MS adds re, but del. 
-- --
48. marg. Prima descriptio. 
49. MS has arrarante 0 
--
so .• marg. Secunda descriptio. 
51. MS has 
--
apparante. 
52. MS has incomplexe. This must surely be a corruption. 
The descriptions are never elaborated any further in the 
treatise, despite the promise in the last sentence of the 
paragraph (although they are referred to briefly in par. 
258). Yet, emending 'incomplexe' to 'complexa' or 'complexum' 
makes sense of the description, and conforms to the examples 
of "hypothetical" insolubles given later in the treatise 
(pars. 236-257). 
53. MS adds divisione, but del. 
-- --
54. MS has quinto. 
--
55. Clearly an error. There are only three divisions 
(par. 104). The last is between categorica! and hypothetical 
insolubles, but it is hard to see how these two descriptions 
could be said to "follow" from that division. There is 
a fifth supposition (par. 109) and a fifth conclusion 
(par. 130), but neither of these seems to be relevant 
here. In the absence of the author's promised discussion, 
there is insufficient information to determine the correct 
reading. 
56. MS adds patebit, but delo 
-- ---
57. marg. Prima conclusio. 
58. 
59. 
(Notes to pars . 112-118) 
~ ~ nullam a11am rem, ~ ~. 
MS has illam . 
--
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60. praecise natura11ter: MS has na tura11ter praecise, 
with a 'b' over 'naturaliter' an-a-aii"""'Ta' over 'praecise'. 
Cf. above, n . 15 to par . 4. 
MS has quilibet . 
--
~ ~ quodlibet, ~ ~· 







65". MS leaves a blank space, in the middle of a line. 
66. marg . Secunda conclusio. 
67. Perierm . 1, 16af., p. 5: "sunt ergo ea quae sunt 
in voce earum quae sunt in an1ma passiontml notae, et ea quae 
scribuntur eorum quae sunt in voce." 
68. The description does not appear in this treatise. 
Cf. above, p. ~6. 
69. marg . Confirmatur. 
70. MS . adds vel, but del . (Probably a false abbrev. 
for 1nihil") .-- - -
71. tnars. Confirmatur . 
:12. MS has 
--
quale . 
·:·73. M.2 ~= b, ~Ml. 
74. MS has tentendum . 
--
75. MS adds ab, but de,!. 
--
76. MS adds ultra, ~~· 
--
77". MS adds et ultra: igitur, nullum extremum 
propositi'Olli'Sa!iquid ex 1mpos1tione significat, nis1 
quod naturaliter et a priori significat extremum 
propositiohis mentalis, quad est probandum, but vacat. 
-
(Notes to pars . 118-122) 
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78. M.§ .£.~~ sibi . 
79. Ii§.~ propositionem . 
Bo . The emendations in this sentence are taken from 
the original statement of this second conclusion (par. 
il6) and from the passage marlced vacat, above, n. 77 . 
81. marg. Tert1a conclus1o . 
82. Reading uncertain. 
83. Cf . above, p . *30, and n . 79 to p . *36. 
84. ~ ~ dicere. 
85 . From here to the end of the par., the author 
seems to have rev.ersed the meanings stipulated for 'a 1 
and ':e,' . 
86. Cf. above, pars . 116-118 . 
87. marg . Quarta conclusio. 
88. MS adds quarto (?), but del . Likely a false start 
for 'conclusIO"T:' - -
89. In fact, the conclusion is never discussed for 
negative propositions. 
90. !§ ~ e, ~ del . 
91 . 1 . e., prime modo primae figurae: Barbarao 
92. 1nterl1n. ~· ~item. 
93. ~~item, ~ ~!.· 
94. Perhaps Perierm. 1, 16a13-19, pp . 5f.: " · •• circa 
compositionem eniru et divisionem est falsitas veritasque . 
Nomina igitur ipsa et verba consim111a sunt sine 
compositione vel d1v1s1one intellectu1, ut 'homo' vel 
'album', quando non additur aliquid; neque enim adhuc 
verum aut falsum est. Huius autem signum: 'hircocervus' 
enim s1gn1ficat aliquid, sed nondum verum vel falsum, 
s1 non vel 1esse' vel 'non esse' addatur vel s1mplic1ter 
vel se cundum tempus. 0 
(Notes to pars. 122-124) 
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95. MS adds a vertical stroke, but del . 
96. Averroes, In VI Meta., tx. c. 8, Junt., v. B, 
f. 152D-E: 11Doctordi0It~t loquamur de vero ente', 
•• • et hoc est i llud, quod est in an1ma. Haec enim entia 
facta sunt ab intellectu, quan do dividit ent1a sb1nv1cem 
aut co.mpon1 t ea ad1nv1cem ••• vera en1m aff1rmat1 va 
s1gn1f1cat compositionem in entibus, et vera negativa 
d1v1s1onem • • •• cum aff1rmat1va est vera per compos1t1onem, 
negat1va est falsa per divisionem . Et sim111ter, quando 
negativa est vera per divisionem, affirmativa est falsa 
per composi t1onem •••• " (on ~. E, 4, 1027bl6-22). 
97. ~ anima III, 6, 430a26-28, Crawford ed., 454: 
"Formare autem res 1nd1vis1 biles eri t in 1stis rebus, 
sc1licet in quibus non est falsitas. Res autem in 
quibus est falsum et verum, 1llud est aliqua compositio 
tune ad res intellectas secundum quod sunt entia; ••• " 
98. Averroes, In III De anima, tc. c. 21, Crawford 
ed., 455: "· •• incePft""Considerare de actionibus et 
proprietatibus intellectus • • •• Idest, comprehendere 
autem res simplices non compositas erit per intellects 
que non falsantur neque veridicantur, que dicitur 
infonnatio; comprehendere autem ab eo res compositas 
erit per intellecta in quibus est falsitas et veritas ••• • 
Idest, intellects autem in quibus invenitur veritas et 
falsitas, est in eis aliqua compositio ab intellectu 
mater1a11 •••• " 




~ ~ persupponit. 
~~et,~ fil· 
3. MS abbrev. unclear, but perhaps 'nisi' or 1ubi'. 
The emendation seems demanded by the sense of the argument . 
4. MS adds the beginning of the letter '~', but del, 
5. The word is divided in the middle of the first 'n'. 
The first minim of the letter is at the end of one line of 
writing, while the second minim begins the next line, 
6. 1nterlin. 























(Notes to pars. 124-132) 
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corr. from a11a. 
- --
in marg. as a corr~ for an illeg. abbrev. crossed 
the line of writing. 
~ abbrev. ypocis 
MS has 1ntellectum. 
--
!!.§. ~ terminus, ~ .!!tl.• 
MS abbrev. adds an extra minim, but expunc. it. 
Abbrev. corr. 
On the contradiction, cf. above, n. 81 to p. *37. 
. ~ ; ; t ~. ·~ ~·. 
~: . 
... ~·· . . 
~ ~ conclusionem. Of. above, pars. 30-41. 
marg. Quinta conclusio. 
Termination unclear in MS. 
Of. above, n. 3 to p. *23. 
marg. Ad idem. 
MS has: d. 
-- -
MS adds an illegible abbrev., but del. 
!§ ~ arguo, ~ ~!· 
Corr. from sic. 
-
MS adds s, but del. 
-- --
Corr. from quam. 
--
28. Perierm. 8, 18al3-25, pp. 12f.: ''Una autem est 
adfinnatio et negatio quae unum de uno significat, vel cum 
sit universale universaliter vel non similiter ••• Sin vero 
duobus unum nomen est positum ex quibus non est unum, non 
est una adfirmatio; ut, si quis ponat nomen 'tunica' homini 
et equo, 'est tunica alba' haec non est una adfirmatio nee 
(Notes to pars. 132-138) 
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negatio una; n1h11 enim hoc differt dicere quam 'est' 
equus al bus et homo al bus', hoc autem nih11 differt quam 
dicere 'est equus albus' et 'est homo albus'. Si ergo 
hae multa significant et sunt plures, manifestum eat quoniam 
et prima multa vel nihil slgnificat (neque enim est 
aliquis homo equus). 
29. ~ ~ s, }lli! fil· 
30. marg. Hie vult arguere contra duas ultimas 
conclusiones. 
31. Termination unclear in MS. 







!1.§ ~ sa (?), ~ ,g~. 
MS has omnium. 
--
MS. has propositionum. 
- -
marg. Secundo contra easdem. 
TBI, f. 135ra. Cf. Appendix C, c), p. 137. 
-
39. MS adds Et additur quod hoc negare non est, 
n1s1 figmentUiilTllorum qui aliter ad insolubilium 
nesciunt respondere. Quarto sic, £..!:!! vacat. 
4o. For the addition, cf. above, n. 39, and below, 
par. 151. 
41. marg. Quarto contra conclusiones. 
42. TBI, 12.£. ill· Cf • .Appendix C, d), pp. 137£. 
43. marg. Quinto contra conclusiones. 
44. TBI, 
-
f. 134vb. Cf. Appendix C, b)' p. 1370 
45. . marg. sex to contra conclusiones • 
46. ru. 1.9.£. cit. Cf. Appendix c, a)' pp. 136f. 
(Notes to pars. 138-142) 
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47. In fact, the reference is t o the fourth book 
(cf. below, par. 154) . The text is Metath:ysics r , 8, 
1012bl5-18, iv1111a.m of Moerbeke tr. , con a i ned in 
sancti Thomae Aquinatis ••• In meta~h~sica.m Ar1stotel1s 
commentaria , M.-R. cathala , ed., 4 : "Nam qui omnia 
ve ra di ci t, orationis suae contrariam veram faci t . ·Quare 
et suam non veram. Contraria enim non dicit ipsam esse 
veram. Qui vero omnia falsa, et ipse se ipsum.~ 
48. MS has albus, corr. from asinus . The argument 
seems .to demand 'asinus-r:-- -
49. Ii§. spelling C1chero . 
50. li.§. spelling Ch1cerone. 
51. li,2 ~ vera, ~ ~. 
52. Cf. ~. f. 135ra. Cf. Appendix c, e), p . 138. 
53. Prior Anal~tics I, 1, 24b26-3o, Boethius tr., AL 
III, 1, p. 6: "In ·oto autem esse al terum a1 tero et de-
omn1 praedicari altero alterum idem est . Dicimus autem 
de omni praedicari quando nihil est sumere dubiect1 
de quo a1terum non dicatur; et de nullo similiter. " 
54. MS has commenti . Averroes, In Priorum 
resolutorIOruiil'liber unus, Junt. I, 2-;-t. 2vb-3ra: 
"verum enim vero diet~ de onni, aut dictum de nullo, 
s1gn1f1cat, n1h11 in omni reper1r1 subiecto, de quo non 
praedicetur praedicatum, hoc est, ut praedicatum ins1t 
omni subiecto, et omni etiam 1111, quad per subiectum. 
d1spon1tur, inexistat: adeo, ut cum d1c1mus, omne 
animal est corpus, et velimus in ipso exercere 1ntent1onem 
dicti de oCTni, non tantum sit 1ntentio nostra, unumquodque 
ex animalibus est corpus, sed unumquodque ex animalibus, 
et omne id quad per unumquodque ipsorum d1spon1 tur, est 
corpus. Et haec est differentia inter dictum de omni, 
quad principium eff1c1tur in hoc libro, et inter 
propositionem universalem: et dictum de nullo 
consim1liter. Significat enim nihil in omni reper1r1 
subiecto, a quo non negetur praedicatum, ita ut 
praedicatum negetur ab omni subiecto, et ab ijs omnibus, 
quibus inest subiectum, hoc est ab ijs, quae disponitur 
a subiecto." 
55. marg. Hie respondetur. 
(Notes to pars. 142-150) 
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56. Of. above, par. 133. 
57. M2 ~ potest aliquid significare, ~ !!tl.• 
58. ?i§ ~ e jus. 
59. !i§ ~ potest, ~ fil• (?) 
60. !:!.§ ~ q, but del . 
61. The scribe started to write 'tenninus'. He 
nearly completed the abbreviation, then corrected it to 
'termini'. 
62. ?!§ ~ ordinare, ~ fil• 
63. ~· Hie arguitur contra istam 1maginat1onem. 
64. MS abbrev. has an extra minim, but del. 
65. MS adds an illegible m~rk, but del. 
66. ?!§ ~ quia, ~ ~1· 
67. M.§. has quo. 
68. MS has Conf1nnat1o (?). 
--69. Cf. above, par. 143. 









Cf. above, par. 144. 
MS abbrev. has an extra minim, but del. 
Cf. above, par. 133. 
Of. above, par. 134. 
MS has mediante, or mediate. 
-- -
MS leaves a blank space, in the middle of a line. 
MS has significantibus. 
--
Cf. above, n. 88 to p. *38. 
(Notes to pars. 150-154) 
79. !:1§ ~ autem, ~ ~!· 
Bo. marg • .£2!.!:• !2£ autem. 
81. MS has esse. 
--





Cf. above, par. 135. 
~ ~ 111am. 
MS ~ vestrum, ~ fil• 
MS has desoutuent1. 
--
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87. T~ author does not seem to have had any individual 
passages 1 ind. Rather, the ~tatement seems to mean 
simply tha for a part to stand for its whole would be 
opposed to the whole thrust of Aristotelian psychology 
(as it is presented, e.g., in~ anima II and III). 
88. marg. Ad quartum. 
89. Of. above, par. 136. 
90. Cf. the discussion above, n. 88 to p. *38. 
91. li.§. ~ auditur. 
92. Cf. above, par. 136 • 
. 93. On the argument in this par., of. above, n. 88 
to p. *38. 
94. Cf. above, par. 137. 
95. Cf. above, par. 116. But this is not what the 
second principle conclusion states. For "re duce re ad 
aotum intellegendi", cf. above, pars. 134, 149. 
96. marg. Ad quartum (~) de auctoritate. 
97. Cf. above, n. 47 to par. 138. 
98. !:!.§ ~ b, ~ fil· 
(Notes to pars. 154-156) 
99. MS adds a false start for the abbrev. for 
're sponde s', but del. 
1. MS adds what seems to be a false start for 
'arguebat', and does not delete it. 
2. .£2.!E.• ~ hominem. 
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3. Spelling here ana elsewhere!_!!~ !1,2: Eraclitum 
(Eracli tus). - -
4. ~ spelling: Anaxegaram .2£ Anaxogaram . 
5. Metaphysics r , 7, 1012a24f., Moerbeke tr., ~· ill•, 
240: ttv1de tu r autem He racli ti qui dem oratio dicens 
omnia esse et non esse, omnia vera facere. Quqe vero 
Anaxagorae, esse al1quid medium contradictionis. Quare 
omnia falsa." 
6. MS adds a false start for 'consequentias', but del. 
7. MS has ooncludebat satis, with a 'b' over 
'concludeba~and an 'a' over 'satis'. Cf7 above, 
n. 15 to par. 4. -
8. !1§ ~ possu, ~ ~.· 
9. mtr~. Hie arguitur Philosophus cont~a Heraclitum, 
qui posui ?) omnia esse vera. 
10. !1.§ ~ vera, ~ ~ .• 
11. Ibid., 10llb24f., §.Ji. illo, 240: -•verum nee 
inter contradictiones quicquam medium esse contingit; 
sed necessariUI!l aut dicere aut negare unum de unoquoque. •• 
According to Aristotle (cf. above, n. 5), it was 
Anaxagoras, and not Heraclitus, who denied the Law of 
Excluded Middle; Heraclitus denied rather the Law of 
Non-Contradiction. Yet, Aristotle seems to argue, 
Heraclitus' position implicitly implieE a denial of 
the Law of EXcluded Middle as well. Cf. ?-Ietaphysics r , 
8, 1012a29-bl5. 
12. MS has aliquid. 
--
13. Ibid., l012bl4-19, ed. cit., 245: "contingit 
autem quod ~dmatum est omnibus talibus rationibus ipsas 
(Notes to pars . 156-162) 
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seipsas destruere. Nam qui omnia vera dicit, orationis 
suae contrariam veram facit 0 Quare et suam non veram . 
Contrar1a enim non dicit ipsam esse veram. Qui vero 
omnia falsa, et ipse seipsum. ~ 
14. MS abbrev. adds an extra minim, but del . 
15 . MS leaves a blank space at the end of a line . 
16. MS adds a false abbrev., but del. 
17. Cf. above, n. 13. 
18 . MS has an extra minim, but del . 
19 . marg. Responsio ad a11um . 
20 . Cf . above, par. 139 . 
21 . !iQ ~ totum, }?.li! del . 
22. marg. Ad a11am fonnam. 
23. Cf. above, par . 140. 
24. li,2 spelli ng Chicerone, ~ both occurrances of 
~ word in this pap. 
25. marg . Simile arguitur ex isto casu. 
26. ~£.S· Primus casus declaratur . 
27. Cf. above, par . 160. 
28. ll§ ~ modum (?). 
29 . MS has modus. 
30. !!§ ~ modus. 
31 . MS adds non sit vera 111a propositio 'Solus 
Sortes di'CTt--ver'tml', b~ £.91:.• 
32. ~s abbrev. unclear . 
33 . MS spellin& Chicero. 
(Notes to pars. 162-173) 
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34. Cf. below, pars. 254f. , and above, p. *6. 
35. MS leaves a blank space, at the beginning of 
the line . 
36. Cf. above, par. 141. 
37. !,! adductas: inserted at the end of the following 
line. 
38. marg. Hie solvu.ntur insolubilia jam posita . 
39. ~ ~ pnatur, ~~ de_,!. 
40. marg. casus . 
41. Cf. above, par. 104. 
42. marg. Responsio. 
43. ~ ~ copulativa, !:E..<! ~ad alteram (?), ~ -fil• 
44. For this consequence, cf. !Q, 85 (rule *1.08) 
and references there . 
45 . marg . .Ad aliam fonnam . 
46. marg. Responsio ad a11am form.am. 
47. marg . Contra responsionem . 
48 . M.§. ~ praecise, ~ ~· 
49 . ~ ~ siBni fi cat, El:~ fil• 
50. !:!.§. ~ secunda, Jlli! fil• ( ?) 
51 . Cf. above, par . 1050 
52. [§ add~. s £!: f, .£!!! del. 
53. Cf. above, n. 95 to p. *40. 
54. marg. Responsio. 
55. marg. Contra responsionem. 
56 . marg . Confirmatur. 
(Notes to pars. 173- 187) 
57. Cf. above, n. 95 to p. *40 . 
58 . Cf. rather suppositio prima, par. 105. 
59 . marg . Responsio . 
60 . marg . Ad secundam fotmam. 
61 . tl.§ ~ U~CJ.Ue, ~ ~. 

























71. MS has ti bi . 
--
72. MS adds terminus, ~ fil· 
73. Cf. above, par. 112. 
74. tl.§ ~ erit . 
75. Cf. above, n. 95 to p. *40 . 
76. MS adds an illeg0 abbrev., but del. 
77. Of. above, par. 122. 
78. Cf. above, par . 130 . 
200 
79. Cf. above, par. 119, and the discussion above, p . *30. 
Bo. margo Hie areuitur ex dictis . 
(Notes to pars . 187-198) 
81. !:!..§. ~ sequitur, but. del . 
82. marg. Et contra hoc obicitur. 
83 . marg. Responsio . 
84. Cf. above, par . 106. 
85. marg. Contra responsionem • 
. 
86. marg . Responsio . 
87 . !1§ may ~ arguando. 
88 . Cf . above, pars . 55- 62. 
89 . Cf. above, par. 122. 
90 . Cf. above, par . 1300 
91 . Cf. above, par. 112. 
92 . [§ ~ sed. 
93 . ll§ adds Sortes dicit, but del. 





MS has falsum . 
tl2 ~ non, ~ fil· 
Cf. above, par. 186. 
corr. from latentur. 
--
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99. For the first two, cf . the discussion above, n. 94 
to p. *40. 
1. li2 ~ dicere . 
2. !:!.§ ~ d, ~ fil· 
3. ~ adds illud, ~ del . 
4. NS leaves a blank space in the middle of a line . 
Soph. !Ll:,. 25, 180bl, James of Venice tr., ~ 64, 10340: 
(Notes to pars . 198- 209) 
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" • • • nam qui jurat se perjuraturum (~ ~ perjeraturum), 
bene jurat perjurans hoc solum. 11 
5. marg. Nota bene. 
6. !1.§. ~ igi tur, ~ ~· 
7. MS has consequentia . 
--
8. marg •. Nota: Sensus Ar1stotel1s ad istas 
propositiones . 
9 . ~· conclusio. Cf. above, par. 122. 
10. ~· conclusio . Cf. above, par. 130. 
11. marg. Hie arguitur ex illa propositione . 
12. Cf. above, par . 112. 
13. Cf. above, par. 106. 
14. !1]. ~ aliquid. 
15. marg. Contra confirmationemo 
16. MS adds sic, but del . 
--- --
17. marg. Responsio . 
18 . !1.§. ~est, ~, ~1· 
19 . Reading uncertain (probe?) . 
20 . ~ ~ aliquid (?), ~ ~· 
21 . c~ above., par. 105. 
22. !i§ ~: ]!. 
23. Cf. above, par. 122. 
24. Cf. above, par. 130. 
25. .marg. Quarto principali ter argui tur. 
26. marg. Responsio. 
(Notes to pars . 210-224) 
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27. MS ~ 4 ( ?) , ~ ~· marg. Quarto (2.12) 
ad idem. 
28 . marg. Responsio . 
29. mars . Contra rationem (~: Contra respons1onem). 
30. This rule seems to be based on the "confused and 
distributiveu supposition of general predicate terms in 
negative sentences. Cf., e.g., the following texts from 
~: I, 7Q, pp. 190, 191; I, 74, ~· 206. Cf. also 1Q 
pp. 18-25, 45-48, and references there . 
31 . The 'b' here is that of pars. 210-211, and not 
that mentioned-previously in par. 212: 'Sortes non . dicit 
falsum'. 
3 2. .£2!:!:. 1!2E!.: !:. • 
33. MS. adds: b, but del. 
- - - ---
34. marg . Responsio . 
35. marg. Sexto principaliter ad idem arguitur. 
36. marg. Responsio . 
37. mar~. Responsio. 
38 . marg. Contra responsionem. 
39 . MS adds dictum, but del. 
-- --
40. mar5 . Responsio . 
41 . marg. Contra responsionem . 
42. MS adds a false abbrev. , but del. 
43. batg. Septimo ad {principale) (?), partially 
obscured e ween ~ folios. 
44. marg. Responsio <ad) septimum, partially obscured 
between ~ folios. 
45. ~ ~ f, ~ fil. (?) 
(Notes to pars. 225-226) 
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46. >arg. Hie de terrni(nan)da 1nso(lubilia) categorica 
et f<a1sa , partially obscured betwee n the folios. 
47. MS adds a false start !or 'breviter' (?), 
but del. 
48. mar~. Primus c(asus), ;partially obscured between 
the folios. 
49 .. Cf. above, pars .. 6-23. 
50. Cf~ above, par. 106. 
51 . interlin. 
52. MS adds prae cl se, ~~. 
--
53. Perhaps deleted in MS. 
54. Cf. above, par . 104. 
55 . !:1.§. ~ s, ~ del . 
56 . ti§.~ praecise, but ~· -
57. Cf. above, par. 105. 
58. har~. Responsio (ad) casu(in), partially obscured 
between ~ olios. 
59. The references to the ar~ent in the previous 
paragraph are rather loose. The 'minor" seems to be 0 et 
! praecise significat prime quad hoc est falsum" (par. 225) 0 
The subject of 'potest' is the 'hoc est falsum' of that 
minor. Thus, the consequence which does not hold is that 
from 'non est ita, quad hoc est falsum' to 'hoc est verum' . 
The reason is given in the text . 
60. Cf. above, par. 116. 
61. This is the basis for the inference above, from 
'non naturaliter • • • ' to 'nee hie ex impositione ••• ' • 
62. Incomplete abbrev. in HS. 
63. The structure of the argument becomes rather 
cornpli ca ted from here to the end of the paragraph. The 
(Notes to pars . 226-230) 
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consequentia in question here is from 'in is ta pr.oposi tiohe 
"Hoc est falsum \ nee subjectum nee praedicatum supponit 
pro aliqua propositione' to 'utrumque extremum in a 
propos1 t:ione supponi t eo mo do quo supponeret, si neutrum 
extremuru aliqua~do fuisset inpositum ad sienificandum'. 
The justification 'for this inference is given in the 
passage: 'Consequentia tenet per hoc ••• juxta quartam 
et quintam conclusionem'. Only then, beginning with 
'Subjectum, igitur' does the main chain of reasoning 
start again. Thus, the 'igitur' there connects the 
last sentence of the paragraph with the passage: 
'utruqique extremum in ~ •• • impositum ad significandum' . 
64. The .£._aJ!u~ at the beginning of par. 225. 
65 . This seems to refer to par. 186: used casus qui 
poni t quod Sortes non dici t aliquam alia.m exclud1 t 
extremum propositionis dictae a Sorte supponere pro aliquo 
alio; igitur, s1 pro aliquo supponeret, necessario pro 
ipsa propositione cujus est :pars supponeret." The entire 
argument in par. 186 is parallel to the one in this par. 
66 . The scribe has previously used 'b' as the counterpart 
of '.2' • 
67 . Cf. above, par. 122. 
68. Cf. above, par . 130 . 
69. marg . Contra re sponsionem . 
70. marg. Adhuc. 
71 . Cf . above, par . 112. 
72. MS adds Red totam proposi tionem, as a catchword 
!:1 ~ bottom£! .f. 54v. - -
73. iste terminus 1hoc 1 : MS has species ejus. 
The emendation given, or a similar-oiie, is demanded by 
the sense of the argument. 
74 . marg. note illegible in the microfilm because of 
a fold in the folio. 
75. marg. (Ad) secundum, partial.1.I obscured between 
the folios . 
(Notes to pars. 230- 237) 
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76. Perhaps the reference should be to the fifth 
conclusion, because of the "ex impositione~. For the 
fourth conclusion, cf. above, pars. 122-129; for the fifth, 
cf. above, pars. 130-132. 
' 77. Cf. above, pars. 142-163. 
78 . Cf. above, pars. 122-129 . 
79. M.§. ~ 5, ~ del . 
Bo . Cf. above, par . 116. 
81. Cf. above, par. 130 . 
82. mar_g. Responsio. 
83 . MS ad9-s totum, bu"t. .de1_. 
84. MS~ termini (?). 
85~ marg. note illegible . Partially obscured between 
the folios. 
85b. mar~. (Responsi)o (?), partially obscured 
between ~ folios. 
86. Cf. above, n. 95 to p. *40. 
87 . Abbrev. corr. 
88. ~...B. · (Aliu)s casus, ;par!,~~lly s:ibscure d between 
the folios. 
89. MS ~ dicendum est, but del . 
90 . This seems to be here merely a particle to 
divide members of a sentence, with no disjunctive sense. 
Equivalent to 'tune'. Perhaps the word ought to be deleted. 
91 . The sentence is perhaps corrupt. As it stands, 
the argument is unintelligible . 
92. interlin. 
93 . MS ~ vel . 
94 . }~S ~ vera, but del. 
(Notes to pars. 237-240) 
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95. Cf. above, par. 106. 
96. MS ~ non, b~t del . 
97. Cf. abov~, par. 104. 
98 . .£2£!..• fr9.E, diusjunctivae . 
99. Cf. above, ri . 95 to p . *40 . 
1. ~arg. Responsio. 
2. ~· ~ quae . 
3. Abbrev. corr . 
4 . !!§ ~ per, EE,! fil• 
5. ..£.Q.££• .f!.2£ ista. 
6. Cf. above, par . 112. 
7. Cf. above, par . 130. 
8. MS has igi tur . 
-
MS adds prina, but delo 
- --
9. 
10. Cf. above, par. 112. 
11. Cf. above, n. 17 to p . *44. 
12. Cf. above, par. 116. 
13. !:!.§. ~ propositione, but d~. 
14. marg. Ad secunduc. 
15. Cf. above, par. 237 . 
16. MS adds s1~nif1cat, but del. Also adds the vertical 
stroke of-=t'he letter ·~· (fal'S8""start for 'pars'?), not 
deleted. 
17. tl§. ~ secunda, but del . 
18 . M.§ adds et, ~ ~ ( ?) • 
(Notes to pars . 240-247) 
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19 . Abbrev. corr. 
20 . ll§. started to ~ pp, ~ fil· 
21 . marg. Exemplum. Cf. above, pp. *7f. 
22. added in marg 0 
23 . MS has intellectum. (?) 
240 ll.§. ~ ad se, but ~1.· 
25 . MS adds a false start for 'tamen', but del. 
26 . [§. ~ subject1, ~ del . 
27 . M.§ ~ !:. false star! !££ 'indifferenter', ~ fil• 
28. tl,2 ~ suam. 
29 . M.§ ~ ~ false ~~ for : praedicatum, ~ fil• 
31 . added 1n marg. 
32. ~ ~ naturalem . 
33. Cf. above, n. 99 to par. 26. 
34. MS has intellectum (?) . 
35. Abbrev. cor.r. 
36. !§_ perhaps has camposs1b111s . 
37. interlin. 
38. _rn. in marg • .f!.9!!!.: ~. 
39. cum~ terminus• ••ETfi ~ipso sut~onere: The 
sentence rs-'c1ear1y corrupt . e sense ofe argument 
from par. 240 on, as well a s the clear purpose of the 
argument in the present par., indicates that a read-
ing such as the following ought to be adopted: 11 cum 
1ste terminus 'falsum' et iste terminus 'disjunctiva' 
supponunt sicut communiter solent supponere, et casus 
(Notes to pars. 247-255) 
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excludit ex hoc aliquem talem terminurn supponere pro 
significato ab eo distincto, non excludit ex hoc aliquem 
term in um talem pro se . ipso supp one re. 11 
4o. The sentence is obscure, but the sense seems to 
be: "since in one instance which the case allows, it can 
be true. 11 
41. !1§. ~ derelinquitur. 
42. Cf. above, par. 1040 
43. The sentence~ governe d by the 'si' above, 
remains incomplete. fhe sense is: 11 Si sic arguatur, 
ad hoc responderi possi t ••• 11 • The reply is given in 
the f ollowinB pars. 
44. Perienn . 4, 17a3-5, p. 8: " ••• enuntiativa 
(soil. r atio) vero non monis, sed in qua verum vel 
falsum i nest; non autem in omnibus, ut deprecatio quidem 
est, se d neque vera neque fo.lsa. '1 
45 . Reading uncertain. 
46. Cf. above, par. 248 . 
47. harg. <Pro c/onjunctivis, partially obscured 
between ~ folios. 
48. conjunct1va ••• fa1sa; ll§. ~ aliqua conjunctiva 
falsa es t prolata a Sorte. 
49 . ~ ~ ~ false start f,Q£ omnis, but del . 
50. Reading uncertain. MS adds an 'i' before the 
abbre~. , but perhaps expunctuates it. 
51 . li2 has e st o 















(Notes to pars. 255-258) 
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57. Cf. above, n. 19 to p. *44. 
58. !ill adds et, but del. 
59. li!2. ~ Sortes dicit, but~· 







.£2!£· from conse<J.uentia • ll.§. ~ secunda, but del . 
Cf. above, per. 112. 
Cf. above, par . 116. 
Cf. above, par. 122. 
Cf. above, par. 130 . 
66. marg. Res:ponsio. 
67. marg. Exemplum de exceptiv1s. 
68. Reading uncertain. 
propositions, cf. above, n. 
On exclusive and exceptive 





Cf. above, par. 111 . 
MS has quae . 
--
Cf. above, p . *6. 
MS abbrev. has an extra minim . 
Notes to ~ Appendices 
(Notes to Appendix A) 
1. Reading uncertain. 
2. MS has illudo 
3. marg. nescriptio insolubilis . 
4. interlin. add. by a later hando 
5. !:!.§. ~ solam. 
6. marg. add. by a later hand. 
7. interlln. add. by a later hand. 
8. Reading uncertain. 
9 . 1nterlin. add. by a later hand. 
10. !1.§ ~ quia, ~ ,£&. 
11. .£.0..E:• ~ a .£l ~ later ~· 
12. interlin. add. by a later hand. 
(Note to Appendix B) 
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l. vel hunc ••• consimilem: ~o Paris ed., 1488 
(homoeoteleuton). Expanded according to Vat. lat. 
952, f. 117ra and Cambridge, Oongille & Caius, 464/571, 
f. 58va. The latter omits 'aliquem'. 
(Notes to Appendix C) 
1. f. 134va: 11Restringentium autem duae sunt 
sectae. Quid8:Jll enim restringunt terminum et quidam 
tempus. Restringentium terrninum pro -W.nto dicuntur, 
quia non permi tti t terminurn supponere pro omnibus 
suis significatis vel fl'.'O omnibus suis singulari bus. 
Et istorum autem tres l_treSJ sunt (f. 134vb) sectae. 
Quidam enim istorum solvunt insolubilia secundum quid 
(Notes to Appendix C) 
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et simpliciter. Et 1ta sunt omnes communiter loquentes 
de insolubilibus ••• • 
2. Reading uncertaino 
3. Aristotle , :Metaphysics r , 8, 1012bl3-15, 
Moe rbeke tr., contai ne d i n Sancti Thomae Aquinatis ••• 
In meta~hysicem Aristotelis commentar i a , f.-R. Cathala, 
ed. , 24 : "oontingit autem quo d fa.m a t um est omnibus 
talibus rationibus 1psas seC1psas destruere. 
4. MS adds duae, but del. 
-- --
5. Reading uncertain. 
6. 'HS leaves a blank space in the middle of a line. 
7. Aristotle, Metaphysics r, 8, 1012bl8, Moerbeke 
tr. , !£.£. ill• 
B. interlin. 
9. Reading uncertain. 
10. .£2.£.!• from omne . 
11. Prior Analytics I, 1, 24b26-30 . Cf. above, 
n. 53 to par. 141. 
12. ll§ ~ verum, ~ del . 
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Falsum dicitur a So rte 
• • • • • • 
136 
Falsum est. 
• • • • 5, 6, 21, 22, 23, 30, 33 34, 4o, 55, 56, 135 
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Falsum est hoc • • • • • • • • 234 
Hoc est falsum • • • • • 6, 12, 18, 225, 226 
Homo est al bus • • • • • • • 6, 132 
Homo est animal. • • • • • • 141, 160 
Homo est a sinus. • .18, 33, 58, 63, 139, 199, 258 
Iste term.inus 'disjunctiva' est falsa • • • 239 
Null a propositio est. • • • • • • 54 
Nulla proposi tio est negativa • • • • • 161 
Null um ! est proposit1o vera • • • • • 168 
Null us praeter Sortem dici t verum • • • • 257 
Omne dictum a Sorte est falsum. • • • • 141 
Omne verum est • • • • • • 63, 67, 69 -
Omne verum est verum. • • • • • • 83 
Omnia sunt falsa • • • • • • 138 
Omnia sunt vera. • • • • • • 156 
Omni s propositio est vera. • • • • 50, 52 
Per ;oeum, ego sum perjurus • • • • • 200 
Plato non dicit verum • • • • • • 162 
Passi bile est Sortem esse. • • • • • 94 
Propositio est • • • • 48, 53, 54, 135, 224 
Quodlibet istorum est verum • • • • • 37 
Quodlibet verur:i est aliquod is to rum. • • • 161 
Rex sedet • • • • • • • .9, 10, 11 
'Rex se det' est IJroposi tio falsa • • • 9, 11 
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1 Rex sedet' est propositio vera • • • 9, 10 
Rex se det vel disjunctiva prolata a te 
est t1b1 dubia • • • • • • • 252 
Sol us Sortes curri t • • • • • • • 162 
Sol us Sortes dici t falsum. • • • • • 139 
Sol us Sortes dici t talem voe em 1 !al sum' • • • 256 
Sol us Sortes d1c1 t verum • • • • 140, 162, 258 
Sortes audit falsum • • • • • • 110, 224 
So rte s di cit falsum • .3, 25, 28, 29, 45, 58, 61, 63 
109, 110, 135, 137' 164, 172 
173, 183, 187, 192, 205, 210, 246 
Sortes dic1t istam 1 Homo est a sinus 1 non 
signi fi can tem sicut est .  • • • • 58 
Sortes d1c1 t pro po si tionem falsam • • • • 172 
So rte s dici t talem vocem 'falsum' • • • • 194 
Sortes dic1 t verum • • • • • • • 162 
Sortes est . • • • • • • • • 73 
Sortes est perjurus • • • • • • • 201 
Sortes 1ntellegit An t1chr1 sturn . • • • • 105 
So rte s 1ntellegit falsum • • • • • 109, 224 
Sortes non d1c1 t falsum • • • • • • 212 
Sortes scribit falsum • • • • • 110, 224 
Tantu;n Sorte s dici t falsum • • • • • 225 
Tu e·s homo . • • • • • • 12, 16, 17 
1 Tu es homo' est 'Tu es homo' • • • • • 12 
Tu es homo et aliqua conjunctiva prolata 
a So rte est fal sa • • • • • • 253 
TUnica est alba. 
















• • • • • par. 110 
adhaerentia 
adhaerent1a conclusionis cogn1tae per 
praemissas • • • • • 
• • 126 




a gens liberum • • • • • • • 144 
agens proprium • • • • 112-113, 115, 186 
.Anaxagoras 
.Anaxagoras dicebat omni a esse fal sa. 
• 155-156 
ante ce den ter 
quaelibet proposi tio insolub::tl1s antecedenter 
significat se esse veram et falsa.m • 
• 3 
An ti chris tu s 
Anti christus non sit . • • • • • 88 Antichristum non esse 
• • • 92, 97 , 100 positio Antichristi in esse 
• • • • 97 
nihil est Antichristum esse in re quando 
Anticliristus non est 
• • • • • 98 
apparens 
apparens supposi tio pro complexo • • • 110 
app&renter 
non rea11ter, sed apparenter, sequitur 
• • 1 
auctoritas 
auctoritas Philosophi 
• • • • • 157 
auctoritates 
arguitur per auctoritates. 
• • • 77, 138 
oa.ni s 
animal iatrabile 
• • • • • • 185 
caeleste sidus • • • • • • • 185 




• • • .110 and ;passim 
causa 
causa est prius naturaliter se 1psa. 
• • 
84 
causa falsi ta tis signi 
• • • • • 
66 
causa finalis insolubilium • • • 1 
causa prim a 
• • • • • • • 94 
causa tota11s 1nsolub1lium • • • 109-110 
ca us a veri ta tis sign1 
• • • • 
66, 83 
Plato est causa Sorti s 
• • • • • 
84 
praesupponit tamquam prius veram causam • 66-67 
circulatio 
circulatio in causis essentialiter ordinatis. 53 
color 
nullum oranino habent colorem • • • 
complexum 
propositio per complexum comprehenditur • 
compossi bills 
ad invicem compossibilis • 
confuse 
stare confuse tantum. 
Cf. als~ 'praecognit1o'. 
consequentia 
• 
potest dici valere duplici ter: 





• • • 
• • • 
vel in se 
• • • 










contradictio formalis • • • • 102, 129 
contradictio solum est inter propositiones • 102 
con tradictoria 
in contradictoriis oportet tenninis stare 
pro eisdem 
• • • • • • 
54, 233 
de be re 
significare quod de bet 
• • • • • 
so 
decipere 
non potest dec1p1 
• • • • • 
def1n1 tio 
defin1t1o est convert1b111s cum definito. 
defin1t1o praedicatur de opposito def1n1t1 








eo quad aliqua propositio a11quid denotat, 
ipsum significat • • • • • • 186 
qu1dqu1d aliqua propositio vel ejus extremum 
denotat significare • • • • • 119 
descriptio 
descriptio 1nsolubil1s hypothetica • 




dictum autem propositionis non est propositio. 249 
d1ffic111s 
de diff1c111 solubilia 
• • • • • 1 
dis juncti va 
esse 
1 d1sjunct1va' praec1se ex impositione significat 
duas categoricas vel plures, mediante inter 
111as ista conjunctione 'vel' • • • 239 
in esse subjectivo vel objective • • • 97 
exclusiva 
dictio exclusiva addita subjecto attribuit 
praedicatum subjecto et excludit tantum 
pra.edicatum illius propositionis ab 
• 162 opposito subject1. • • • 
vis exclusivae • • • • • 
experimen tali s 
haec conclusio exper1mentalis est 
• 
minor videtur experimentalis 
• • 
fallacia 
fa11acia aequivocationis • • 86, fa11ac1a consequentia 
• • • fa11ac1a non causa ut causa • • 
• 
• • 200 
• • 149 
• • 134 
222-223, 254 
• 242-243 
• • 86 
224 
falsum 
falsum solum est privatio veri in propositione. 73 
fictio 
fictio est pone re quod proposi tio dicta a 
Sorte significat Sortem dicere aliam 
propositionem ab illa quam dicit. • 
figmentum 
fie;mentum illorum qui aliter nesciunt 
respondere ad insolub111a • • 
figura 
tertio mode primae figurae 
• • • 
filius 
sit Sortes filius Platonis 








finis est causa propter quam causata omnia ab 
a111s causis eoncausantur, et etiam ad quam 
omnes aliae causae ordinantur • • • 1 
finis hujus seientiae • • • • • 1 
finis illius materiae • • • • • 2 
firmi tas 
firmitas talis intellectus • • • • 59 
forma11s 
forma11s con tradictio 
• • • • 102, 129 
fonna11 ter 
formaliter arguitur • • • • 
fonnaliter inter se contradieentibus 
formali ter sequitur • • • • 
po test formali te r eonelu di • • 
frater 
frater studiosus • • • • 
Heraclitus 








incidentaliter dicit <J.UOd propositio dicta 









incompo ssi bile 
incompossibile quod al1quod aliud a se hoc 
extremum 'falsum' dat intellegere • 
incompossibilitas 
incompossibilitas earum simul in falsitate 
inductive 
inductive probatur 
• • • • 0 
inferiora 
de aliquibus sibi inferioribus praedicatur 











procedere in infinitum • • • 
• • 60 
• • • 
infinni tas 
1nfirmitas talium objectorum 
• • 
intellectus 
intellectus simplex semper est vera. 
intuitive 
intuitive cognitum 
Cf. also 'notitia'. 
jurare 
• • • • 
85, 124, 127 
• • 59 
• • 85 
• • 123 
qui jurat se esse perjurum bene jurat jurans 
hoc sol um • • • • • • • 198 
juvenes 
tractabo hujusmodi sophismata propter juvenes 
minus • • • • • • • • 162 
la pis 
species lapidis existens in anima Sortis. 
• 85 
11 bertas 
hoc sophisrna de li bertate. • • • • 147 
tota libertate non potest (soil. voluntas) 
habere velle respectu mali quatenus malum • 147 
226 
linea 
absolute impossibile est quod aliqua linea sit 
quae nee sit recta nee curva • 
• • 
Bo 
Bo recti tu do ad lineam • • • • • • 
medium 
videre per medium vel media 
· vi de re sine omni me dio • 
memoria 
memoria intellectiva. 
reducere ad memoriam. 
modus 





• • • 
• • • 
• • • 
• • 
• • • 
convenire in eadem natura in specie. • 
natura nihil agit frustra, nee agere potest 
ne cesse 
'necesse' prout deterrninaret 1nhaerent1am 
p ra e di cat 1 a d sub j e ct um • • • 
negatio 
qu1dquid negatio negat, negat universaliter 
et distributive • • • • • 
neutrum 












convenienter in obligationibus. 
materia obligationum. • • 
oppositum 
ex opposite consequentis sequitur 
ante ce den tis. • • • 
ex oppo si to sequitur opposi tu'Il. 
passio 






























20 , 75 
penna 
11 Quod habeo pennam. 
" • • • • 
pet1 tio 
pet1t1o princ1p11 • • • • 
pejerare 
bene penerare est male vel false ju rare 
praecogn1 tio 
praecogni t1o confusa et universalis. 
praedicatio 
praedicatio directa • 
• • • prae di ca tio 1ndirecta • • • 
praesent1a11ter 




• • • 
qua11 tercumque 
'qualitercumque' prout distribuit modes 
s1gn1f1 candi. • • • • 
reflexio 
reflexio actuum supra se • • • 
relatio 
aotus (~. un1end1 in propo::;i tione) vel 











includens • • • • • • 
res 
sicut 
eadem re1at10 speo1f1ca • • • • 
ea dem rel a tio in nume ro • • • • 
1mposs1bile est al1quam relationem manere 
deducto altero ejus extrema. o • 
nihil ••• est, nisi res 
• • • • 
'sicut' prout habitudinem denotat et 
proportionem inter rem significatam et 


















s1 gni fi oa re 
descr1pt1o 1llius termini 's1gn1f1care' • 
iste terminus 's1gn1f1care' convertitur cum 
1sto termino 'supponere' • • • 
significare prime • • • • • 
signif1care pr1nc1paliter. • • • 
significare recte • • • • • 
s1gnif1care secundario, ut partialiter • 
signi f1 ca tio 
tota11s s1gnif1cat1o propositionis • 
simul tas 
simultas requisita ad relativa. 
• 
sophista 
maxime (est aamittendus) a sophistis 
species 
species sens1b111s • • • • 
































materia supposi tionum • • • 
supposi tio materialis • • • 
• • 104 
• 104, 245 
suppos1t1o ordinata ad tale insolubile • • 110 
supposi tio personalis • • • • • 245 
suppo si tio sign1f1 ca ti va • • • • • 104 
syllogistice 
syllogi sti ce sequitur • • • • • 7 
syn ca tegorema 
syncategorema habens vim faciendi terminum 
sequentem sic supponere • • • • 61 
tempus 
tempus a1terius di cere 
• • • • • 89 ternpus ejusdem dice re 
• • • • • 89 tempus praesens. 
• • • • • • 89 tempus praeteri tum vel fu turum. 
• • • 89 
verb um uni us temporls 
• • • • • 89 
229 
terminus 
conclud1 t sic in tenninis. • • • • 78 
major in terminis 
• • • • • • 76 
minor in terminis 
• • • • • • 97 
opinio in terminis 
• • • • • • 
66 
tunica 
tunica est alba. 
• • • • • • 132 
unitas 
unitas termini infertur ex uni tate 
signi fi ca ti one • • • • • • 131 
variatio 
var1at10 me d.11 • • • • • • 208, 251 
moli tum . 
non est possibile aliquid esse volitum quad 
prius non fu.i t cogni tum • • • • 147 
voluntas 
voluntas est agens 11 berum • • • • 144 
VOX 
proprietas vocis 
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